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ABSTRACT 
Dwight S. Mears: Interned or Imprisoned?: The Successes and Failures of International 
Law in the Treatment of American Internees in Switzerland, 1943-45 
(Under the direction of Wayne E. Lee) 
 
During World War II, over 100,000 soldiers of various nationalities sought refuge 
in neutral Switzerland, including over 1,500 American airmen from damaged U.S. 
bombers.  As a result of the U.S. violations of Swiss neutrality and other external factors, 
the Swiss government was unwilling to apply the 1929 Geneva Convention prisoner of 
war protections to the interned U.S. airmen when they were punished for attempting 
escape.  The politicization of internment procedures resulted in a diplomatic stalemate in 
which the ambivalence of Swiss officials prolonged mistreatment of U.S. airmen in 
apparent repudiation of emerging customary international law.  The stalemate produced a 
range of responses, revealing that some Swiss officials and citizens disagreed with their 
government’s internment policies and sought to apply prisoner of war protections to 
internees.  Answering the question of how international law functioned in the scenario of 
Swiss internment demonstrates the cultural importance of Swiss adherence to 
humanitarian traditions, the process by which governments and individuals seek to 
influence aberrant state practice, and how many hidden influences combine to enforce 
customary rules. 
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I.          Introduction 
 Many questionable government actions during international conflicts in the 
twentieth century underscore the difficulty of creating and enforcing rules for wartime 
conduct.  Not only is the international law of armed conflict difficult to enforce, but the 
evolutionary nature of the law lags behind the infinite possibilities of combat, and 
loopholes in the law are often addressed only after they have been exploited.  Warfare 
generates new permutations of combatants and technology that are not codified clearly 
under existing international law, producing rules of conduct that emerge as customary 
practice.  The process of interpreting this gray area illustrates how governments behave in 
response to treaties, as well as how individuals and governments can take advantage of 
the inherent ambiguity of international law.  The contestation over these rules also 
demonstrates that multiple factors influence the enforcement of this type of international 
law, ranging from treaty obligations to actors at the individual level. 
In World War II, over 1,500 American airmen were interned by neutral 
Switzerland, the vast majority being U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) aircrews from 
damaged B-17 and B-24 bombers.  As required by the Hague Convention of 1907, “a 
neutral Power which receives on its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies 
shall intern them, as far as possible, at a distance from the theatre of war.”1  Many of 
                                                 
1
 Art. 11, The 1907 Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and 
Persons in Case of War on Land (The Hague: October 18, 1907), available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (accessed October 18, 2011).   
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these internees were treated well, but others who unsuccessfully attempted escape were 
punished well beyond the limits of emerging international law through imprisonment in 
punitive confinement camps.  The presumptive standard for the treatment of internees 
were the carefully codified protections for Prisoners of War (POWs) contained in the 
1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.  Unfortunately, 
that presumptive standard was not yet codified for internees, although many legal 
authorities at the time were making the argument that it was customary international law.   
Customary international law, which is as enforceable as treaty law, requires 
several elements.  According to legal scholar Shabtai Rosenne, customary international 
law “consists of rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of 
the belief that the law required them to act that way.”2  Thus, this type of law requires 
general state practice as well as opinio juris sive necessitates, or the belief that an act is a 
legal obligation.
3
  During World War II, many but not all states claimed that international 
law required treating internees the same as POWs.  Since there was not yet a complete 
consensus on the guarantee of explicit POW protections for internees, the rule was 
“emerging” rather than fully reified customary international law.  Switzerland was one 
state that refused to afford military internees the legal protections of POWs, and instead 
citied more precise written law.   
Exploring the diplomacy surrounding the internment of American airmen in 
Switzerland in 1944 reveals how the Swiss government negotiated emerging international 
                                                 
2
 Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law (New York: Oceana, 1984), 55. 
3
 Barry E. Carter, Phillip R. Trimble, and Allen S. Weiner, International Law (New York: NY, Aspen 
Publishers, 2007), 123-24. 
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law on prisoner treatment, methods used by individuals and governments to pressure the 
Swiss state into compliance, and the importance of humanitarian action for the Swiss 
culture.  In a larger context, the case study also demonstrates the many ways in which 
humanitarian law is influenced beyond the diplomacy between nations and the adherence 
to firm treaty obligations.  In some cases, compliance is first encouraged and enforced at 
the grassroots level before a rule is formally adopted by the state. 
The internment of American airmen in Switzerland during World War II began 
with a B-24 Liberator bomber nicknamed Death Dealer.  A high-altitude heavy bomber 
with a crew of ten, four engines, and a bomb load of six tons, the B-24 was a critical part 
of the Allied strategic bombing campaign in Europe.
4
  Death Dealer was assigned to the 
9
th
 Air Force in North Africa, and was considered a lucky ship after surviving the 
infamous August 1, 1943 raid on the oil refinement facilities in Ploesti, Romania, known 
as Operation Tidal Wave.  Of 177 aircraft on the mission, 53 were lost and 55 damaged.
5
  
In that raid, highly accurate anti-aircraft fire ripped through Death Dealer’s fuselage, 
disabling two of its engines and mortally wounding one of the machine gunners on the 
crew, Sgt. Paul Daugherty.  Despite a gaping wound in his chest, Sgt. Daugherty lived 
long enough to ask his pilot “Will you say a prayer for me?”  The pilot did, just before 
Daugherty died in his arms.
6
  
                                                 
4
 “Battle Log of the Liberators,” Popular Mechanics, September 1943, 28-29. 
5
 See Jay A. Stout, Fortress Ploesti: The Campaign to Destroy Hitler's Oil Supply (Havertown: Casemate 
Publishers, 2003), 76, and James Dugan and Carroll Stewart, Ploesti: The Great Ground-Air Battle of 1 
August 1943 (New York: Random House, 1962), 222. 
6
 Dugan, Ploesti, 216. 
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Less than two weeks later, early in the morning of August 13, 1943, Death Dealer 
went airborne from its base in North Africa and maneuvered into tactical formation with 
113 of its sister ships.  Its mission was to fly over the Alps and drop its incendiary 
payload on the Messerschmitt fighter aircraft factories in Wiener-Neustadt, Austria.  As it 
did for huge numbers of strategic bombers during the war, Death Dealer’s luck finally 
ran out.  One of the aircraft’s engines sputtered to a halt en route to the target, and 
another engine was violently shot out by 88 millimeter anti-aircraft fire while over the 
Messerschmitt factory.  The pilot, USAAF Lt. Alva Geron, struggled in vain to maintain 
altitude with only two engines.  He knew that the smoking aircraft was in trouble.  After 
deciding that he could not return to base in North Africa, Geron requested a heading to 
neutral Switzerland from his navigator.  Soon Death Dealer passed over a large lake at 
the northern foot of the Alps, which the navigator correctly identified as the border on the 
Rhine between Germany and Switzerland.  The ground already loomed too close for the 
crew to parachute from the crippled bomber, so Geron prepared for a crash-landing.  
Spotting an open farm field, Geron lowered the wheels as the remainder of the crew 
braced for impact.  The aircraft touched down and shook violently as it lumbered to a 
halt, plowing its nose into the earth as its forward landing gear collapsed.  Improbably, 
the entire crew survived.  Uncertain whether he was in enemy territory, Geron ordered 
the crew to burn the aircraft to prevent its capture by a foreign government.  As the crew 
set off explosive charges, curious farmers approached the bomber amid the drone of air 
raid sirens.  Geron asked them if he was in Switzerland, and requested to be taken to the 
nearest U.S. Consulate.  In fact Death Dealer had landed in Wil, a small village in the 
canton of St. Gallen in western Switzerland.  The navigator had accurately guided the 
      5 
doomed Death Dealer into a neutral country, and one can only imagine that the crew felt 
a palpable sense of relief at having avoided capture by the Germans.  Even neutral 
internment had its price, however.  The lieutenant and his crew were soon arrested by 
uniformed Swiss soldiers and escorted to a military garrison for interrogation and 
quarantine.
7
  Whether killed or captured by an enemy or neutral, only about one in four 
B-17 or B-24 bomber crews in 1943 completed the required twenty-five missions to 
finish a combat tour.
8
  Death Dealer's crew was the first of many to end up in 
Switzerland, where many of these airmen tested the limits of that country's commitment 
to neutrality and the rule of international law. 
Since the end of the war, historians have examined many aspects of Switzerland’s 
neutrality and role in World War II.  Initial perceptions of Swiss wartime policies were 
largely nationalistic and celebrated the Swiss spirit of resistance.  This attitude was 
exemplified by the works edited by Hans Rudolf Kurz, the official historian of the Swiss 
Federal Military Department.
9
  Kurz published volumes authored by the very officials 
who oversaw Swiss military policies during the war, and who clearly harbored motives to 
highlight the successes of their own efforts.  Kurz characterized Swiss policies as 
                                                 
7
 EX Report No. 247, dated March 16, 1944, decimal 142.761, MIS-X Section, POW Branch, War 
Department Military Intelligence Division, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force 
Base, Alabama (hereafter AFHRA), “Escape and Evasion World War II,” IRIS number 116830, and 
Stephen Tanner, Refuge from the Reich: American Airmen and Switzerland during World War II (Rockville 
Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 2000), 79-80.  Internees were only one segment of the military refugees in 
Switzerland; those who evaded capture and entered on foot, as well as those who escaped from belligerent 
prisoner of war camps were not interned but rather offered asylum. 
8
 Stewart H. Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2003), 9.  The required number of missions to complete a tour 
rose by the end of the war. 
9
 See Rudolf Juan, “The Military National Defence, 1939-45,” in Switzerland and the Second World War, 
ed. Georg Kreis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 197, and Hans Rudolf Kurz, Die Schweiz im Zweiten 
Weltkrieg: das grosse Erinnerungswerk an die Aktivdienstzeit 1939-45 (Thun: Ott Verlag, 1959). 
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necessary reactions to “the menace of military aggression” of belligerent neighbors such 
as Nazi Germany, and claimed that the German invasion of Switzerland was avoided only 
by virtue of the mobilization of the Swiss Army and “the preparedness of [the] entire 
nation [of Switzerland].”10   
The first serious debates over the Swiss actions during the war emerged in the 
early 1960s, and focused on the collaboration between Swiss government officials and 
the Nazis.
11
  In 1962, the Swiss government commissioned a study of Swiss wartime 
neutrality, the Bonjour Report, which dealt primarily with the impact of military 
decisions on foreign policy.
12
  Given the heavily restricted access to World War II 
records, the Bonjour Report “monopolized” Swiss history of the war until the revision of 
the Federal Archive Regulation in 1973.  This step eased restrictions on archive access, 
and in one historian’s view, “created the necessary conditions for the evolution of an 
independent historiography of Switzerland’s role in the Second World War.”13   
A debate over the Swiss Army’s role in the war emerged in 1974, following the 
publication of Max Frisch’s Dienstbüchlein (Service Booklet).  Frisch recounted his 
experiences as a self-described “reluctant soldier” in the Swiss Army during World War 
                                                 
10
 Hans Rudolf Kurz, “The Menace of Military Aggression against Switzerland during the Second World 
War,” translated from  ll e e  e s h e  er s he  l t r e ts hr  t 117 (Nov. 1951), p. 1, 32, available at 
the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.  
11
 See Alice Meyer, Anpassung oder Widerstand.  Die Schweiz zur Zeit des deutschen Nationalsozialismus 
(Frauenfeld: Verlag Huber, 1965). 
12
 Juan, “The Military National Defence, 1939-45,” 198. 
13
 Sacha Zala, “Governmental Malaise with History: From the White Paper to the Bonjour Report,” in 
Switzerland and the Second World War, ed. Georg Kreis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 328-29. 
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II.  The author refused to undergo officer training, a decision that angered his superiors.
14
 
Frisch questioned Switzerland’s highly militarized society and strict adherence to 
outdated traditions.  He also portrayed the popular story of the Swiss Army’s defensive 
National Redoubt strategy as a deterrent to German invasion as a myth, which eventually 
gave rise to the suggestion that Switzerland retained its autonomy because of its 
willingness to collaborate economically with the Nazis.
15
   
The importance of Switzerland’s economic ties with Germany were confirmed in 
1985 by Werner Rings’s Raubgold aus Deutschland (Looted Gold from Germany), which 
linked Switzerland’s independence to its financial relationship with the Axis.16  In 1989, 
the issue again entered the public sphere with Markus Heiniger’s Dreizehn Gründe: 
Warum die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg nich erobert wurde (Thirteen Reasons why 
Switzerland was not Conquered), which addressed the financial, strategic, and political 
benefits that Swiss neutrality provided to Berlin.
17
  Heiniger argued German leadership 
was unwilling to attack Switzerland because of “the economic, intelligence, and 
diplomatic usefulness of the Swiss Confederation.”  Therefore, he claimed that “an intact 
Switzerland, remaining stable under a state of emergency and military mobilization, 
would be of greater use to the German Reich than a conquered, damaged and fractured 
                                                 
14
 Max Frisch, Dienstbüchlein (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Taschenburch, 1974),  9, 11. 
15
 See Kreis, ed., Switzerland and the Second World War, 5, and Hugh R. Wilson, Switzerland: Neutrality 
as a Foreign Policy (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, 1974), 11-12. The National Redoubt strategy 
would apply during an invasion, and entailed surrendering indefensible parts of the country and moving the 
bulk of the Swiss Army into alpine fortresses that controlled key roads.   
16
 See Kreis, Switzerland and the Second World War, 3-4, and Werner Rings, Raubgold aus Deutschland : 
die "Golddrehscheibe" Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Muenchen: Artemis, 1985). 
17
 See Neville Wylie, Review: “‘Life Between the Volcanoes,’ Switzerland during the Second World War,” 
The Historical Journal 38 (Sep. 1995), 760, and Markus Heiniger, Dreizehn Gründe: Warum die Schweiz 
im Zweiten Weltkrieg nich erobert wurde (Zurich: Limmat Verlag, 1989). 
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Switzerland.”18  He also noted a historiographical void on the oral history of the war, and 
claimed that such history “has remained a foreign concept, in so far as it might go beyond 
the often idealized self-portraits in more or less official memoirs.”  In particular, he called 
for more works on the experiences of Swiss soldiers and the refugees who crossed Swiss 
borders.
19
 
Although historians had already uncovered much of Switzerland’s controversial 
wartime actions prior to the 1990s, the debate remained largely in academic circles until 
the release of the U.S. government’s “Eizenstat Report” in 1997.  The Eizenstat Report 
bluntly accused Switzerland of using neutrality as “a pretext for avoiding moral 
considerations,” and of prolonging the war by financing the Axis.20  The Swiss were 
labelled as sharing culpability for the Holocaust as a result of receiving “tainted” gold 
looted from Holocaust victims.  Private citizens targeted the Swiss banking system for 
retribution, and a boycott of Swiss banking in New York City was threatened.
21
  The 
Eizenstat Report also triggered an outpouring of polemics defending Switzerland's 
conduct in the Second World War.  Amid this furor, the Swiss government sought to 
influence the debate by commissioning an Independent Committee of Experts (ICE) to 
render an impartial verdict on wartime collaboration.  The ICE found that, outside of 
                                                 
18
 Heiniger, Dreizehn Gründe, 233. 
19
 Ibid., 241-42. 
20
 “Major Conclusions and Policy Implications,” in U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and  
Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II (U.S. Dept. of State, 
1997), available at: http://fcit.usf.edu/Holocaust/resource/gold/GoldMenu.htm (accessed October 19, 2011).  
See also Hans Senn, “Defending Switzerland: The Impact of Armed Neutrality in World War II,” in 
Switzerland Under Siege, 1939-1945:   Neutral Nat o ’s Stru  le  or Surv val, ed. Leo Schelbert 
(Rockport: Picton Press, 2000), 15.   
21
 Angelo M. Codevilla, Between the Alps and a Hard Place: Switzerland in World War II and Moral 
Blackmail Today (Washington D.C.: Regnery, 2000), x. 
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scholarly circles, “hardly any critical questions were posed regarding the past,” which 
resulted in an “idealised collective memory” of the war.22 
The historiography of Swiss military internment of American airmen was 
originally a part of the Swiss grand narrative that emphasized the accomplishments of 
Swiss humanitarian efforts during the war.  In the 1970s, one author naively related that 
American airmen in Switzerland “had a splendid time, except when they suffered from 
boredom and homesickness.”23  The subject remained overshadowed by the issues of 
Swiss civilian refugee and financial policies during the war until the 1990s, when the 
release of archival records permitted a more thorough investigation.  Swiss historian 
Peter Kamber’s Schüsse auf die Befreier (1993) was the first in-depth study of the 
American internee experience.  Kamber described a de facto war between Swiss air 
defenses and Allied airplanes, and asked “what [does Switzerland] stand for and who are 
we that we could dare to shoot those who liberated us?”24  He also described the 
mistreatment of interned Allied aviators in punishment camps, questioned the legality of 
internment policies, and criticized the denial of POW protections to internees.
25
  
Kamber’s work was followed by Olivier Grivat’s Internés en Suisse (1995), another 
Swiss history which placed the internment of American airmen in the context of all 
interned nationalities.  Grivat drew similar conclusions about the internment of 
                                                 
22
 Independent Commission of Experts (ICE) Switzerland – Second World War, Switzerland, National 
Socialism and the Second World War (Zürich: Pendo, 2002), 497. 
23
 Heinz K. Meier, Friendship under Stress: U.S.-Swiss Relations 1900-1950 (Bern: Herbert Lang & Co, 
1970), 299. 
24
 Peter Kamber, Schüsse auf die Befreier: Die "Luftguerilla" der Schweiz gegen die Alliierten 1943-45 
(Zurich: Rotpunktverlag, 1993), 7. 
25
 Ibid., 221. 
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Americans and blamed poor oversight of Swiss Army officials in charge of internment 
camps.  He faulted Swiss inspectors for ignoring practices that apparently violated the 
Geneva Conventions, and instead issuing inaccurate reports that characterized internment 
conditions as “idyllic.”26  He claimed that “Bern sinned through naivety or blindness” in 
its dealings with coercive foreign powers, and the legacy of its wartime actions were a 
mixture of “cowardice and compromise.”27   
In the 2000s, the first U.S. authors published works that dealt exclusively with 
American internees in Switzerland, such as Stephen Tanner’s Refuge from the Reich 
(2000) and Cathryn Prince’s Shot from the Sky (2003).28  Both works concentrated on the 
oral history of American internees, including combat experiences, internment, and escape 
or repatriation.  Prince accused Swiss government officials of denying American 
internees the protections of international law, but stopped short of analyzing the military 
tribunals of American airmen or other legal implications of internment.  American 
internees of Switzerland are also mentioned in several works about the larger air battle 
for Europe, but the scope of these works afforded little room for protracted discussion of 
the internment experience.
29
  The polarization of the Swiss literature in the wake of the 
Eizenstat Report has influenced some portrayals of American internees in Switzerland: 
                                                 
26
 Olivier Grivat, Internés en Suisse 1939-1945 (Chapelle-sur-Moudon: Editions Ketty & Alexandre, 1995), 
64-65. 
27
 Ibid., 14. 
28
 See Stephen Tanner, Refuge from the Reich: American Airmen and Switzerland during World War II 
(Rockville Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 2000), and Cathryn J. Prince, Shot from the Sky: American POWs in 
Switzerland (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2003). 
29
 See Rob Morris, Untold Valor: Forgotten Stories of American Bomber Crews over Europe in World War 
II (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books Inc, 2006), and Donald L. Miller, Masters of the Air: America's 
Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
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Stephen Halbrook’s Target Switzerland (1998) cites only effusive statements about Swiss 
internment from two American internees, in what could only be described as a 
mischaracterization.
30
   
Thus several American and Swiss authors have mentioned the questionable 
internment policies of the Swiss government, but none fully contextualize the problem 
within the malleability of developing customary international law.  Most works on the 
larger debate over Swiss wartime conduct mention Swiss military internment only in the 
aggregate, and therefore American internees are subordinated to the superior numbers of 
many other interned nationalities.
31
  This study significantly rewrites this story through a 
more thorough analysis of sources in the U.S., Swiss, and International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) Archives, complicating the current understanding of Swiss actions 
during the war by including perspectives of both internees and their captors.  
Furthermore, I demonstrate that the Axis and Allies concurrently asserted pressure on the 
Swiss, in terms of both internment and other wartime concerns.  Perhaps most crucially, I 
also add an extensive framework of legal analysis that has yet to appear in any accounts 
of Swiss internment.   
Of particular use in understanding how Switzerland navigated its way between the 
competing pressures of diplomacy, military threat, and international law is a 
consideration of how law functions in a society.  A substantial and growing body of work 
                                                 
30
 See Stephen P. Halbrook, Target Switzerland : Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II (Rockville 
Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 1998), 203. 
31
 American military internees numbered only 1,517 airmen, while approximately 104,000 military 
refugees were interned over the course of the war.  See “Index,” undated, Swiss Internees Association 
Archives, Lakewood, NJ (hereafter SIAA), Prince, Shot from the Sky, 24, and Independent Commission of 
Experts Switzerland – Second World War, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era (Bern: ICE, 1999), 
21. 
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on law and culture informs the analysis presented here.  The field was pioneered by 
nineteenth century anthropologists with legal training such as Lewis Morgan and Henry 
Maine.  By the early twentieth century, the ethnographic fieldwork of Bronislaw 
Malinowski shifted the discipline from a focus on jurisprudence to all forms of disputes 
and social control.  In the 1950s, scholars such as Max Gluckman and Victor Turner 
founded the processual approach, or the study of law “as process rather than as rules and 
outcomes.”  The most influential scholar of this field is Laura Nader, whose book The 
Disputing Process: Law in Ten Societies (1978) studied different types of dispute 
settlement in various cultures.
32
  As expressed by Lawrence Rosen, law is a “cultural 
domain” which can help to “understand how a culture is put together and operates.”33  
Although this field rarely focuses on disputes over international law, my analysis of the 
legal policies of Swiss internment nevertheless examines a similar “push and pull of 
contestation” during cultural negotiations over how the law is interpreted and what it 
means.
34
   
By presenting the internment of Americans in Switzerland as a case study, I hope 
to demonstrate what the rule of international law meant to Swiss officials, how 
contestation over the law influenced decisions made well below the architects of legal 
policy, and how similar negotiation of the law can occur in contemporary conflicts.  
Although these emerging customary rules were not yet practiced universally, many Swiss 
fervently believed that they were enforceable.  It mattered little to them whether practices 
                                                 
32
 Dorothey H. Bracey, Exploring Law and Culture (Long Grove IL: Waveland Press, 2006), 13-16. 
33
 Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 4-5. 
34
 Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, “The Cultural Lives of Law,” in Law in the Domains of Culture 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998), 8-9. 
      13 
conformed precisely to rules codified in treaty law, but rather that practices accorded with 
cultural expectations of humanitarian principles.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
II.  Historical Context of Internment 
 
The precedent for internment of belligerent aircraft and their crews was 
established well prior to the arrival of Death Dealer in Switzerland.  International law 
defined the obligations of neutral Switzerland to intern belligerents.  Neutrality, defined 
by T.J. Lawrence in 1925 as “the condition of those states which in time of war take no 
part in the contest, but continue pacific intercourse with the belligerents,” has a particular 
and evocative meaning when discussed in the context of Swiss history.
1
  Switzerland 
pioneered much of the contemporary international law governing neutrality, making the 
practice one of the defining characteristics of the Swiss state. 
Switzerland’s neutrality during World War II was the continuation of a policy of 
longstanding or “perpetual neutrality” that had its roots prior to Switzerland’s existence 
as a federated state.  Switzerland began in the fourteenth century as a defensive alliance, 
called the Eidgenossenschaft or Swiss Confederation.
2
  The Swiss Confederation shifted 
toward neutrality after its catastrophic loss to the French at the Battle of Marignano, near 
Milan, Italy in 1515.  The defeat was the worst in the history of the Confederation, and 
convinced the Swiss that they were best suited for defensive wars.  The policy of 
                                                 
1
 Thomas J. Lawrence, A Handbook of Public International Law (London: Percy H. Winfield, 1925), 149.  
2
 James M. Luck, A History of Switzerland: The First 100,000 Years: Before the Beginnings to the Days of 
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neutrality was formalized after the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648.3  Switzerland’s 
neutral position was further cemented by Allied guarantees of perpetual Swiss neutrality 
in 1815 after violations of Swiss territory occurred during the War of the Sixth Coalition 
against Napoleon.
4
  In addition, the Swiss Constitution of 1848 made Switzerland a 
federative state instead of a confederation, providing a central government and army that 
allowed the political declaration and enforcement of neutrality.
5
   
In the modern era, Swiss obligations as an “active neutral” included (and still 
include) providing humanitarian assistance to belligerents as a protecting power, hosting 
international conferences on humanitarian law, and receiving both civilian and military 
wartime refugees.  These services all set Switzerland apart from other neutral states in 
global conflicts.
6
  The Swiss custom of interning foreign belligerents took several 
centuries to develop, as the policy entailed more than simply humanitarian concerns.  In 
the Evangelical Conference of 1644, the Swiss decided to deny asylum to foreign armies 
because of the danger that a pursuing army would follow the interned forces and fight 
them in Switzerland.
7
  In 1709, approximately 4,000 Austrian cavalry troops trespassed 
on Swiss territory and highlighted the weaknesses of the existing policies governing 
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Swiss responses to belligerents.  Despite engagement of the Austrians by Swiss forces, 
French General du Bourg accused the Swiss of aiding the Austrian cavalry by allowing 
them to evade and fight another day.
8
  This jeopardized Swiss neutrality by appearing to 
provide a military advantage to one belligerent.  New policies were developed in reaction 
to this problem, namely disarming and interning belligerents to preclude their further use 
in a conflict.  Thus, the original motive behind internment was to remove the military 
advantage of a belligerent for the duration of the conflict, no different than if the interned 
personnel were prisoners of war.  This also created an active obligation to ensure that the 
interned personnel remained in custody, since neglecting this duty would render the 
internment pointless and again expose Switzerland to charges of aiding one side in the 
conflict.   
Switzerland first tested its interment policy during the War of 1859, or the Second 
Italian War of Independence.  The Swiss Federal Council issued instructions to the Swiss 
Army to disarm any belligerent troops “pushed on Swiss territory,” and intern them in 
“the interior of Switzerland.”  This decree was the first instance in history in which a 
government stipulated the requirements of a neutral country toward belligerent troops 
during international armed conflicts.  The decree was soon enforced when seven Italian 
soldiers crossed the Swiss border, soon followed by a contingent of 650 Austrian 
soldiers.  All parties were interned in castles and military barracks, and were released 
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upon the conclusion of the conflict.  The pro-rated costs of internment were assessed as 
21,296 Swiss Francs for Austria, and 344 Swiss Francs for France and Sardinia.
9
 
The Swiss government next resorted to internment of belligerents in 1871 during 
the Franco-Prussian War, when nearly 88,000 soldiers of the First French Army, known 
as the Bourbaki Army, crossed into Switzerland at Les Verrières and were disarmed and 
interned by the Swiss military.  French General Clinchant brokered an agreement with the 
Swiss government that indemnified France for the costs of internment, to be settled at the 
end of the conflict.  The massive number of internees forced the Swiss to distribute the 
internees among 188 villages in nearly every canton, where internees were under the 
administration of local military authorities.
10
  Swiss guards were detailed to ensure a 
minimum ratio of one guard for every ten internees.  The Federal Council gave the Swiss 
Army jurisdiction over internees who committed criminal offenses, including escape 
attempts.  Internees who were caught outside their assigned districts were confined at the 
criminal garrison at Luziensteig near the border with Liechtenstein.  The cost of the 
internment was assessed at the end of the conflict in 1872, and came to over 12,000,000 
Swiss Francs.
11
 
Although the obligation for a neutral state to intern belligerents only existed under 
customary international law in 1871, the example of the internment of the Bourbaki 
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Army directly influenced subsequent written law of armed conflict conventions.
12
  The 
1874 Conference of Brussels drafted articles listing the obligation of a neutral power to 
intern belligerents “at a distance from the theatre of war”; to provide for basic 
humanitarian needs such as “food, clothing, and relief,” and to accommodate the need to 
transport wounded troops through neutral territory.  Neutral states were authorized to 
house internees “in camps and even confine them in fortresses or in places set apart for 
this purpose.”  The Brussels Declaration also listed the requirement that “The Geneva 
Convention applies to sick and wounded interned in neutral territory,” which referenced 
the largely inadequate Geneva Convention of 1864.
13
  Although the Brussels Declaration 
was not ratified, the 1899 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land soon codified these requirements verbatim into treaty law.
14
  These same 
requirements were repeated in the 1907 Hague Convention (V) respecting the Rights and 
Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land.
15
  In addition, the 1907 
Hague Convention added neutral responsibilities such the use of force to prevent 
belligerents from utilizing neutral territory and the equal application of trade restrictions 
to all belligerent powers.
16
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Neutral governments again interned soldiers of belligerent powers during World 
War I, a conflict which also introduced the airplane as an instrument of war.  The right of 
a neutral state to prevent belligerent aircraft from violating its airspace is an extension of 
the right of territorial integrity, which was also in flux during this period.
17
  Neutrals 
restricted entry of belligerent aircraft, as jurists of the period realized that failure to do so 
would lead to aerial attacks over neutral airspace and expose the cities below to “falling 
bombs, projectiles and disabled airships.”18  As expressed by one author, “the force of 
gravity, omnipresent and relentless, makes any vertical limit to sovereignty over the air-
space impossible in a time of war.”19  Therefore, during World War I neutral states 
pioneered the practice of repelling belligerent aircraft with hostile force, and in the case 
of border violations they interned both belligerent aircraft and their crews.  By the end of 
the war most neutral states generally acknowledged and adhered to the rule, although 
there were some exceptions in terms of state practice.
20
   
During the war, arguments were raised that the obligation to intern belligerent 
aircraft should not apply in cases of erroneous overflight, force majeure—a superior force 
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such as inclement weather—or aircraft in distress.21  For example, the Swiss Neutrality 
Ordinance of August 4, 1914 gave the Federal Military Department or the commander of 
the Swiss Army the discretion to release any aircrew that violated Swiss territory 
“through force majeure and when there appears to be no reprehensible intention or 
negligence.”22  The force majeure exception was invoked by at least one neutral, Norway, 
when they released the crew of a German airship that landed near Stavanger in May 
1916.
23
    
Despite the intention of several neutrals to follow the force majeure exception, 
these cases were judged to be “too indefinite to differentiate from intentional entrance” 
by belligerent aircraft.  Therefore, most neutral states instead adopted a strict 
interpretation of the obligation to intern.
24
  Thus, although Swiss officials had the 
authority to release airmen under the force majeure exception, they declined to do so on 
several occasions, ostensibly for fear that the loophole would be invoked as a pretext for 
political reasons.  In 1915, French pilot Georges Madon became disoriented in fog and 
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landed his aircraft in Porrentruy, in the north-western canton of Jura.  The Swiss interned 
both Madon and his aircraft, a practice they repeated later in the war.
25
 
Although only fifteen aircraft and their crews were interned in Switzerland during 
World War I, at least three American pilots were among this small population.
26
  His 
propeller damaged by enemy fire, Second Lieutenant James Ashenden crash-landed his 
French Nieuport 28 fighter in Solothurn Canton on June 24, 1918.
27
  Lieutenants Thomas 
Fuller and Virgil Brookhart of the 135
th
 Aero Squadron of the U.S. Air Service were also 
interned on September 12, 1918, after their mission to adjust artillery near Montsec, 
France went awry.  The aviators flew their single engine De Havilland DH-4 airplane into 
a cloud bank, became disoriented, and elected to fly southwest in the hopes of finding an 
airdrome with better weather conditions.
28
  The wind blew the aircraft to the east into 
Switzerland, and the Americans unknowingly set down just over the Swiss border, near 
Fahy.
29
  When they landed the airmen noted that “the country looked strange,” and they 
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were quickly surrounded by Swiss soldiers and farmers.  When Fuller and Brookhart tried 
to take off the Swiss soldiers shot into their engine block and quickly captured them.
30
      
The American lieutenants were not offered release under the force majeure 
exception, but rather presented the stark alternatives of going free on “parole” by giving 
their word of honor not to escape, or choosing incarceration in prison.  Brookhart chose 
parole, whereas Fuller “did not fancy the prospect of being interned in Switzerland for 
the period of the War” and so refused to disavow escape.  Fuller was sent to the military 
prison at Andermatt, where he was confined on the fourth floor of the facility.  The 
lavatory on his cell block had an exterior window, and so Fuller devised a plan to cut 
apart his bed sheets and fashion a makeshift rope with which to escape.  Unfortunately, 
Fuller’s rope had insufficient tensile strength to hold his weight, and when it snapped the 
lieutenant plummeted 30 feet to the ground and was knocked unconscious.  He was soon 
captured, and was kept confined until the signing of the armistice.
31
  Fuller was perhaps 
the first American internee to attempt escape from neutral Switzerland, a harbinger of 
events to come in the next world war. 
The sovereignty of airspace was codified in international law after World War I in 
the Air Navigation Convention of October 13, 1919.  The Air Navigation Convention 
recognized state sovereignty of the air above both territory and territorial seas, but was 
not binding on neutrals or belligerents during wartime.
32
  However, a similar declaration 
later appeared in the 1923 General Report of the Hague Commission of Jurists upon the 
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Revision of the Rules of Warfare.
33
  The Commission of Jurists also repeated the 
inviolable obligation to intern all belligerent aircraft and aircrews, stating that “A neutral 
government shall use the means at its disposal to intern any belligerent military aircraft 
which is within its jurisdiction after having alighted for any reason whatsoever, together 
with its crew and the passengers, if any.”34  Similarly, the 1939 Draft Convention on 
Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War required a neutral state “to 
intern [belligerent military aircraft] after they have alighted, whether the landing be 
voluntary or forced, together with persons and property on board.”35  Despite this 
apparent consensus, the 1939 Pan-American Conference adopted a resolution that 
permitted an exception to internment of belligerent aircraft “in cases in which the landing 
is made because of proven distress,” the same argument already settled by state practice 
during World War I.  According to one period observer, “such an exception is likely, in 
actual practice, to be subject to wide abuse.”36   
The duty of a neutral to intern belligerent aircraft had percolated through the 
American media and into the public by the start of World War II, and even appeared in 
American media stories describing Swiss internment.  In a story published in the New 
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York Times in May 1944, the newspaper listed “the international rules governing the 
internment of belligerent fliers who violate neutral territory,” and explained that “a 
neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal to intern any belligerent military 
aircraft which is within its jurisdiction after [the aircraft lands] for any reason 
whatsoever.”37  The article made no mention of the fact that when neutral itself, the U.S. 
government declined to intern a belligerent Royal Canadian Air Force plane that force-
landed in New York in 1940.  The U.S. Attorney General allowed to aircraft to depart, an 
apparent invocation of the now-outdated force majeure exception.
38
  This was but one of 
many instances where political pressure influenced the practice of internment in neutral 
countries during World War II. 
Most neutral European countries interned American airmen during World War II, 
although the length and type of internment differed significantly depending on the state’s 
political system, location, and the fortunes of war.  The two states that hosted the vast 
majority of American internees were Switzerland and Sweden, largely due to their stricter 
adherence to internment obligations, liberal policies of asylum, and central locations in 
Europe near American bombing raids against Germany.  According to one American 
airman based at the Eighth U.S. Air Force in England, crews assigned to bomb Germany 
were given explicit instructions about which neutral countries to land in, in the event of a 
major malfunction or crippling combat damage.  An Eighth Air Force airman recalled 
similar instructions that “if you were in Northern Germany, try for Sweden,” and “[if you 
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were in] Southern Germany, try for Switzerland.”39  In November 1943, an Eighth Air 
Force briefing officer informed his aircrews that “if you get into trouble . . . and you 
don’t think you can make it back . . .  here are the coordinates of place you can land in 
Sweden, and Sweden is neutral and they will intern you.”40  In March 1944, another 
Eighth Air Force briefing officer told the airmen of the 44
th
 Bombardment Group that 
their target, Friedrichshafen, was only “about 10 miles across the lake from Switzerland.”  
Therefore, he advised them that “if your aircraft is badly damaged, and you don’t think 
you can make it back to base, or if you have wounded on board that need urgent 
attention, you should seek sanctuary in that neutral country.”  As an afterthought, he 
added “just be sure that you can justify such an action, if you’re ever called on to do 
so.”41 
Switzerland’s location and its reputation of humanitarian service made it a 
favorite refuge for imperiled USAAF aircrews.  A total of 166 USAAF aircraft crashed or 
landed in Switzerland during the war, and five other USAAF aircrews bailed out over the 
country while their bombers flew on and crashed elsewhere.
42
  Both the airmen who 
landed and those who parachuted were interned, as they were all presumed to be on 
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belligerent missions.
43
  A total of 1,517 American airmen were interned in Switzerland 
during the war, in addition to 225 American evadees and escaped prisoners of war who 
sought refuge but were not interned.  Therefore, there were 1,742 American military 
refugees in Switzerland, but there were never this many held all at once due to 
repatriations and successful escapes.
44
  The American military refugees in the country 
peaked at just over 1,200 personnel in the summer of 1944.
45
   
Generally the Swiss adhered strictly to internment obligations, although they were 
occasionally influenced by German political pressure.  One such case was when fifteen 
German airmen who were shot down over Switzerland in June 1940 were quietly released 
from internment as a political concession.  The deal was brokered in spite of the fact that 
several Swiss pilots were killed while intercepting the aircraft.
46
  The German aircraft 
were also returned, and no expenses of internment were assessed.
47
  In contrast, media 
reports from the same period promised that the interned German aviators “will be 
interned for the duration of the war.”48  Early German and French internees were also 
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released after the fall of France under the justification that the two countries were no 
longer engaged in armed conflict and therefore not belligerents.  This decision invited 
some criticism by the media, who noted that World War II was “not a simple Franco-
German war.”49  After the American entry into the war American internees were not 
released unless an exchange was arranged that met with the approval of Germany.  One 
such exchange resulted in the repatriation of seven American internees against seven of 
their German counterparts in March 1944.
50
  The remaining American internees were not 
exchanged until February and March of 1945 when the end of the war in Europe was 
inevitable.
51
 
Neutral Sweden also performed protecting power duties during the war.  Like 
Switzerland, Sweden had a longstanding tradition of neutrality that began in 1812 and 
largely resulted from defeats in the Napoleonic Wars.
52
  However, Swedish neutrality 
differed from the Swiss model in that it was somewhat more flexible and capable of 
modification in the face of changing political realities.
53
  Such was the case in World War 
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II, when the German conquest of Norway put the Swedish shipping lanes under German 
control.  Sweden thereafter consented to the overflight of German airplanes and the 
transport of German troops and war material through its territory, concessions granted in 
the face of crippling German economic pressure.
54
  In light of this collaboration with the 
Axis, it is not surprising that Sweden initially interned all Allied aviators in order to avoid 
the threat of reprisal.   
One USAAF aircrew that landed in Sweden in April 1944 attempted to avoid 
internment by explaining that they were on a non-combat mission.  This excuse was an 
invocation of the same legal argument from World War I that aircraft on training flights 
were not overtly belligerent, and therefore did not require internment.  However, by 
World War II this argument was seen as a pretext to subvert the law, and the claim was 
flatly rejected by Swedish authorities.  The pilot explained that “I don’t think it does any 
good to tell the Swedes you are on an air-sea rescue mission; you get interned anyway.”55  
The official Swedish policy on belligerent aircrew was to intern both aviators and aircraft 
until the end of the conflict.
56
  A total of 141 USAAF aircraft crashed or landed in 
Sweden during the war, and 1,218 American airmen were interned.
57
  However, Sweden 
eventually adapted to the Allied successes of 1943 and modified its neutrality policies 
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accordingly, first by agreeing to curb trade with Germany.
58
  Soon U.S. officials reported 
that “the Swedes appear anxious to be rid of interned U.S. aircraft and to be endeavoring 
to find a formula for releasing them without undue embarrassment to themselves.”59  In 
late 1944 the Swedes decided to release 500 interned USAAF airmen without a reciprocal 
exchange of Axis internees.  The quid pro quo was the sale of nine interned B-17 
bombers and four P-51 fighters to Sweden, as well as a promise of 50 more P-51s.
60
  
Swedish diplomats publicly claimed that the release of internees was “in anticipation of 
any Germans who may come into Sweden,” implying that the repatriated Americans left 
an available credit for any future German internees.
61
  The softening of Swedish 
internment rules to the benefit of the Allies was likely due to the relative certainty of an 
Allied victory by this point in the war. 
Other neutral states interned belligerents less consistently than the Swiss and the 
Swedes.  In the case of Ireland, internment policies were frequently bent to accommodate 
the Allies.  Only one American aviator was interned in Ireland throughout the entire war, 
despite the fact that at least 260 other American airmen landed in the country during the 
same period.  The lone American internee, Pilot Officer Roland “Bud” Wolfe, was a 
volunteer in the Royal Air Force’s Eagle Squadron.62  Wolfe was interned in November 
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1941 after his Spitfire crashed near Moneydarragh.  He made the mistake of fabricating a 
parole slip and then attempting escape dishonorably, a decision that invited severe 
political reciprocity after he was recaptured.
63
   
With the exception of Pilot Officer Wolfe, other American aircrews were quickly 
released in accordance with a secret agreement between Ireland and the United States.  
The U.S. aircrew were instructed to “advise Eire authorities that [their] plane was 
performing training or [a] ferry flight” in order to avoid internment.64  The excuse was so 
well known that Irish officials even informed USAAF aircrews that they were on non-
combat missions rather than vice versa.  One USAAF bomber that drifted off course and 
landed in Ireland in February 1944 was offered such assistance.  The pilot, 2
nd
 Lt. Carl 
Ellinger, was informed by the Irish airfield commander that “[I am] very sorry but as a 
matter of formality [I] must ask, ‘It was a non-operational flight, was it not?’”  Ellinger 
“told him he was right,” and as a result his crew was promptly fed, his plane was 
refueled, and he “took off shortly thereafter.”65   
Spain, under the control of Francisco Franco, was initially neutral and then 
changed its status to “non-belligerent” upon the imminent fall of France to the Germans 
in June 1940.
66
  Although the change still meant non-participation in hostilities, it 
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represented an ideological shift from the preclusion of warfare under neutrality to the 
temporary choice of non-participation.
67
  In the words of one observer, this was “an 
intermediary position between belligerency and neutrality.”68  Thus, it presaged possible 
entry into the conflict, in which case Franco openly indicated that he would side with 
Germany.
69
  Although Franco allowed Spanish recruits to openly serve in the German 
military in the so-called Spanish “Blue Division,” he also allowed the release of Allied 
airmen who entered the country.
70
   
Spain nominally interned Allied troops, although internees were openly allowed 
to repatriate by travelling to the British territory of Gibraltar.
71
  This was due to what 
U.S. officials called “exceedingly good relations between [the U.S. embassy] and the 
Spanish Air Ministry.”  According to the U.S. Naval attaché in Spain, “the release of 
aviation personnel has always been treated by the Spaniards as different from the release 
of other members of other belligerent forces,” a distinction he attributed to the Spanish 
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sense of chivalry and “the fraternity of aviators.”72  Spanish officials reportedly released 
most U.S. military refugees into the custody of an officer detailed from the U.S. military 
attaché’s office, who then drove them across Spain to Gibraltar.73 
Although Spain publicly claimed to release equal numbers of Axis and Allied 
internees, U.S. officials negotiated a secret policy wherein they reportedly obtained the 
release of a greater number of Allied internees.
74
  Spain thus released at least 1,100 
Allied airmen between November 1942 and June 1944, although less than a quarter of 
these personnel were internees.
75
  Spain was also the primary destination of Allied 
escaped prisoners of war and evadees in Western Europe prior to the liberation of France.  
An estimated 30,000 escaped Allied military and civilian personnel transited through the 
country during the war.
76
  However, not all of these Allied military refugees were well-
received; many were first imprisoned in a concentration camp called Miranda de Ebro in 
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northern Spain until diplomats intervened on their behalf.
77
  According to the ICRC, 
inspections revealed that conditions in Miranda were “very precarious,” and provisions 
such as food and clothing were “unsatisfactory for a long time.”78 
 German officials in Spain noticed the exodus of Allied military refugees in 
August 1942.  As a result, they formally protested “the action of Spain in allowing large 
numbers of Allied escaped prisoners to depart.”  Paradoxically, they also noted that the 
number of Allied military refugees was “greater than the number of Spaniards in the 
‘Blue Division.’”79  The comparison was apparently intended to warn Spanish officials 
that violations of neutrality were only tolerated so long as they were more or equally 
advantageous to the Axis.  According to the U.S. Ambassador in Spain, the Germans 
“protested and fumed,” but “all the satisfaction they got was the release of a mere handful 
of their own aviators.”80 
At least thirty-seven USAAF or US Navy aircraft crashed or were interned in 
Spain during the war.  In early 1943, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the sale of 
all “non-confidential” force-landed military aircraft to the Spanish government.  The 
policy was reportedly intended as a gesture to induce Spain to release interned aircrews 
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“in connection with [the airplane] sales.”81  Accordingly, at least three interned USAAF 
C-47 aircraft and one Navy PBY Catalina “flying boat” were sold to Spain for $100,000 
each and put into service with Iberia Airlines.
82
  The policy governing aircraft sales to 
Spain did not initially allow the sale of bombers or fighters, ostensibly because U.S. 
officials were unwilling to risk that these aircraft might eventually be used against Allied 
forces in the event of Spain joining the Axis.  Even the sale of the transport aircraft was 
contingent on Spanish assurances that Germany no longer had holdings in Iberia Airlines.  
The War Department later reversed its position and offered to sell at least five interned B-
24 bombers to Spain for conversion into passenger aircraft.  The transaction was 
personally approved by the commanding general of the USAAF, who set the same sale 
price as the transports: $100,000 per aircraft.
83
 
The decision of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to promote the release of interned 
airmen in Spain was part of a larger Allied effort to create a new category for certain 
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interned aircrew under international law.  In effect, U.S. officials sought to reclassify 
distressed aircrew as non-belligerents, in a similar category as shipwrecked mariners.
84
  
According to one official on the War Department general staff, “[with] respect to the 
treatment of belligerent aviation personnel and equipment, there are few established 
precedents and no provisions in the Hague or Geneva Conventions, and consequently, the 
principles of International Law in this regard are now in the process of being 
formulated.”  Considering this lack of treaty law, the official recommended that force-
landed aircrews be classified separately from belligerent vessels and crews.
85
  Spain had 
also interned a German U-boat crew, and creating a distinction between interned aviators 
and interned mariners would allow the German crew to remain interned while the 
USAAF aircrews could be released.
86
  Although there is no evidence that this legal 
position ever gained significant traction in the larger international community, it 
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nevertheless was consistent with the larger U.S. effort to seek the return of interned 
aircrews in spite of the legal obligations of neutral states to retain them.  Like other 
countries, the U.S. was more than willing to exploit perceived weaknesses in 
international law in order to gain an advantage in the conflict. 
Spain’s neighbor, Portugal, declared neutrality in September 1939, but maintained 
its longstanding ties to Britain that dated back to the fourteenth century.  The Portuguese 
government primarily feared that Spain would join the Axis and encroach on its 
sovereignty.  Portugal remained economically neutral, but nevertheless allowed Britain to 
use the Azores archipelago for military bases in August 1943, followed by a similar 
agreement with the United States in November 1944.
87
  In the spirit of this military 
collaboration, Portugal only temporarily interned American aviators throughout the war, 
although the same privilege was also initially afforded to some German aircrew.
88
     
The relatively short internment of most USAAF internees in Portugal was 
jeopardized by the first U.S. internee, 1
st
 Lt. Jack Ilfrey, who landed in Portugal in 
November 1942 after his P-38 fighter ran out of fuel when the spare tank fell off of the 
aircraft.  According to Ilfrey, “we had been poorly briefed about what to do if we were 
forced down in Portugal or Spain,” and he finally chose Portugal because he “vaguely 
remembered someone saying the Portuguese were friendlier than the Spaniards and might 
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be bribed to get you out of the country.”89  However, after landing he was informed that 
Portugal had a duty “to intern all foreign pilots and their planes.”90  Once his aircraft was 
refueled, Ilfrey convinced his Portuguese military hosts to allow him to return to the 
airplane and “[explain] the various mechanisms.”  While the officials were distracted, 
Ilfrey started the engines, knocked a Portuguese officer to the tarmac, and successfully 
flew to Gibraltar.  The escape caused a major diplomatic incident, and Ilfrey was nearly 
forced to return to Portugal as a result.  In Ilfrey’s words, “although I knew I had violated 
international law in wartime . . . I did not realize to what extent or degree I had broken 
the law.”91  According to the U.S. military attaché in Portugal, Ilfrey’s escape greatly 
“irritated the Portuguese authorities” and resulted in more “rigorous” treatment of 
subsequent internees.
92
  The escape also caused the Portuguese to relocate future Allied 
internees to a new town with a stronger military garrison.
93
    
A total of 135 USAAF internees from at least 43 aircraft were eventually released 
from Portugal in spite of Ilfrey’s actions.94  One aircrew that ditched their bomber off the 
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Portuguese coast in December 1943 was rescued by fishermen and interned for only a 
week.  The quick release was justified by classifying the aircrew as “ship-wrecked 
mariners” since they had technically not landed on Portuguese soil.95  Other U.S. airmen 
in Portugal were often briefly interned for a period of several months before they were 
smuggled out of the country.
96
  According to the U.S. Minister in Portugal, “it has always 
proved possible for both sides to get [the internees] out of the country quietly after 
sufficient time had elapsed to permit public interest to die down and enable Portuguese 
authorities to convince themselves that due respect had been shown to the principle of 
Portuguese sovereignty.”97   
Escapes from Portugal did not always go smoothly even with the tacit approval of 
the Portuguese government.  In July 1943 seven “escaping” USAAF pilots refused to 
board a British freighter to Gibraltar that was arranged by the U.S. authorities.  The 
airmen reportedly claimed that the ship, the René Paul, “was not fit to travel on,” a 
reference to the vessel’s perceived lack of seaworthiness.  The airmen were subsequently 
arrested by the port police and incarcerated in the Lisbon city jail.  Their actions upset the 
U.S. military attaché in Lisbon, who claimed that the pilots’ behavior “jeopardize[d] [the] 
tacit understanding with [the] Port [Military] Authorities as to [the] future release of 
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internees” and might “give rise to harmful propaganda from [the] Axis.”  Therefore, the 
military attaché charged the airmen with “willful disobedience of orders,” and the airmen 
were tried by general courts-martial on July 27, 1943.  The defendants were all found 
guilty, but their sentences were a mere “three months confinement to assigned bases, and 
an official reprimand.”  In the opinion of the military attaché, the sentence was “a shock 
to everyone, owing to its astonishing lack of severity,” and he claimed that even General 
Eisenhower was “extremely disturbed by the lightness of the sentence.”98  
The U.S. War Department also considered asking for the return of the interned 
USAAF airplanes in Portugal by requesting that “the same refuge privileges that are 
extended to vessels in distress be extended to force landed aircraft.”  However, U.S. 
officials realized that this proposal might also “necessarily be extended to the enemy,” 
which would afford German long-range bombers a significant advantage by allowing 
them to refuel in Portugal.  Therefore, the War Department decided to sell the USAAF 
airplanes to Portugal as an alternative course of action.
99
  The Portuguese concurred and 
purchased most of these aircraft for prices of $100,000 for bombers and $20,000 for 
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fighters, with the exception of two P-39 fighters that were given to Portugal for free.
100
  
The only condition on the transfers was that the aircraft “will not be resold to [the] Axis 
and only technical and instructional manuals will be provided.”101 
Turkey was another “non-belligerent” for much of the war, a policy influenced by 
the specter of possible conflict against the Soviet Union.  The Turkish government 
eventually declared war on Germany in February 1945, largely a symbolic gesture in 
order to establish its position as a founding member of the United Nations.
102
  Prior to 
this time Turkey interned at least 189 airmen from 21 USAAF bombers and one U.S. 
Navy (USN) airplane.
103
  All of the aircraft were interned as well, less one that sank into 
the Black Sea in July 1944.
104
  Many of the bombers arrived as a result of Allied efforts 
to destroy the Axis-controlled oil refineries in Ploesti, Romania, including eight aircraft 
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that landed in Turkey after the Ploesti raid of 1943 that also saw the internment of Death 
Dealer in Switzerland.
105
   
The USAAF airmen who landed in Turkey were initially interned, but most were 
eventually repatriated or allowed to “escape” with the consent of the Turkish 
government.
106
  In one instance the Turkish Prime Minister gave the Turkish Army 
general staff instructions that “the ‘most valuable’ of [the] interned [USAAF] flyers 
should be allowed to escape in the very near future,” and fifteen were subsequently 
released.
107
  On another occasion the Turkish Foreign Minister also agreed to instruct the 
Turkish military “not to take exceptional measures to prevent the escape of 
[internees].”108  Later he agreed to repatriate eighteen interned Americans on the 
condition “that there would be no publicity in the U.S. or in Turkey on the release.”109  
This arrangement of condoning escapes and secret repatriations allowed Turkey to claim 
that the airmen had escaped on their own agency in the event of a protest by the German 
government.  Turkey was highly attuned to the threat of German reprisal, as Germany 
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controlled islands located only miles off the Turkish coastline.
110
  As with Portugal, some 
internees in Turkey were also released on so-called “medical grounds,” despite the fact 
that U.S. authorities acknowledged that “most of the ‘injured’ were in fairly good 
health.”111   
Turkey also retained the interned USAAF bombers and later pressed at least six 
B-24 Liberators into service in the Turkish Air Force.  Unlike the bombers in Portugal 
and Sweden, the aircraft in Turkey were reportedly “given as a gift without strings of any 
kind” by the U.S. Ambassador.112  The interned Americans were occasionally enlisted to 
help conduct test flights on the bombers, a practice that led to the unauthorized escape of 
at least one interned aircrew.  In December 1942, eight American airmen conducting a 
test flight on a B-24 named Brooklyn Rambler managed to elude Turkish fighters and 
escape over the Taurus Mountains.  This action jeopardized the relationship between the 
U.S. and Turkish authorities.  The U.S. military attaché in Ankara informed the War 
Department that “immediate return of the plane would assist materially in effecting future 
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escapes.”113  In response, the U.S. State Department suppressed news reports of the 
escape while the USAAF overhauled the bomber and returned it to Turkey.
114
 
The Soviet Union utilized a similar tactic of condoning escapes for USAAF and 
USN aircrew that set down in Russia.  Although an ally of the United States in Europe, 
Russia was neutral with respect to Japan until August 8, 1945, just prior to the Japanese 
surrender to the Allies.  The neutrality pact was seen as a temporary stop-gap while both 
powers dealt with their other ongoing military conflicts.  As a neutral power the Soviets 
dutifully interned Allied aircrews, largely because of Japanese pressure to extradite the 
belligerents into their hands.
 115
  Russia was also concerned that the perception of 
favorable treatment of Allied aircrews might result in Japanese reprisals against the 
Soviet Far East.  Therefore, the Soviets interned a total of 291 airmen from 37 USAAF 
and US Navy aircraft for an average of five months.  The first American internees were 
the five man crew of a USAAF B-25 bomber from the Doolittle raid against Tokyo in 
April 1942.
 116
  Like Turkey, the Soviets eventually chose to overlook international law 
and organized a total of four secret “escapes” for 239 of the American internees, who 
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were surreptitiously ferried back to U.S. military control through Iran.
117
  However, this 
cooperation was dependent on absolute secrecy.  An ill-timed news release reported the 
first repatriation of American internees in 1943 and temporarily delayed future efforts 
while the Soviets waited for the Japanese reaction.
118
 
Thus, the practice of neutrals interning belligerents during World War II was 
decidedly varied despite firm treaty obligations.  State practice ranged from strict 
adherence to outright repudiation of recognized international law.  The differences can be 
attributed to the distinction between permanent and temporary neutrality, the ambiguity 
in the 1907 Hague Convention, differing interpretations of customary law, as well as 
shifting allegiances during the conflict.  Switzerland espoused perhaps the most 
conservative posture on internment, a policy resulting from the exceptional Swiss 
position as a permanent neutral, Switzerland’s treaty obligations as a guardian of the 
international law of armed conflict, and diplomatic pressure from the Axis powers. 
In Switzerland, the Swiss Army was responsible for supervision of interned 
soldiers during World War II, and its organization played a role in how the internees were 
treated.  At least 850,000 Swiss citizens served in the Swiss Army, home guards, or 
auxiliary during the war, although not all of these troops were mobilized 
simultaneously.
119
  The vast majority of soldiers in the Swiss Army were reservists called 
to service because of the state of national emergency, and only a small percentage were 
professional soldiers.  The Swiss Army was based on a militia system of compulsory 
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conscription, wherein able-bodied males underwent a short period of military training at 
the age of twenty and were then assigned to reserve divisions based on age and training 
until the age of forty-eight, although in the late 1930s the age limit was increased to sixty 
on account of the wartime emergency.
120
  The service of most officers was also 
compulsory; there were so few permanent positions in peacetime that the Swiss Army 
required any soldier to accept a commission or take a command as a contingency.
121
   
Even the Swiss Army’s top rank of four-star General was constitutionally limited 
to times of national emergency after an election by the Federal Assembly.
122
  This was a 
reflection not only of Switzerland’s defensive military posture, but also the reality of 
decentralized control of military affairs in which troops often resented leaders who were 
not from a canton of like cultural affiliation.
123
  In August 1939, the Swiss Federal 
Assembly promoted corps commander Henri Guisan to the rank of General and 
commander in chief in response to the expectation that French troops massing on the 
border would infringe Swiss neutrality.
124
  Guisan was only the fourth Swiss soldier in 
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history to attain the rank, which he held for the remainder of the war.
125
  Guisan answered 
only to the seven-person Federal Council, or Bundesrat, which serves as the collective 
executive branch of Switzerland’s federal government.  Guisan’s most direct superior 
was the minister of the Swiss Federal Military Department, a politician selected from the 
Federal Council.
126
  According to the U.S. Minister in Switzerland, Guisan “is probably 
the most influential man in Switzerland [during the war], and more than any other living 
Swiss symbolizes the underlying national policies of Switzerland: neutrality, 
independence, military preparedness, and defense of the country in event of invasion.”127 
In 1940, the Swiss Federal Military Department created a Federal Commissariat 
for Internment and Hospitalization (FCIH) to oversee the considerable task of supervising 
internees from the fighting between French and German forces.  On June 18, 1940, nearly 
43,000 soldiers from the Forty-fifth French Corps sought refuge in Switzerland after 
facing encirclement by German panzer units, forcing the issue of centralized federal 
control over internment.
128
  Nearly 7,000 Swiss soldiers were immediately detailed to 
perform as Bewachungstruppen or internee guard forces for the FCIH, and approximately 
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12,000 served in this capacity in 1940 alone.
129
  The internment locations were organized 
into seven separate sectors, or regions, each under a command subordinate to the FCIH.  
All sectors were comprised of multiple base camps of approximately 50-300 internees, 
each under the command of a Swiss Army officer.
130
 
The commissioner of the newly created FCIH answered to the chief of the Swiss 
Army General Staff as per a decree of the Swiss Federal Council in December 1940.
131
  
Command of the FCIH was passed from a major general to a lieutenant colonel in its first 
year of existence, and then was subordinated as a section under the adjutant general of the 
Swiss Army in January 1942.
132
  In early 1943 the adjutant general himself, Major 
General Ruggero Dollfus, was officially appointed as the FCIH commissioner, a post he 
held through late 1944.
133
  That Dollfus served concurrently as the FCIH commissioner 
and the adjutant general during an unprecedented military mobilization testifies to the 
understaffed and overburdened Swiss officer corps.   
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As FCIH commissioner, Dollfus ran an organization that consisted largely of 
conscripts and volunteers.  As reported by General Henry Cartwright, the military attaché 
at the British Legation in Switzerland, senior Swiss Army officers often complained of 
“the poor type of officer serving in the Commissariat, who would not have been there if 
he had been capable of earning a decent living in civil life.”  According to the attaché, 
senior FCIH officers mistrusted their subordinates and were hesitant to delegate decisions 
to the camp level.
134
  This view of the FCIH was evidently shared by other Allied 
diplomats, such as those at the U.S. Legation in Switzerland.  According to the U.S. 
military attaché, Brigadier General Barnwell R. Legge, “in general, the Swiss Internment 
Service is staffed by personnel not up to their tasks and responsibilities.”135  Whether or 
not the FCIH was really this poorly administered, the internal friction in the organization 
did eventually hamper communication and impede inquiries into internment conditions.   
The FCIH oversaw internment and asylum for over 104,000 foreign military 
refugees during the war, a significant task considering that the population of Switzerland 
was only 4.2 million people.
136
  The FCIH oversaw not only internees, but also escaped 
prisoners of war and evadees who were not interned as belligerents and therefore enjoyed 
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greater freedom of movement.
137
  The military refugees in Switzerland hailed from at 
least thirty-eight separate nations, although only France, Italy, Poland, Russia, Germany, 
Yugoslavia, and the United States had populations that exceeded 1,000 personnel.
138
  The 
largest influxes of foreign military personnel were the internment of 13,000 Poles and 
30,000 French troops from the Forty-fifth French Corps in June 1940, and asylum for 
approximately 21,000 Italian soldiers and 7,000 former Allied prisoners of war following 
the surrender of Italy to the Allies in September 1943.
139
  Over 3,000 German soldiers 
were interned at the end of the war in Europe in 1945, and another 1,500 German 
deserters also sought refuge during this period.  The total population of military refugees 
in Switzerland peaked in 1940 with the internment of the nearly 43,000 soldiers of the 
Forty-fifth French Corps, and was lowest in late 1942 at only 11,000 foreign military 
personnel.
140
  Thus, American internees were consistently a minority among the larger 
population of military refugees.  Americans were a majority only among the population 
of interned aviators, as they flew 166 of the 244 aircraft that crashed or landed in 
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Switzerland during the war, and also comprised 1,517 of the 1,620 interned airmen.
141
  
Americans internees were also somewhat unique in terms of how they arrived in 
Switzerland, where they were interned, and their reactions to the realities of internment.
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III.  American Internees 
  The Americans interned in Switzerland arrived exclusively by military aircraft.
1
  
Swiss aircraft intercept procedures were first initiated in September 1939, when the Swiss 
Army adopted the policy that foreign aircraft in Swiss airspace would be “forced to land 
by any means and fired on by the troops with all the appropriate weapons.”2  Swiss 
antiaircraft batteries were allowed to open fire on all foreign aircraft without warning, 
whereas Swiss fighter planes were first required to issue a warning and attempt to force 
the intruders to land.  This warning could take the form of a “radio warning,” “green 
rockets,” or “shots with tracer ammunition.”3  The intent of the warning was to determine 
whether foreign aircraft intended to seek refuge in Switzerland or if they had violated the 
border unintentionally as belligerents. Although both types of intruders were technically 
classified as belligerents, only one merited hostile fire.   
 The Swiss intercept procedures were tested in May and June of 1940 during the 
Battle of France.  Foreign aircraft violated Swiss airspace a total of 197 times during 
these two months, and Swiss fighter aircraft engaged in several dogfights with intruding 
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German airplanes.
4
  The political repercussions resulted in a temporary halt of all aerial 
combat against German and other foreign aircraft.  General Guisan issued the order that 
“until further notice, air combat anywhere over sovereign Swiss territory will cease,” and 
specifically that “no flight crews will be sent into action against foreign aircraft transiting 
through Swiss airspace.”5  Other concessions to Germany included a directive to 
antiaircraft units and fighter aircraft to fire only on formations of three or more 
airplanes.
6
  The policy to attack only formations of airplanes was still in force in 1943 
when the first Americans arrived in Switzerland.
7
   
In early 1944 the Swiss commander in chief updated the U.S. government on the 
intercept procedures for foreign aircraft seeking refuge in Switzerland.  The Swiss 
directed that “[two] or more foreign military aircraft flying in formation will be attacked 
without warning by Swiss [fighter] squadrons,” since an entire formation of aircraft was 
unlikely to seek asylum.  In contrast, “isolated military planes” in Switzerland received 
the opportunity to communicate that “the infringement of Swiss neutrality is not 
intended.”   The foreign plane would first be approached by one or two Swiss fighters 
“level with the longitudinal axis” in order to demonstrate no hostile intent.  A landing 
order would then be signaled by the firing of green flares, the lowering of landing gear, 
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and visual signals from the Swiss pilot.  The Swiss fighters were to give the foreign 
aircraft “a few seconds” for “reflection and decision,” and then the warnings were 
repeated once.  If the foreign aircraft did not indicate compliance by returning flares, 
turning to follow the Swiss fighters, or lowering landing gear, then they would be shot 
down.  These instructions were in the standard operating procedures reportedly briefed to 
“all airmen likely to fly over Switzerland.”8   
Staff Sergeant Joe Krajewski experienced the Swiss intercept procedures firsthand 
in October 1944.  Krajewski, the engineer on a B-24 bomber nicknamed Brown Nose, 
was based out of Pantenella Airfield, near Cerignola, Italy.  While on a mission to bomb 
Munich, Germany, Brown Nose was hit by anti-aircraft fire that “raked [the bomber] 
from nose to tail.”  Krajewski was struck by a metal fragment above his right eyebrow, 
causing blood to run down his face.   The nose gunner was thrown from his turret with a 
severe head wound, the bombardier was wounded in the arm, and the radio operator 
received six shrapnel wounds in his leg.  In addition, the copilot was “knocked halfway 
out of his seat” with minor injuries, and the top turret gunner was thrown to the flight 
deck.  The damage to the bomber was even worse: hydraulics were gone and the nose of 
the aircraft was on fire; three engines were gone; gas was leaking from right wing; the 
radio set was damaged and inoperative; and a “large slit” of daylight was now evident 
between the cockpit and the bomb bay.  The pilot, 2
nd
 Lt. Sam Peskin, miraculously 
managed to restart two engines and regain control of the airplane after losing 9,000 ft., 
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but the bomber could no longer climb to a sufficient altitude to clear the Alps and return 
to Italy, and several members of the crew were badly wounded and needed immediate 
medical attention.  Therefore, “[going to] Switzerland was the only out and he took it.”9   
After crossing the Swiss border, two Swiss ME109 fighters intercepted the 
heavily damaged bomber.  At first Krajewski had trouble distinguishing the airplanes 
from German fighters.  Krajewski readied his flare pistol “to signal that we were 
disabled,” and hesitated briefly when he realized that the pistol might ignite the heavy gas 
fumes in the bomber.  He concluded that he had to take the risk in order to make contact, 
and so he fired a “long string of shells” and in response the Swiss fighters pulled 
alongside the aircraft and “wiggled their wings.”  Krajewski observed that although the 
aircraft initially appeared to be German, upon closer inspection they each had a “white 
cross on [a] red background” emblazoned on their sides.  He immediately recognized that 
the fighters were Swiss, a fact he claimed “put new spirit in all of us.”10 
The Swiss fighters guided the heavily damaged Brown Nose to Dübendorf 
Airfield near Zurich, and the crew frantically prepared for an emergency landing.  
Krajewski propped up his unconscious nose gunner between several parachutes to “hold 
him erect” during the landing.  The landing gear was frozen due to the loss of hydraulics, 
and so Krajewski kicked the nose-wheel down and cranked the main landing gear down 
by hand.  The runway at Dübendorf was only 1,200 yards in length, as it was originally 
designed as a fighter airstrip.  Unfortunately, this meant that a heavy bomber without 
flaps or brakes had no chance of stopping after touching down at approximately 170 
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miles per hour.  Brown Nose proved this point by plowing off the end of the airfield and 
hitting a drainage ditch, whereupon the nose wheel collapsed.  The bomber finally came 
to rest in a corn field, with its tail “thirty feet in the air.”  Krajewski was “dazed” and 
“soaked with gas [and] hydraulic fluid” when he crawled out of the crippled ship and was 
surrounded by Swiss soldiers.  Krajewski described the responders as “German jabbering 
soldiers pointing rifles at us,” and in his confusion he momentarily believed that he had 
landed in Germany.
11
     
After arrival most American internees were interrogated by military authorities 
and then sent to a quarantine camp in a resort hotel on a hill above Neuchâtel.  The city is 
the capital of the canton of the same name, located on a large lake in western 
Switzerland.  The quarantine of newly arrived internees typically lasted for two weeks.  
According to 2
nd
 Lt. Sidney Bolick, “the Swiss were deathly afraid of epidemic diseases,” 
particularly when it came to their densely populated cities.  The Americans were kept 
apart from Swiss civilians while in quarantine, although curious residents often travelled 
up the hill from Neuchâtel and stared at the internees from across a waist-high hedge that 
ran the length of the hotel grounds.  Bolick recalled that “these civilians were very 
friendly, speaking to us across the hedge in English, asking where we were from, what it 
was like [in the United States], and did we know their cousin Hans who lived in 
Chicago.”12 
From August 1943 to February 1944 about a hundred American airmen were 
interned in Switzerland under the supervision of the FCIH.  Many of the first American 
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internees were housed in hotels in Macolin and Evilard, near the city of Biel in western 
Switzerland.
13
  Technical Sergeant James Scott, the radio operator on one of the first 
interned American bombers, recalled that he was first billeted in a Swiss Air Force cadet 
barracks, and then moved to Hotel Bellevue in Macolin.  According to Scott, “we felt like 
monkeys in a zoo as hundreds of local citizens paraded by on week-ends just to see those 
‘American Flyers.’”14  The hotels were publicly accessible by cable car, but the American 
internees were under Swiss orders not to leave the hotel grounds, and were reportedly not 
allowed “to associate with the civilians in any way.”  FCIH officials imposed strict 
curfews of 11:00 PM for officers and 10:00 PM hours for enlisted men.  These rules were 
strictly enforced by about ten Swiss Army guards who imposed various penalties for 
infractions.  According to official reports, “if an internee were seen talking to a girl he 
would be confined to his room for 10 days.”  More serious offenses merited confinement 
in prison camps.
15
 
Officials at the U.S. Legation in Switzerland soon made contact with the interned 
airmen in Macolin and Evilard.  The internees complained that the food at Macolin was 
“insufficient,” and also related that they “had a great deal of trouble with dysentery.”16  
U.S. officials reported to the War Department that the hotels in both locations were “of 
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the poorest [quality]” as they were merely “summer hotels without heating systems,” and 
thus pressed the Swiss to find a more suitable location.
17
   
In November 1943 the internees were moved to the resort town of Adelboden, 
located in the Bernese Highlands at 4,450 ft. altitude.  The Swiss General Staff selected 
Adelboden for its remote location and numerous hotels normally used to accommodate 
winter-sports tourists in peacetime.
18
  The Americans shared the town with Swiss 
civilians as well as interned British soldiers and Yugoslavs who had escaped from Axis 
prisoner of war camps.
19
  U.S. internees referred to the American compound as “Camp 
Maloney,” a tribute to Sgt. Joseph Maloney, the first American to die while arriving in 
Switzerland in September 1943.
20
  Maloney was severely wounded by enemy fire while 
bombing Stuttgart, Germany, and his body went down with his B-17 when the crew 
ditched the bomber in Lake Constance, Switzerland.
21
  Arrival at the camp was a 
welcome respite for many war-weary Americans.  According to Sergeant Robert 
Hammer, “when I first saw [Adelboden], I thought the Lord was really being good to 
us.”22 
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Lt. Lee Ellis recalled his arrival in Adelboden on a bus “fueled with a huge 
charcoal burner.”  He was housed at the Nevada Palace Inn, which he described as an 
upgrade from his bombardment group’s “dingy tent city in southern Italy.”  According to 
Ellis, the town had a population of 3,500 Swiss who spoke multiple languages— 
including English— because of the tourist trade that normally fueled the resort 
community.  The downtown of Adelboden consisted of “wide asphalt streets lined on 
both sides with gift shops, sporting goods stores, cafes, taverns, and other assorted 
businesses.”  Ellis noted that the town’s appearance was “immaculate,” in that “not a 
weed, can, or scrap of paper” could be found on the street.  This was no accident, as 
every shopkeeper swept from his storefront to the center of the boulevard, and then 
another worker meticulously swept this refuse into a wheelbarrow.  Ellis was highly 
amused by the exacting drills conducted by the Adelboden volunteer fire department.  
The exercises were announced by “advance firemen” who “[blasted] their long alpine 
horns to clear the traffic,” followed shortly by a team lugging a wooden hose cart up the 
street.
23
 
The military supervision at Adelboden was initially minimal due to the isolation 
of the camp, and the fact that internees had few options for escape until after the 
successful invasion of Normandy.  To aid in identification and control, internees were 
required to wear GI uniforms issued through the Red Cross.
24
  The village was 
surrounded by tall mountains and only one guarded road connected it to the rest of 
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Switzerland.
25
  One internee described the location of the resort town as “a dead end 
canyon” hemmed in by natural barriers.26  According to another internee, “there was no 
need for the Swiss to keep us under close guard to prevent our escape,” since there were 
few ways out of the village.
27
  The road to Adelboden was only wide enough for one 
vehicle, thus local motorists had a system to telephone the opposite end of the steep trek 
to ensure that the route remained clear.
28
  Only one bus came up to the town every day, 
and the nearest railway station was over nine miles away in Frutigen.  Therefore, the 
location permitted relative freedom for the internees, so long as they were not confined to 
quarters for quarantine or disciplinary infractions.
29
   
Technical Sergeant Richard H. recalled that internees could walk around the town 
and even go on hikes unsupervised, as “[the Swiss guards] knew we couldn’t get out.”30  
Curfews were identical to those at Evilard and Macolin, so the American non-
commissioned officers had to be back in their rooms by 10:00 PM curfew, whereas the 
officers had until 11:00 PM.
31
  The Swiss guards conducted nightly bed checks at the first 
deadline, and then again at 3:00 AM.
32
  In the morning the internees were mustered for 
                                                 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Vincent Fagan, “The Fortunate Sky,” undated, SIAA. 
27
 Bolick, To Soar With Eagles, 198. 
28
 Clinton O. Norby, “World War II Experience,” dated July 1990, SIAA. 
29
 Richard H., telephone interview, May 20, 2011. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 “Camp Joseph F. Moloney: Daily Schedule,” dated August 9, 1944, and letter from Lee Ellis, “A Step 
into Paradise,” undated, SIAA. 
32
 James A. Green, “The Story of My Capture and Escape during World War II,” dated April 20, 2006, 
unpublished manuscript in possession of author, p. 18. 
      60 
roll call in the street.  They lined up in three ranks and counted off for accountability.  
The internees noticed that the tenant guards rotated about once per month and differed 
significantly by cantonal region.  The French-Swiss guards were generally liberal when it 
came to privileges, whereas the German-Swiss always strictly enforced bed checks, roll 
calls, and curfews.  The punishments for minor infractions were subjective, and so 
missing curfew under a German-Swiss guard unit meant that “you might be put in the 
local jail overnight.”33 
Meals were served at fixed times at the hotels, but the internees often 
supplemented their meager rations with food purchased out in the town.
34
  Although 
housed in resort hotels, the internees experienced somewhat less than the standard resort 
experience due to the wartime shortages and tight budgets.  The hotel rooms were 
unheated, and some internees kept their clothes in bed with them to keep them from 
freezing in the winter.
35
  Hot water was hard to come by, as it was turned on in the hotel 
about every ten days, and sometimes even less frequently.
36
  Sergeant Clinton Norby 
recalled that when the water was turned on, “everyone headed for their rooms to get 
ready for a bath,” which they then had to reuse to conserve water.37  One internee recalled 
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shaving with ice and shaving cream.
38
   Another internee warmed water with an 
immersion heater, a high-voltage device that “resembled a soldering iron.”39   
Adelboden’s tranquility stood in stark contrast to the normal routines of American 
aircrews who were often accustomed to demanding schedules rife with the stress and 
violence of combat operations.  Second Lt. Jack McKinney, the copilot of a B-17 that 
was shot down by flak in March 1944, expressed that when first arriving in Switzerland 
“we were a little suspicious of each other with the exception of our own crew members or 
those we knew from our [bombardment] group.”  Only after sustained interaction with 
other internees did he “[begin] to feel more at ease around other internees.”40   
The challenge for U.S. and FCIH officials was providing the American internees 
with productive ways to occupy their time.  Unlike most internees of other nationalities, 
the American aircrews were almost exclusively officers and noncommissioned officers, 
which meant that they could not be compelled to perform manual labor due to the Swiss 
interpretation of the 1907 Hague Convention.
41
  The U.S. airmen were therefore offered 
educational classes in the mornings and afternoons, and a swimming pool was open all 
day for the internees’ use during the summer months.42  Lt. McKinney described his 
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immersion in “endless” bridge games and the pursuit of photography.43  Captain James 
Roberts, the senior American officer at Adelboden, managed to order books through the 
Red Cross and eventually set up a library.  He also procured donated musical instruments, 
and soon the internees formed an orchestra.  According to Roberts, the band performed at 
dances that were held twice per week in the winter months.
44
  Technical Sergeant Alva 
Moss was one member of the musical group, a “seven or eight piece band” that had three 
saxophones, several trumpets, a trombone, and a piano.  Moss, who played both the 
saxophone and clarinet, first thought the band “was pretty bad” and refused to join.  
However, he eventually relented after the band improved, and started practicing with the 
group once per week.
45
 
Winter recreation was also a prime attraction at Adelboden.  Captain Roberts 
hired Swiss ski instructors to give lessons to the interned Americans.
46
  One internee, 
Staff Sergeant Raymond Baus, went from a novice to an expert skier in only one 
season.
47
  Sergeant Alva Moss used skiing and other recreation as a method to pass the 
time.  According to Moss, “I kept active because I felt better moving around and doing 
[activities].”48 
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Many internees also indulged—and overindulged—in the “frothy black beer” that 
could be purchased in Adelboden.
49
  This occasionally led to incidents of drunkenness 
and disorderly conduct and resulted in room restriction or a short stint in the local jail in 
nearby Frutigen.
50
  The senior American officers at the camp organized a rotating 
military police patrol to round up internees from the taverns and return them to their 
rooms in the evenings.
51
  The names and offenses of Americans who were in trouble for 
minor disciplinary infractions were posted publicly on bulletin boards to serve as 
warnings to their comrades.
52
 
The Swiss government eventually constructed 768 camps for foreign military and 
civilian refugees, although the Americans were generally segregated into their own 
camps as were most nationalities.
53
  The number of American internees in Switzerland 
spiked dramatically starting in the spring of 1944, as the increased tempo of the Allied 
strategic bombing offensive sent American bombers farther into France and Germany in a 
coordinated attempt to destroy the German Luftwaffe prior to the Normandy landings.
54
  
Sixteen damaged heavy bombers landed in Switzerland on a single day in March 1944, 
and the landings continued unabated through July, a month that saw the internment of 
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forty-five U.S. warplanes with 404 airmen.
55
  The influx of new Americans prompted the 
Swiss to open a second camp at Davos in June 1944, followed by a third camp at Wengen 
in August 1944.
56
  At peak capacity, the Americans were housed in a total of fourteen 
hotels located in Adelboden, Davos, and Wengen.
57
  The U.S. Legation eventually 
arranged to transfer all interned American officers to Davos, as they found that “the 
segregation of officers and men at Adelboden in separate hotels was insufficient for the 
preservation of discipline.”58  Second Lt. James Misuraca remembered the train ride from 
Adelboden to Davos.  He supported the move, claiming that “it doesn’t work” to have 
officers and enlisted soldiers living and fraternizing together in the same location.
59
 
The town of Davos is located in the Swiss Alps at an altitude of 5,250 feet, and 
was largely a farming community until 1865 when Dr. Alexander Spengler noticed that 
pulmonary tuberculosis was extremely rare in the village.  Spengler’s discovery 
inaugurated the development of the town as a health resort, and Davos soon hosted some 
of the premier tuberculosis sanitariums in the world, with capacity for several thousand 
patients by the early 1900s.  Davos also developed an international reputation for skiing 
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and ice skating, which fueled a winter tourism economy in peacetime.
60
  Like Adelboden, 
Davos had numerous empty hotels available during World War II, which led to the 
decision to transfer the Americans to this location.  According to one internee, “Davos 
was a larger town than Adelboden and had much more recreational activities.”61 
Second Lt. Lewis Sarkovich related that the Americans were housed in the Palace 
Hotel in Davos, just across the street from the German Legation.  He noted that “all the 
furniture was moved out of our hotels,” and the internees used lower quality furniture 
“from the Red Cross or Goodwill.”  Sarkovich found that Davos “was beautiful—
mountains, friendly people, clean, fresh air, but little food, little money and nothing to do 
but hike, play chess, play tennis—boring as hell.”  He bought a camera, a “Cotax 35mm,” 
which he used to “[take] pictures all over the place.”62  Sarkovich eventually helped start 
a dance band with instruments and music donated by the YMCA.
63
  The band played big 
band music in the ballroom of the Palace Hotel, where the American internees were 
housed.
64
   
Second Lt. James Green recalled that Americans in Davos “could play cards, 
chess, checkers and bang on an old out of tune piano” for entertainment.  However, this 
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was not enough to satisfy all of the internees.  According to Green, one airman who was 
“a former cabinet maker” converted an old pool table such that it would flip over and 
become a craps table.  While the frame was stationary, the table “could be flipped over in 
an instant” in order to disguise the internees’ late-night gambling routine.65  Green 
yearned to play sports, but unfortunately the equipment was often lacking.  Green and 
several other internees were denied access to the local nine-hole golf course at Davos on 
the grounds that “golf balls were just not available.” Several internees eventually gained 
permission to work as caddies, and they devised a system to ensure that some of the 
errant golf balls ended up in their pockets.  According to Green, the club manager finally 
“allowed us to play only at certain times when none of the other members were 
around.”66   
Second Lt. James Misuraca recalled that Davos had a small tennis court available 
for the Americans’ use, but since “everyone wanted to play tennis” it was nearly 
impossible for the internees to secure reservations.  He preferred instead to play baseball, 
or ride the funicular up the mountains to the ski lifts.  Misuraca was not interned during 
the ski season, so he rode the railcars “just for fun.”  However, he knew several internees 
who learned to ski in Switzerland, and recalled that “a lot of [Americans] got broken 
legs” on the slopes.67 
An inspection of the internee hotels at Davos by the ICRC in July 1944 revealed 
that the Americans reportedly had “all modern comforts” of the period, including baths 
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“twice a week” and access to a modern kitchen.  The ICRC delegate noted that the 
Americans were “in a privileged situation in comparison with the other internees [of 
other nations],” as they were not required to work to pay for their internment costs.  The 
internees enjoyed three “zones of liberty” in Davos, which included sports fields and 
cinemas in the village.  The American officer in charge lodged no complaints with the 
ICRC delegate, noting that the present conditions in Davos were much less crowded than 
at least one other American internment camp, presumably Adelboden.
68
 
The third and last major U.S. camp, located at Wengen, was similar to Adelboden 
and Davos in that it was situated in yet another isolated mountain village that was nearly 
vacant because of the war.  Located at 4185 feet, Wengen was described as “a paradise of 
winter sport” and close to Interlaken, “the most frequented tourist-resort in the Bernese 
Oberland.”69  According to Technical Sergeant George Michel, Wengen could only be 
reached by train, and the village appeared to be “carved out” from the side of a mountain.  
According to Michel, the valley was characterized by “almost vertical, rocky sides 
slashed with cascading waterfalls and green meadows.”70   
Wengen primarily housed American noncommissioned officers (NCOs), who 
were allowed to move around the village so long as they stayed in “G.I. clothes.”  As in 
the other camps, the Americans were supervised by rotating Swiss guards who conducted 
roll-calls and bed checks to maintain accountability.  However, security was generally 
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loose due to the isolated location.  Internees who obtained special passes were permitted 
to travel up to the Jungfrau, the third highest mountain in the Bernese Alps.
71
  Other 
diversions included skiing on Nursery Hill, located behind the tennis courts in Wengen.  
In November 1944, at least three Americans reportedly broke their ankles on the slope, in 
addition to several other skiing injuries. The internees also established a small movie 
theater, the Paramounds, which showed less current films from the 1930s and early 
1940s.
72
  Educational classes were also offered in the camp, and included Gregg 
shorthand, accounting, typing, and language training.
73
  
The few legitimate complaints about the regular American internment camps 
centered on the food and medical care.  Captain Lawrence McGuire, the senior American 
officer at Davos in the fall of 1944, expressed that the “food quantity was insufficient.”  
He recalled that once additional pay was authorized, the American internees 
supplemented their issued meals with food “in local town eateries.”  Technical Sergeant 
Richard H. recalled the same practice in Adelboden.  According to Richard, the strictly 
rationed food quantity might be barely adequate for the average adult, but “for a bunch of 
kids that’s starvation.”  Therefore, he illicitly purchased spare ration books from Swiss 
farmers.  The farmers were virtually “independent” when it came to food, since they “had 
their own gardens, chickens, and eggs.”  Richard used the coupons in the ration books to 
buy extra quantities of rationed bread and margarine in Adelboden.  He frequently went 
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to a bakery where internees could purchase small cakes and pastries, and he also 
purchased potato bread from a small cart pulled by a Saint Bernard.  Richard recalled that 
“you couldn’t eat fresh bread,” a ration restriction meant to limit consumption since 
people generally ate more bread if it was recently baked.  Therefore, the bread “had to be 
at least a day old” before it could be sold.74 
Second Lt. James Misuraca found that the regular food simply “wasn’t enough.”  
He recalled that “you could have all the soup you could drink” as well as ample quantities 
of dark bread, but the diet was lacking when it came to fresh fruit and protein.  Therefore, 
Misuraca used the same tactic as the Adelboden internees to procure extra ration books in 
Davos.  Upon arrival in the town, he soon discovered that “the Swiss people were willing 
to barter” for their ration books, particularly on Saturdays when the farmers came to 
town.  According to Misuraca, “the Swiss really looked the other way” when it came to 
strict adherence to the food rationing system.  He recalled a popular café in Davos where 
he and his friends supplemented their rations with sweets like chocolates, ice-cream, and 
apple strudel that he claimed was “out of this world.”  Misuraca also went to the café to 
procure highly-rationed eggs and bacon.  Although he frequently lacked the necessary 
ration coupons, he nevertheless received bacon hidden beneath a serving of eggs.  He   
attributed this generosity to the fact that he was dating the daughter of the proprietor.
75
 
In Captain McGuire’s opinion, “[the] quality of the Swiss internee food offered 
was unquestionably below any normal standards.”76  Some of the concerns over the types 
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of food may have been cultural, such as when Flight Officer Robert Long was served 
several unusual types of meat, a rarity since internees normally received only two ounces 
of meat twice per week.  Long recalled eating blood sausages, mountain goat, and 
“rabbits with [their] heads still on.”  The rabbits bore a striking resemblance to a litter of 
cats at the hotel, and so Long asked the Swiss cook, “Hilde, where are your kittens?”  
Hilde quickly found all seven kittens and brought them out to prove that they were not 
the main course.
77
  Similarly, Technical Sergeant Alva Moss remembered that “we ate a 
lot of rabbit,” which the Swiss often falsely passed off as chicken.  He claimed that the 
rabbit gravy was particularly unpalatable.
78
  Technical Sergeant James Scott remembered 
that “it took some doing for us to get used to black bread and stinking cheese topped off 
with acorn ‘coffee’ for breakfast.”79  Sergeant Richard H. recalled eating lentil soup, 
tripe, and horsemeat cut into pieces.  According to Richard, the horsemeat “had kind of a 
sweetish taste to it” that was not to his liking.  However, he remarked that “when you’re 
hungry you’ll eat anything.”80 
An inspection of American camps by a U.S. Army Medical Corps officer in 
November 1944 affirmed that the FCIH only allotted 1500 calories per internee per day, a 
quantity deemed to be “barely a subsistence diet even by continental standards.”81   The 
reason for the severe rationing was that the internees were classified by the FCIH as 
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“light workers,” and therefore required less nourishment.82  The doctor recommended a 
minimum of at least 2100 to 2300 calories in order to preserve “physical and mental 
stamina.”83  The quality of the food at Davos was also lacking, a problem attributed to the 
chef, a Swiss soldier. According to the U.S. inspector, the cook “seemed to have very 
little understanding of the proper preparation of balanced and palatable diets,” and also 
“showed reluctance to any interference or suggestions.”84 This was perhaps emblematic 
of how many FCIH soldiers were ill-trained for the wartime duties that they so hastily 
assumed. 
Medical inspections of the internees by a U.S. Army Medical Corps doctor also 
revealed inadequate access to hospitals and almost nonexistent treatment of dental 
problems.  The isolated internment camps served to curtail escapes by sequestering 
Americans in the mountains, but this also made it difficult to provide access to medical 
care.  In particular, Swiss dental treatment was described as “poor,” resulting in cases of 
bleeding gums and “trench mouth,” a reference to severe gingivitis prevalent among 
soldiers who served in the trenches during World War I.
85
  These problems were also 
attributed to the FCIH, which only utilized Swiss military doctors who were temporarily 
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mobilized for various short periods of time.
86
  Technical Sergeant Edward Pribek, the 
senior American NCO in Adelboden, recalled that “nearly half the men had trouble with 
their teeth and gums and none received proper medical or dental treatment.”87  According 
to 2
nd
 Lt. James Green, “after the second month [of internment] my teeth became very 
sensitive and started chipping.”  Green blamed his poor diet for his dental deterioration.88   
The problem of dental hygiene was not exclusive to the interned American 
population.  The ICRC eventually addressed the problem among the entire population of 
foreign military refugees by converting a railroad dining car into a mobile dental office, 
billed as a “dentist’s office on wheels.”  The car included a laboratory and treatment 
areas, and was operated by the Swiss Army’s dental service.  The car reportedly travelled 
between Estavayer-le-Lac and Frutigen, nearby the American internee camp at 
Adelboden.
89
 
General Legge also documented problems with acute medical care.  According to 
a report by Legge in November 1944, “Some critical medical cases jeopardizing 
American lives [are] now handled by reserve Swiss army doctors with relative 
disinterested attention.”90  These doctors reportedly “prescribed rest and other such 
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doubtful remedies” for all but the most serious medical conditions.91  In one case in 
December 1944 an American staff sergeant was sent to the hospital at Thun with 
suspected appendicitis, but he was returned to his camp at Wengen with a report that 
“nothing was wrong with him.”  The U.S. Legation intervened in the case since the 
airman “was quite evidently in physical distress,” and he was correctly diagnosed and 
underwent an appendectomy in a different hospital in Bern.  According to the U.S. 
Legation, this was a clear case of “either an incompetent or a negligent diagnosis” and 
“we can hardly be expected to have further confidence in the ability or diligence of the 
Thun hospital.”92  In response to these reports, the Headquarters Strategic Air Forces in 
Europe eventually decided to send three Medical Corps officers and one dental officer to 
Switzerland to supplement the Swiss medical treatment of the American internees.
93
 
One of the most serious cases of perceived medical neglect in Switzerland was 
that of Staff Sgt. James Stotts, the left waist gunner on a B-17 that crashed in Switzerland 
on April 24, 1944 after a harrowing firefight over Germany.  While on a mission to bomb 
Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany, nine Luftwaffe fighters shot out two of the bomber’s 
engines and then pursued and “constantly attacked” the damaged aircraft all the way to 
Switzerland.  According to the copilot, “my courageous gunners [shot down] no less than 
seven of the nine [German] aggressors” before the bomber crossed the Swiss border.  The 
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crew narrowly averted a crashing into an urban area and landed in a field near 
Neftenbach, ripping the tail from the bomber in the process.
94
 
The experience deeply affected the entire crew, but none more than Sgt. Stotts.  
According to a crewmember’s report, Stotts was not physically injured, but “could have 
been mentally affected” by the traumatic events of his final mission. Another 
crewmember related that “[Stotts’s] mind wasn’t right after that.”  The sergeant was 
subsequently hospitalized for twenty-five days in a mental health institution in Waldau, 
Switzerland, but then was inexplicably released.
95
  According to a Swiss medical official, 
the Swiss physician treating Stotts claimed that he was “cured,” and reported that “the 
patient’s behavior seemed to be very orderly and natural, without hallucinations.”  
Therefore, the doctor requested that Stotts be transferred back to his camp at Wengen, 
where he “could completely recover more quickly than in the hospital.”96 
A few days later Stotts reportedly experienced “a violent short-lived state of 
catatonic excitement with religious inspiration” in which he wrote and talked 
impulsively.
97
  He subsequently “jumped from a hotel window [in Wengen, Switzerland] 
and died of [his] injuries.”  Stotts’s crew blamed both the U.S. Legation and the Swiss 
government for the incident, claiming that if “the American Military Legation [had] taken 
sufficient concern and precaution, [Stotts] would have remained confined to a medical 
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institution.”  Another crewmember reported that “this crew member died through 
‘Negligence.’”98  The Swiss censors intercepted another complaint about the incident 
from Staff Sgt. Lester Henderson, who complained that “it took three hours before a 
doctor came to examine [Stotts], and then he did nothing to send him to the hospital.”  
According to Henderson, Stotts “waited 6 to 8 hours in some corner before we took care 
of him,” and “in our army we do not wait one week before giving first aid to a wounded 
man.”99 
Not all interned Americans took issue with medical care in Switzerland.  
Technical Sergeant Alva Moss’s B-24 bomber, Jack Pine Joe, was hit by intense 
antiaircraft fire while on a combat mission to bomb an engine factory at Allach, 
Germany, on July 19, 1944.  The aircraft lost an engine and the pilot was unable to 
feather the propeller, causing the aircraft to rapidly lose altitude.  To the crew’s 
misfortune, the navigator immediately bailed out of the aircraft, and all of the relevant 
maps and charts were blown out of the escape hatch.  While the crew desperately threw 
all heavy objects out of the aircraft, the pilot simply “guessed at a compass heading” and 
flew toward what he thought was Switzerland.  Jack Pine Joe passed directly over 
Friedrichshafen, Germany, and was hit by antiaircraft fire a second time.  According to 
Moss, “all Hell broke loose” as explosions rocked the aircraft, and he received a large 
fragment of shrapnel in his lower left leg.  The pilot gave the order to bail out when the 
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heavily damaged aircraft reached Switzerland, and Moss went out the escape hatch.  Two 
other crew members were injured in the jump, and the copilot was killed.
100
 
When Sergeant Moss regained consciousness he was hanging from his parachute 
in the middle of a Swiss orchard.  A Swiss soldier helped him down, and he was taken to 
a Catholic hospital at Münsterlingen on the shore of Lake Constance.  Here he received 
an operation to remove the shrapnel, and then remained in the hospital for two months to 
recuperate.  According to Moss, “I remained in bed on my back for five weeks, then four 
more ambulatory weeks before being released.”  His doctor, a Swiss Army lieutenant, 
spoke “good English,” as did most of the nurses.  Moss thought that his medical care was 
“decent,” although the location of the hospital near the German border meant that every 
time the adjacent city of Friedrichshafen was bombed, “the hospital would vibrate and 
shake” from the explosions and “the Swiss would get out their air raid [helmets].”101 
Medical concerns and food rationing aside, most American internees agreed that 
although life while interned in Switzerland was not ideal, it was much preferred to the 
alternative of captivity in enemy hands.  Flight Officer Robert Long related that he 
harbored “no ill feelings or animosity of any kind” over his treatment while interned at 
Davos, claiming that “[the Swiss] shared what they had with us.”  According to Long, “at 
that time there were no fat Swiss,” an observation he attributed to the strict wartime 
rationing.
102
  Technical Sergeant Alva Moss professed that “most of the Swiss I came 
into contact with were very congenial to Americans,” and “the Swiss were very good to 
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us.”103  Lt. Walter Walser related that “our stay in Switzerland was pleasant and 
comfortable,” and he was “thankful that [his crew] were not in a prisoner of war camp or 
something worse.”104  Technical Sergeant Richard H. claimed that he received “excellent 
treatment,” and believed that he “had a good time compared with what [other downed 
airmen experienced] in Germany.”  Richard expressed that “all in all, I’m sure glad we 
made it there [to Switzerland].”105  According to 2nd Lt. James Green, “Life in Davos as 
an Internee/POW was not to be compared with that of POWs in the Stalags in Germany, 
unless one committed [an offense] such as getting caught trying to escape.”106   
The Americans who were caught escaping from Switzerland experienced a 
markedly different type of treatment from regular internees.  Rather than the isolation and 
boredom of mountain hotels, they faced confinement in civilian jails and military-run 
prisons where they were malnourished, medically neglected, and denied due process in 
the Swiss legal system.  The Americans’ escape attempts and their resulting incarceration 
strained the relationship both between internees and the U.S. Legation in Switzerland, as 
well as between the Swiss and U.S. governments.  
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IV.       Escaping Americans & Punishment Camps 
 
The number of interned Americans reached its apex in September 1944, at 1,179 
airmen, and declined to 700 by December 1944 due to what the U.S. military attaché 
referred to as an “exodus” of “internees escaping from Swiss territory” via the French 
border.
1
  Escapes were rare prior to August 1944, primarily due to the fact that 
Switzerland was completely surrounded by Axis occupied territory.  One explanation for 
the sudden rash of escapes was the notion of duty, as airmen realized that they were 
sitting out the remainder of the war as internees.  The aircrews were briefed by their 
commands that in the event of an apprehension by local authorities in neutral countries, 
“in all cases crews should attempt escape and return to their proper units,” with the caveat 
that “such escape should be made without use of force of arms or personal violence 
against neutral officials.”2  Technical Sergeant George Michel, a radio operator and 
gunner on a B-24 bomber, recalled that “at each and every briefing prior to mission we 
had been told very specifically that if our plane went down for any reason, it was our duty 
to try to escape and return to our bomber group.”3  Second Lt. James Misuraca 
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acknowledged “feeling some guilt” over sitting out the war in Switzerland, and claimed 
that escaping was simply “what you’re supposed to do” as a soldier.4   
Of course, other motivations also contributed to the exodus of internees.  Second 
Lt. Donald Malloy wanted to leave Switzerland because he had a new baby born after he 
had left for combat.  Second Lt. Loren Merritt simply wanted to get home to his wife.
5
  
According to 2
nd
 Lt. Wallace Northfelt, internment was analogous to a football player “on 
the bench” in the middle of a critical game.  He related that the highly-trained aircrews 
felt the same way when they faced the transition from active combat to an existence of 
relative complacency.  According to Northfelt, “all of a sudden [the airmen were] sitting 
down doing nothing—it’s impossible [to bear].”  He also admitted that “we had some 
little girls [at] home in America” who served as additional incentives.6  Lt. Walter Walser 
echoed similar sentiments, explaining that “sitting there and hearing the news of the war 
was [nerve-wracking],” since his crew was “[no longer] able to do our part to help bring 
the war to a close.”7  First Lt. Edward Jennings wanted to rejoin the war because there 
were two other pilots in his family, of which “one [was] missing in action [and] the other 
somewhere overseas.”  He claimed that “I hope my [escaping from Switzerland] does 
them a service as well as my country.”8  These motivations and others convinced many 
internees to jeopardize their positions of relative safety and attempt escape, an ironic 
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reversal from when they entered Switzerland in order to avoid capture by the Nazis.  This 
decision potentially carried considerable consequences, since by escaping the airmen also 
risked apprehension and possible punishment by their Swiss hosts.  Once Allied forces 
neared the Swiss border in late August 1944, escape attempts increased dramatically as 
hundreds of American internees aspired to rejoin friendly lines.
9
   
The U.S. Legation and Consulates actively assisted internees’ escape from 
Switzerland.  Prior to the summer of 1944 the U.S. authorities utilized a limited number 
of existing British escape routes.
10
  General Legge reported in December 1943 that “one 
or [two] British and a number of Dutch have gotten thru” France to Spain using the 
escape channels, and he felt that the Legation “should make [an] effort to start some of 
our escaped pilots” on the route.11  However, the attaché eventually determined that these 
routes were “inadequate and unproductive,” since it was “extremely difficult and 
dangerous to get men across occupied France.”12   
After the U.S. lines reached the Swiss border in August 1944, Lt. General Ira 
Eaker, commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, submitted a proposal to assist 
in returning interned airmen to U.S. lines.  Eaker asked the Office of Strategic Services 
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(OSS), a secret organization that specialized in espionage and clandestine operations, to 
prepare to evacuate 1,000 of the internees.
13
  This operation was part of a larger OSS 
“underground railway” that rescued thousands of downed airmen during the war.14  The 
OSS was well postured for this mission in France because of Operation Carpetbagger, an 
OSS run effort to supply the resistance movements in Europe.  Under Carpetbagger, the 
OSS dropped so-called ‘Jedburgh’ teams ahead of Allied lines in France in order to 
coordinate local resistance.  This also meant that the Jedburgh teams were frequently the 
closest Allied forces to the Swiss border in mid 1944, and therefore in a unique position 
to coordinate the repatriation of escaped internees.  The OSS also had operational control 
of several squadrons of USAAF personnel and aircraft in the 492
nd
 Bombardment Group 
that could be used to repatriate internees from France.
15
  Together, several of the 
Jedburghs and four C-47 Skytrain transport aircraft under the control of the 856
th
 
Bombardment Squadron formed a new network that eventually repatriated hundreds of 
escaped internees.
16
  On the ground this operation was called the Air Crew Recovery 
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Unit, a name that applied to operations in France as well as earlier efforts to evacuate 
downed Allied airmen from the Balkans.
17
 
In September 1944 the U.S. Legation in Switzerland hatched a new plan to 
evacuate about twenty internees per week into the hands of the OSS, which had 
operatives operating across the French border in Annecy and Annemasse.
18
  The Legation 
reportedly chose internees based on a “priority list,” and then ferried them across the 
border using various intermediaries.
19
  The escape network consisted of U.S. agents, 
Swiss civilians, and French Maquis.
20
  On the French side of the border, the OSS network 
established a processing center at Hotel Beau Rivage on Lake Annecy, which was not far 
from Geneva.
21
  The operation was originally overseen by Lt. Ball of the OSS—
codenamed “Niveau”— one of the original Jedburghs who parachuted into France in June 
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of 1944 in order to coordinate with the local resistance.
22
  Once the processing center was 
established at Annecy, OSS officials regularly sent a car to the French border to ferry 
escaped internees back to the hotel, where they were fed, bathed, and then interrogated.  
When weather permitted, the former internees were driven to Lyon and then manifested 
on the next C-47 returning to England.
23
 
Eventually the Eighth Air Force set up a permanent receiving station in Annecy in 
order to process the returning internees and fly them back to England.
24
   Other field 
detachments complete with “tents, blankets, some transportation and some food” were 
established in Brussels, Verdun, Luxembourg, Liege, and Lyon in order to “care for the 
escapers and evaders” until they could be evacuated to London.   From here the escaped 
internees reported to the U.S. Special Reception Center for debriefing.
25
  In November 
1944, General Legge wrote the War Department that “about 220 internees have escaped 
to date with assistance [from] this office.”26  To transport this number of internees out of 
Switzerland, several of the U.S. Legation staff provided way stations for internees in their 
own houses, and other U.S. officials took very active roles in personally conveying the 
internees to the French border.   
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The U.S. Legation continually looked for ways to expand the escape network in 
new directions.  In December 1944 the Legation requested the assistance of Captain 
Charles “Chuck” Yeager to help plan escapes from Switzerland.  Yeager was well-known 
because he was shot down over southern France in March 1944 and managed to evade 
over the Pyrenees Mountains into Spain.  He held the distinction of being one of the first 
U.S. airmen to make it back to his squadron in England, as well as one of the few evadees 
who obtained approval to return to combat in Europe despite War Department regulations 
to the contrary.  At the Legation’s request Yeager was driven to Lake Annecy, about 50 
miles south of the Swiss border at Geneva,  where a Legation representative asked him to 
assist in planning for the escape of 800 U.S. airmen over the Alps.  The officer solicited 
Yeager’s advice on the optimal size of escape groups and other logistical details.  Yeager 
was skeptical of the far-fetched proposal to smuggle internees through the mountains, and 
recalled that “as far as I know, the escape plan was never attempted.”27 
Perhaps the most aggressive advocate for escaping internees was Sam E. Woods, 
the U.S. Consul General stationed in Zurich.  Woods had a passion for helping the 
American pilots, possibly because he was a former Marine Corps aviator himself during 
World War I.  Prior to his assignment in Switzerland, Woods was assigned to Berlin in 
1937 as the inspector of all U.S. commercial attachés in Europe.  Later Woods became 
the commercial attaché himself at the Berlin embassy, and was then promoted to Foreign 
Service Officer when the Bureau of Foreign Commerce was reorganized under the State 
Department in 1939.  Woods’ role as a commercial attaché served as an excellent cover 
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when he began using his German contacts to ferry Nazi secrets to his State Department 
superiors on his own initiative.
28
  Woods reported his intelligence directly to President 
Roosevelt, divulging German progress in heavy water experiments, submarine warfare, 
and even providing advance warning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, 
Operation Barbarossa.
29
  He maintained his German contacts when he was transferred to 
Zurich, and this enabled him to remain one of the most important American intelligence 
sources of the war.
30
   
Woods often took substantial risks to help escaping internees, despite the 
importance of his intelligence work, including travelling to meet them in person, allowing 
them to stay in his residence, and even ferrying them to the border.  Woods came to visit 
Sgt. William Wilkey and other Americans confined to a prison camp for attempting to 
escape from Adelboden in September 1944.  According to Wilkey, Woods “[told] us he 
would have a car parked not too far from the prison camp on such a date and time.  All 
any one of us had to do was get out of the compound and past the guards and dogs, and 
get to the car, which would haul us to freedom.”  Wilkey recalled that at least one 
American escaped from the camp this way.
31
   
Woods offered similar assistance to 2
nd
 Lt. Robert Dillworth and 2
nd
 Lt. Peter 
Zarafontis after they crawled under the barbed wire of a prison camp where they were 
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confined for previous escape attempts.  The two officers phoned Woods from the border 
of Zurich.  The Consul General soon picked the men up in his car, and let them stay in his 
house until proper arrangements were made.  Woods arranged for rail tickets for the 
officers to travel to Lausanne, and also coordinated with a French resistance contact.  
When the Americans arrived in Lausanne, a blonde woman met them and brought them 
to her house.  Dillworth and Zarafontis waited their turn while the woman’s husband 
ferried another group of Americans into France.  Unfortunately this group was arrested 
while crossing the border, which prompted the Swiss family to send Dillworth and 
Zarafontis to a Swiss hotel in Geneva.  The next evening they were instructed to follow a 
guide from a distance.  When the guide displayed the prearranged signal – closing an 
umbrella – the pair “made a dash across the fields and went through the first barbed wire 
fence” of the French border.  They were shot at by Swiss border guards, but nevertheless 
stumbled through the two layers of wire and gained their freedom.
32
   
Another American officer, 2
nd
 Lt. Lewis Sarkovich, was also personally assisted 
by Woods in escaping from Switzerland.  Sarkovich, the copilot of a B-24 based out of 
Norfolk, England, was interned in April 1944 when he crashed his badly damaged 
aircraft, nicknamed Commando, in Payerne, Switzerland.  Sarkovich was knocked 
unconscious in the crash, which also ripped off Commando’s wings and tail, and set the 
ship on fire.  When Sarkovich was hauled away from the crash site in an ambulance, a 
Swiss soldier told him "Für Sie dem Krieg ist fertig,” or “for you the war is finished.”  
However, the Swiss soldier underestimated Sarkovich, who had no intention of sitting out 
the war.  Starting in October 1944 Sarkovich made four unsuccessful escape attempts, 
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resulting in several periods of incarceration in Swiss military jails and a punishment 
camp.  He knew that another failed attempt guaranteed a considerable prison sentence, 
and so he decided to seek out the help of Sam Woods.  In January 1945 Sarkovich slipped 
out of Davos by procuring a Yugoslav military uniform and a forged passport from a 
group of Yugoslav escapees who were also lodged in Davos.  He retained his U.S. Army 
dog tags so that he could prove his identity in the event of capture.  The Yugoslav 
escapees were not confined to Davos like Sarkovich; they did not enter Switzerland as 
belligerents and therefore were not interned.  As a result the Yugoslavs had much greater 
travel liberties, and could even purchase rail passes for trips around Switzerland.  
Sarkovich slipped in with a group of Yugoslavs and travelled via train to Zurich, taking 
care to act the part and speak only Serbian.  Once in Zurich, he asked a Yugoslav friend 
who spoke German to call the U.S. Consulate, as the Swiss operators would cut off 
callers who spoke any other language.  The friend used a prearranged code word, 
“Charlie Chase,” which meant that Sarkovich urgently needed help.33    
Sarkovich next met Sam Woods in a local bar to arrange for his escape.  Woods 
was incredulous that Sarkovich managed to escape from his camp in a foreign uniform, 
exclaiming “that’s a new twist!”  Woods kept the pilot in his house in Zurich for several 
days until he could arrange the escape.  He eventually decided to smuggle Sarkovich out 
of the country by driving him to Geneva in his diplomatic vehicle, where they would 
meet members of the escape network who would take him over the border.  Sarkovich 
was betrayed to Swiss authorities on previous escape attempts, and believed that his 
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guides had turned him in to collect rewards.  Therefore, he asked Woods if he could alter 
the plan and cross the border on his own by rowing across Lake Geneva from Vevey.  
Woods agreed to the new plan and gave the pilot $200 worth of Swiss Francs, a compass, 
and several maps of Switzerland.  He told Sarkovich to remember the names of the Swiss 
civilians who helped him, as they would be compensated by the U.S. government.  
Woods advised the pilot “When you get across [the lake], ask for the O.S.S.  I’ll see that 
they know you are trying to get across and when.”34   
Sarkovich took “a long walk” through Vevey looking for a small boat that he 
could use to cross Lake Geneva.  He observed that most of the cottages on the Swiss side 
of the lake were summer homes, and as a result were “fairly isolated.”  Many also had 
boats in the yards, “some covered, and some just turned over to keep out rain.”  He made 
a mental note of several houses with boats in the yards, and then left the area to find 
dinner.  Later that evening under the cover of darkness, Sarkovich returned and located 
one of his target boats.  He used a knife to remove the chain that anchored the craft to a 
nearby tree, waited until around 11:00 PM, and then started out across the lake.  
Sarkovich strapped his compass to his wrist to remind him of the heading of 20 degrees 
he hoped would take him to the French shoreline nearly eight miles away.   He stopped 
rowing every half hour “to listen for engine noises” from the patrol boats.  After about 
two and a half hours of rowing he heard an engine, prompting him to lie down in the boat 
and reduce his profile.  According to Sarkovich, “a flash of light passed about 20 feet 
overhead,” and “after about three or four passes, the light went out.”  Fortunately, the 
waves were so heavy that they completely concealed the boat from view when it was in a 
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trough.  Eventually the engine noises dissipated, and Sarkovich continued rowing.  Soon 
he could “make out the shoreline and woods behind it” in France.  He had been rowing 
for four or five hours in freezing temperatures, and when he finally got ashore he noted 
that “my legs felt numb from below my knees to the soles of my feet.”35    
After about ten minutes on the French shore a figure approached Sarkovich, who 
was now shivering and nearly hypothermic.  The pilot soon saw that his visitor carried a 
flashlight, rifle, and an armband emblazoned with “F.F.I.,” the French resistance.  The 
rifle was leveled at Sarkovich, who simply stated “American pilot.”  The airman was 
marched at gunpoint to a “military compound of some sort,” which turned out to be a 
French resistance base at St. Gingolph.  Here a French commandant verified Sarkovich’s 
identity by calling back to the U.S. Legation in Switzerland, and then contacted a U.S. 
Army base in Annecy described as “a staging ground for all personnel escaping from 
Switzerland.”   After a few days an OSS officer arrived in a truck with several other 
former internees, and the group travelled to Annecy.  Sarkovich was eventually driven to 
Lyon, where he boarded a C-47 transport to London.  After a three to four hour flight, he 
arrived at a camp “for internee and escapee processing.”  Sarkovich went through several 
days of paperwork and medical screenings, and then was issued his back pay and new 
uniforms.  He went to his old bombardment group in Seething and discovered that there 
was only one officer that he still knew.  The officer told Sarkovich that he was the only 
surviving member of the group from early 1944, as “the entire unit was wiped out in a 
period of about six months.”36    
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Sarkovich cleared his bombardment group and flew to Washington D.C. via 
Scotland, Iceland, and Greenland.  He and the other passengers were “briefed as 
returnees” in Washington, and ordered to report to a debriefing center.  According to 
Sarkovich, “the first person I talked to was a character from the Internal Revenue 
Service,” who “had all my records and made out my tax bill for 1944.”  The sum came to 
$280, which Sarkovich paid on the spot.  The experience astounded the recently 
repatriated lieutenant, who noted that “the son of a bitch didn’t even say ‘Welcome 
home’ or ‘Glad you made it.’”37 
Sarkovich was only one of many Americans who were personally assisted by Sam 
Woods.  However, the consul could not possibly do the job alone, and so Woods enlisted 
the help of several interned Americans and other consular officials to assist with the 
escape network.  One of these assistants was 2
nd
 Lt. Floyd “Mac” MacSpadden.  
MacSpadden was the pilot of the fifth American bomber to land in Switzerland in early 
September 1943, a B-17 nicknamed Madame Butterfly.
38
  The U.S. Legation designated 
him as a special representative for the distribution of movies for the internees, which 
required him to travel to Basel, Geneva, and Zurich.
39
  This was apparently a cover to 
allow him to travel under the guise of liaising with film distributors.  MacSpadden was 
given a supply of ration stamps to procure extra food and civilian clothing for escapees, 
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as well as medical supplies to pay off the French resistance for their help in crossing the 
border.  He also encouraged the escaping internees to befriend Swiss civilians, 
particularly women, in order that they could obtain extra ration stamps and forged travel 
passes.  The Swiss girls in particular were “glad to assist them.” MacSpadden was 
responsible for ferrying the internees to prearranged “pick-up points” where the French 
resistance would escort the internees across the border.  He reportedly used ten or twelve 
escape routes in order to throw off the Swiss military, and the operations usually took 
place after dark.  MacSpadden made a point of not keeping a record of the men he 
helped, in order to have deniability in the event of capture by the Swiss.
40
  It was also 
quite possible that many of the men he assisted did not know that he was working for the 
U.S. Legation.     
MacSpadden was told that he must himself flee the country in December 1944, as 
the Swiss were planning to arrest him and others involved in the escape network.
41
  He 
escaped from Adelboden after dinner on 13 December and travelled to Bern with another 
American officer.
42
  The pair went directly to U.S. Legation where they spent the night.  
The next day they were introduced to a Czech smuggler who planned to get the officers 
out of the country by boating across Lake Geneva into France.  Using forged documents 
they travelled via train to the lake, and crossed successfully to the French side.  The next 
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day the U.S. Army sent a truck to pick up MacSpadden, and he was eventually flown 
back to England.
43
 
Sam Woods provided more than merely minor assistance to Dillworth, Zarafontis, 
Sarkovich, and MacSpadden.  By insisting on driving the escaping internees and 
sheltering them in his own home, he took significant risks that certainly jeopardized his 
other important duties.  As a result, Swiss officials soon noticed that Woods was helping 
Americans to flee the country.  According to a high level FCIH administrator, the fleeing 
Americans were “protected and promoted” by the Zurich Consulate through personal 
involvement and coordination of escape attempts.
44
  Woods and other legation officials 
often visited the internees under the excuse of delivering books or other supplies.
45
  
According one Swiss officer, Woods ran “a very discreet operation” in which “U.S. 
soldiers who were evacuated to a hospital escaped several days after arriving there.”  In 
one case an American sergeant telephoned Woods from Sursee Hospital “on some 
pretext.”  According to the complaint, “several hours later, the man was gone.”46  
Another American internee asked a local innkeeper in Rotkreuz “if he could telephone to 
Zurich and what code to dial for Zurich,” followed shortly by “a short phone call in 
English,” ostensibly to the U.S. Consulate in Zurich.  Soon a man in civilian clothes who 
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the Swiss authorities claimed was “presumably Sam Woods” showed up at the inn late 
that night and visited the internee in his room.  The civilian “told the internee to come 
with him,” and the pair soon disappeared.47  On another occasion, four American 
internees escaped from a confinement camp at Hünenberg immediately after a visit from 
Woods.  Swiss police surmised that Woods drove the internees to the French border at 
Chavannes-de-Bogis, where they found footprints made by “shoes with Fibran soles” that 
they attributed to the internees.  According to the police, “This indicates that they were 
American internees and that they had been driven to the Chavannes-de-Bogis location 
with the help of Consul General Sam Woods.”48   
Once Swiss military officials caught wind of the U.S. Legation’s escape network, 
they took steps to curtail its effectiveness and warn U.S. officials of the potential 
consequences.  They restricted access to internees who were deemed flight risks, 
requiring special passes from high-level FCIH section chiefs in order for U.S. Legation 
officials to enter certain camps and visit internees.
49
  In late January 1945, the Swiss 
Minister of the Political Department also threatened “a formal demarche in Washington 
regarding the activities of the Consulate General at Zurich,” a clear reference to Sam 
Woods.
50
  According to General Legge, “[the] Swiss [are] well aware that I, members of 
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my staff and Consulates [are] engaged in escape activities,” and the threat of a diplomatic 
protest was evidence that “[the] continued escape of our internees is becoming 
embarrassing for [the] Swiss.”51   
Despite the fact that the Swiss knew about the U.S. efforts, the Legation still took 
steps to maintain plausible deniability.  The U.S. Legation protested the restrictions on 
contacting internees, claiming that “this complicates the question of the duties of our 
office vis-a-vis our officers [and] men.”  The military attaché claimed that one officer 
who was overheard coordinating escapes was simply “engaged on liaison work between 
the different camps necessitated by financial settlements and general administrative 
matters.”52  The Legation also punished Americans who jeopardized the escape network.  
In one case, a U.S. Army Lt. Col. on temporary duty for the U.S. Legation was 
disciplined for writing to his wife about the covert activities of U.S. officials in 
Switzerland.  Lt. Col. Peter de Paolo disclosed that “the American Consulate General in 
[Zurich] was assisting interned American personnel to escape from [Switzerland].”  
According to the counter intelligence section of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied 
Expeditionary Forces, sending this information through German censors was “a serious 
                                                 
51
 Telegram from U.S. Military Attaché, Bern, Switzerland to U.S. War Department, dated January 31, 
1945, No. 2062, NARA, RG 319, E57, Confidential and Secret Incoming and Outgoing Messages 1942-
1945, Switzerland Box 616. 
52
 Letter from General Legge, Military Attaché at U.S. Legation in Bern, Switzerland to Colonel Blanc, 
FCIH Chief of Section, dated January 15, 1945, SFA, Box E5791, 1000/949, Vol. 609. 
      95 
security violation which could easily lead to reprisals and diplomatic as well as military 
difficulties of a very grave nature.”53 
The U.S. government also took steps to ensure that their escape assistance 
remained within the boundaries of international law.  For instance, on several rare 
occasions U.S. officials offered to return internees who escaped while on parole, since 
this conduct was considered a breach of international obligations and potentially 
jeopardized diplomatic standing and the ability to offer future paroles.  Paroles have their 
roots in the medieval codes of chivalry, when captured knights were offered freedom in 
exchange for a promise not to take up arms against their captors.
54
   Thus, the rule was 
later codified international treaties, such as the 1899 Hague Convention (II), as well as 
the 1907 Hague Convention (V).  Both conventions also authorized neutral powers to 
offer parole.
55
  According to the 1907 Hague Convention, Switzerland could “decide 
whether officers can be left at liberty on giving their parole not to leave the neutral 
territory without permission.”56  The exact implications of the parole were applied by 
analogy from the 1899 Hague Convention (II), which specified that “prisoners of war 
may be set at liberty on parole if the laws of their country authorize it, and, in such a case, 
they are bound, on their personal honour, scrupulously to fulfill, both as regards their 
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own Government and the Government by whom they were made prisoners, the 
engagements they have contracted.”57  The 1899 Convention also elaborated that “any 
prisoner of war, who is liberated on parole and recaptured, bearing arms against the 
Government to whom he had pledged his honour, or against the allies of that 
Government, forfeits his right to be treated as a prisoner of war, and can be brought 
before the courts.”58  A period legal opinion from the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General 
cited the precedent that previous U.S. Army regulations stipulated that “breaking the 
parole is punished with death when the person breaking the parole is captured again.”59 
Valid paroles for Americans interned in Switzerland were countersigned by the 
U.S. Legation in Bern, which meant that both the U.S. government as well as the 
internees were bound to respect the provisions of the paroles.  Therefore, when 2
nd
 Lt. 
Robert Simpson escaped while on parole on October 5, 1944, the U.S. government 
returned him to Swiss authorities on October 22 despite the fact that Simpson had already 
been repatriated back to his bombardment squadron in England.
60
  USAAF Lt. Colonel 
Robert Fish, commander of the “Carpetbaggers” bombardment group in late 1944, 
recalled the incident in his memoirs.  According to Fish, while preparing to fly a number 
                                                 
57
 Article 10, 1899 Hague Convention (II). 
58
 Article 12, 1899 Hague Convention (II). 
59
 The quote references General Order 100, dated April 24, 1863, and is from a Judge Advocate General 
opinion authored explicitly to address the parole implications in Switzerland.  See memo from Col. 
Archibald King, JAGD, to the Judge Advocate General, “Personal Responsibility for Breach of Parole 
Given to a Neutral Government,” No. SPJGW 1944/12149, NARA, RG 319, E47, Army Intelligence 
Project Decimal File 1941-1945, Switzerland Box 1019. 
60
 See Alexander Mussard, “An American Bomber in Switzerland: Supplementary Report,” dated 
November 7, 1991, SIAA, and telegram from U.S. Military Attaché in Bern, Switzerland to War 
Department, dated October 8, 1944, No 1829, NARA, RG 319, E57, Confidential and Secret Incoming and 
Outgoing Messages 1942-1945, Switzerland Box 615. 
      97 
of escaped internees from Annecy to London, one of the escapees—Lt. Simpson—
informed him “that he might not be a ‘legal escapee’” because he had violated a parole 
that allowed him to attend classes at a Swiss university.  Fish repatriated the airman, 
reasoning that “my job was to transport ‘escapees’ back to England and he was obviously 
an ‘escapee.’”  However, only two days later, Fish received a call from the U.S. Embassy 
in London, ordering him to “get that lieutenant back into Switzerland as fast as [he] 
could,” as “the Swiss government was vigorously protesting that he had broken his 
parole.”  Fish flew Simpson back to Annecy, where he was driven to the Swiss border 
and handed over to the border guards.  However, only five days later Lt. Simpson arrived 
in Annecy again after his second successful escape.  According to Fish, since the parole 
was no longer valid the airman “was a legitimate ‘escapee’ and the Swiss had no 
objection [to his repatriation],” since “the requirements of international neutrality and 
protocol had been satisfied.”61    
The U.S. government offered to return at least one other parole violator to 
Switzerland in February 1945.  Staff Sergeant Charles Page escaped from Switzerland the 
previous month while on parole, and even received U.S. Legation assistance in the 
effort.
62
  When the U.S. military attaché discovered the inconsistency, he wrote to the 
War Department complaining that since his “word of honor that this man would not 
escape is involved,” “his return should formally be offered [to the] Swiss by [the] War 
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Dept.”63  Although the War Department initially authorized Page’s return to Switzerland, 
Lt. General Carl Spaatz, commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, soon 
intervened.  Spaatz reported that “[Page] was in serious medical condition [and] thus 
anxious to get out,” a reference to gunshot wounds that Page received while on his final 
mission that resulted in his internment.  Therefore, Spaatz recommended “[Page’s] return 
to Switzerland only if [General] Legge cannot satisfy Swiss officials without jeopardizing 
his position.”64  Legge presented the case to Swiss authorities, who conceded that Page’s 
return was “not necessary” under these mitigating circumstances.65 
Although well intentioned, the U.S.-sanctioned escape networks were ultimately 
inadequate to meet the demand of escaping internees, and many internees were 
apparently unaware that they even existed.  This problem was due in part to the highly 
decentralized command and control that existed between the U.S. Legation and the 
various U.S. internment camps spread throughout Switzerland.  The U.S. Legation had a 
severe shortage of experienced officers to staff its primary functions, much less supervise 
and administer the internment of nearly 1,200 U.S. airmen.  According to the military 
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attaché, “very little trained personnel [were] available, either on my own staff or among 
the internees, to handle the large and complex administrative problems which arose.”66   
The already poor command relationship between the U.S. Legation and the 
internees was also actively impeded by the Swiss government.  According to General 
Legge, “the Swiss authorities from the start took the attitude that the care of the internees 
is their own concern and have acted independently as possible of the [military attaché].”  
Thus, newly arrived internees were sequestered for days “until they [were] interrogated,” 
and internees were frequently moved without any notification to the U.S. Legation.
67
  
According to Legge, this attitude stemmed from the fact that most internees in 
Switzerland prior to the arrival of the Americans were nationals of governments in exile, 
such as the Poles, Yugoslavs, and French.  Thus, the Swiss saw the administration of 
internment “as their own responsibility, to be carried out with a minimum of interference 
from other governments.”  As a result, although the Swiss “recognized in theory the 
command responsibility of the [military attaché], most of the command functions could 
not be exercised.”  Legge’s repeated protests about these problems “brought little or no 
result.”68    
Swiss interference, inadequate staffing, and limited resources prevented the U.S. 
Legation from meeting the immediate demand of hundreds of internees who eventually 
escaped from Switzerland between 1944 and 1945.  An October 1944 review by Brig. 
General George McDonald, the director of intelligence for the U.S. Strategic Air Forces 
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in Europe, expressed that “we have long realized that the Swiss situation was one which 
required some action.”  According to McDonald, many of the internees in Switzerland 
“are getting very impatient, and try to escape on their own accord.”  He explained that 
“The trouble is that up to this point they have had so many rumors of mass evacuation, 
exchange, established escape routes, that they don’t put too much credence in [General] 
Legge or his staff from a point of view of their ability to help them.”  McDonald advised 
that “The main thing is to get the boys in the camps informed on established channels for 
escape so that they won’t go off on their own accord.”69  A similar review by Major 
Benjamin Nordman of the same command concluded that “the men were prone to 
disregard advice from General Legge’s office and to attempt to escape on their own” 
because they no longer found the Legation credible.  As a result, although “there were 
numerous [U.S. supported] opportunities for escape from Switzerland,” these networks 
“were not being availed of because the USAAF personnel in the camps did not know of 
their existence.”  Major Nordman personally travelled to Switzerland with the goal of 
“[making] direct contact with our personnel” at the internment camps and providing them 
with the needed information.
70
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the goal of improving the information flow to 
internees in Switzerland was never realized, as many internees did not solicit or receive 
help from U.S. authorities. Accordingly, many left Switzerland with a thoroughly 
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negative view of the U.S. Legation.  2
nd
 Lt. William Wesson escaped without U.S. 
assistance in September of 1944, and upon arrival at U.S. lines in Annecy he reported that 
“we [were not] able to find the slightest sign of [an] escape organization in Davos nor any 
person who could give us any information.”71  1st Lt. Donald McConnell reported to U.S. 
officials at Annecy that the U.S. Legation should help more with escapes.
72
  1
st
 Lt. Arthur 
Glasier also reported to U.S. officials at Annecy that “[the] treatment by American 
Legation in Bern [was] in no way helpful and often antagonistic.”73  Dozens of officers 
and non-commissioned officers echoed the same sentiments, reporting to U.S. officials 
that there was “no apparent help by the Am. Legation,” “the American Legation has been 
very hard on men trying to escape,” “Poor aid to anyone [escaping],” “Very little help for 
any reason by American Legation,” “American Legation in Switzerland had [the] 
appearance of incompetence [and] did very little,” “The American Legation is very 
poor,” and “The American Legation in Switzerland [did] very little or nothing at all for 
us.”74 
The relationship between the U.S. Legation and the internees further deteriorated 
after August 1944 when General Legge issued blanket orders for the Americans internees 
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not to escape on their own without assistance.
75
  The policy apparently originated in the 
War Department’s Military Intelligence Service, which on June 7, 1944 directed Legge 
“to forbid all personnel under your command to make attempts to escape from 
Switzerland without your personal approval.”76  Legge agreed with the policy, as he 
believed that “escape, without [a] plan, was extremely hazardous.”77  The order not to 
escape, combined with the general lack of communication, soon exacerbated the already 
tenuous relationship between the internees and the U.S. Legation.  Internees interpreted 
the order as proof that the U.S. authorities in Switzerland condoned the punishment 
meted out by Swiss authorities to failed escapers, and some Americans even mistakenly 
believed that escape would also result in punishment by the U.S. military.  Absent an 
explanation the order not only failed to achieve the desired result, it actually convinced 
many internees to defy their instructions.  According to one American sergeant, the 
“scuttlebutt” about the order seemed so outrageous that it “cooled the heels of a few as a 
valid reason to ‘ride it out in Switzerland.’”78 
Several American internees who successfully escaped without U.S. assistance 
reported their concerns on the escape policy directly to the War Department.  In October 
1944 USAAF 1
st
 Lieutenants James White and Roger Smith both submitted formal 
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complaints to the Captured Personnel and Material Branch of the Military Intelligence 
Service, alleging that General Legge improperly forbid internees to escape.  According to 
the officers, “[Legge] stated [in April 1944] that if anyone had a plausible escape plan he 
would discuss it with him, however, when several men came forward with plans they 
were rejected.”  They testified that later, in August, Legge issued an order not to escape, 
including a threat that “the escapee would be court-martialed on returning to American 
control.”  The internees objected since the order apparently contradicted standing orders 
“that it was our duty to escape,” a reference to War Department policy briefed to all 
aircrews before they began combat operations in Europe.
79
  In November 1944 a similar 
allegation was submitted to the War Department by three USAAF lieutenants who were 
“very bitter against the American Legation in Switzerland in general and against General 
Barney Legge in particular.”  The lieutenants, who had previously escaped from 
Switzerland, complained to the War Department’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel 
that “General Legge gave direct orders to them that they were not to attempt to escape,” 
and also that Legge “threatened a general court-martial for all attempted escapes and, at 
one time, threatened them with dishonorable discharge.”  All of the lieutenants felt that 
the Legation could have done more to improve their treatment, as well as “filter useful 
information through to them.”80   
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It is clear from the complaints that the disgruntled internees had almost no direct 
contact with General Legge, and that his instructions were significantly garbled by the 
time they reached the internees through various intermediaries.  In a reply to queries by 
the War Department, General Legge acknowledged that “My greatest trouble here is 
preventing [the internees] from trying to escape.”81  However, he claimed that “no one 
was threatened by me with General Courts Martial for attempting to escape against my 
orders,” and “no one was threatened with dishonorable discharge.”82  Legge justified his 
policy by citing statistics: he claimed that only 50 percent of escape attempts without 
U.S. Legation assistance were successful, whereas 98 percent of U.S. assisted escapes 
succeeded.  Some internees who escaped without official sanction were captured by the 
Germans in France.
83
  Legge also noted that the unassisted escape attempts put 
considerable pressure on remaining internees, as the Swiss government reacted by 
sending hundreds of additional soldiers to guard the American camps.  In Davos alone 
the guards were increased to approximately 700 Swiss soldiers, a force that dwarfed the 
mere 250 American officers in the camp.
84
  Legge claimed that “In general [the internees] 
have apparently never been able to appreciate our exact situation vis-à-vis the Swiss 
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authorities.”85  This statement had a basis in fact, although it appears that the internees 
usually had woefully insufficient information to comprehend the challenges or the 
instructions of the U.S. Legation.  By mid-October 1944, Legge resolved that the 
internees would continue to escape “in spite of any existing regulations or conventions, 
and all of the orders which I have published,” a clear acknowledgment that his control 
over the internees under his charge was entirely ineffective.
86
 
The problems with command and control of the American internees resulted in 
hundreds of unassisted escape attempts, many of which failed.  From 1944 to 1945 Swiss 
authorities intercepted 183 of at least 940 American internees who attempted to escape to 
Allied lines in France.
87
  The Americans were not the only internees attempting to flee 
the country, and in fact represented only about five percent of the military refugees 
escaping from Switzerland from 1940 to mid 1945.
88
  Therefore, internees of other 
nationalities had already pioneered the Swiss reaction to escaping internees, and 
disciplinary procedures to deal with such offenses were already in place.   
Escaped internees were normally arrested and jailed in special military-run 
prisons designed both for captivity and punitive retribution.  At least 154 Americans who 
were caught attempting escape in 1944 were sent to a special punishment camp at 
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Wauwilermoos, where their confinement would eventually test the limits of international 
law.
89
  The Swiss government was required to enforce competing legal obligations to 
both intern and guard belligerent forces and also treat them humanely.  At times these 
completing mandates resulted in prisoner mistreatment, as ambiguity in Swiss regulations 
and international law was exploited by inept or criminal elements within the FCIH.  
 In early December 1944, USAAF First Lieutenant Wally Northfelt was nearing 
his second month of imprisonment in the punishment camp at Wauwilermoos.  Nine 
months earlier as the navigator of Shoo Shoo Baby, a B-24 bomber based in England, he 
was shot down by German anti-aircraft fire while on a mission to bomb the Dornier 
Aircraft Factory in Friedrichshafen.  Since the target city was near the Swiss border, the 
pilot diverted the damaged plane to Switzerland and crash-landed at Dübendorf Airfield 
in Zurich.  Northfelt attempted to escape from Switzerland near Geneva in September 
1944, but he was apprehended by border guards and confined at Wauwilermoos.  After 
his arrival at the punishment camp, Northfelt quickly tired of the meager rations of 
coffee, bread, and thin soup, which he blamed in part for his weight loss of forty pounds 
over the course of his time in Switzerland.  He professed that “I never did sit down to a 
meal where I was completely satisfied,” and claimed that he was only able to get enough 
food to survive by purchasing it off the black market.  Northfelt was also ill; sleeping on 
dirty straw had caused him to break out in sores all over his body, and he had problems 
with his prostate gland.  Appeals for medical care had resulted in a consultation with a 
doctor who, Northfelt claimed, “specialized in women’s cases” and was unqualified to 
help him.  Northfelt thought the doctor “knew about as much about medicine as I did,” 
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judging by the fact that he “puttered around” and “wasn’t doing anything for me.”  
Northfelt also disliked the camp administrators, who, he claimed, were “pro-Nazi,” and 
only cleaned up the camp when inspections by high ranking officers or American 
dignitaries were announced.  He resolved to make a formal complaint to U.S. authorities 
when, and if, he was released from Wauwilermoos.
90
 
 Wauwilermoos was built in 1940 near Lucerne, Switzerland, about twenty-six 
miles south of the German border.  Run by the Swiss Army, the camp housed military 
internees of various nationalities, including Poles, Italians, French, English, Germans, 
Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Americans.
91
  Military-run prisons like Wauwilermoos were 
established earlier in the war, after cantonal prisons became overcrowded with prisoners 
convicted in military courts.  According to a decree of the Swiss Federal Council in 1941, 
military prisoners would be confined according to whether their offenses qualified them 
for “custodia honesta,” or honorable confinement normally reserved for political 
prisoners.  Under this regime the Federal Council sought “to spare the convicted soldier 
incarceration in civilian prisons with common criminals.”  Instead, special military-run 
prisons would offer confinement for “certain offenses of a purely military character” that 
did not require rehabilitation.  According to the Federal Council, internees were well 
suited for custodia honesta because “their transgressions, particularly escape and escape 
attempts, as a rule are not offenses of a common criminal nature.”  Therefore, the 
punishment of escaping internees was explicitly intended to “lay outside the framework 
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and organization of [the Swiss] military penal code.”92  Regardless of the original intent 
of the Federal Council, for most of 1944 the FCIH did not follow the custodia honesta 
model, but rather grouped American internees who attempted escape with all manner of 
foreign military criminals in Wauwilermoos.  This policy shift took place as early as the 
fall of 1942, well before the arrival of the first Americans.  At the time, General Henri 
Guisan determined that “when it comes to escape, it will never be possible to stop it 
completely, no matter how many preventive measures, however strict, are implemented.”  
Therefore, he concluded that “the best available solution was to deal with the internees as 
prisoners.”93 
 At one point in the war, the administration of Wauwilermoos consisted of twenty-
three Swiss soldiers and one civilian.  The officers included a commandant, two 
quartermasters, an adjutant, an office supervisor, and a camp physician.  The enlisted 
personnel included a camp sergeant major, an accounting sergeant, two quartermaster 
sergeants, three military policemen, two drivers, an interpreter, and various munitions 
personnel and office staff.
94
  Five of these soldiers were members of the Hilfsdienst, or 
Auxiliary, an unarmed organization of conscripts created to perform unskilled labor for 
the regular field army.  Members of the Auxiliary did not meet the requirements for 
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regular military service and lacked formal military education or training.
95
  The Auxiliary 
troops ostensibly augmented the FCIH out of necessity due to critical military manpower 
shortages, but another contributing factor was likely that the FCIH was a lower priority 
for the Swiss Army than the paramount mission of ensuring national defense in a time of 
war.   
From 1941-1945, Wauwilermoos was under the command of Swiss Army Captain 
André Béguin, a politically controversial figure who bore much of the blame for the 
camp’s conditions.96  Born in the French-speaking canton of Neuchâtel, Béguin had 
obtained a commission as a Swiss artillery officer in 1928, but subsequently was 
discharged due to excessive personal debt.  In the 1930s he became active in politics and 
joined the National Union in Geneva, an anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi political party which 
was a popular fascist movement in Switzerland during the period.
97
  He eventually 
became the local leader of the National Union in Yverdon, and in 1937 he was arrested 
for illegally wearing a Nazi “party uniform” to a political rally in the same city.98  
Around the same time, Béguin was also forced to resign from the National Union after he 
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embezzled party funds.
99
  He blamed his financial troubles on his politics, claiming that 
many of his business clientele deserted him because they were “Jewish freemasons.”100  
He moved to Munich, Germany in 1938, where he worked as an architect.  He openly 
professed allegiance to Germany, and claimed in letters that “because of my anti-Semitic 
and anti-freemason thinking, I was only able to find work in the [German] nationalistic 
sphere.”  He wrote that in exchange for his employment, “I want to pay back this debt of 
honor owed to my comrades in the national organization.”  Béguin also signed his 
correspondence in Germany with “Heil Hitler,” a fact that later came back to haunt 
him.
101
  In September 1939 he returned to Villiers, Switzerland after the Nazis invaded 
Poland.  According to police reports from Neuchâtel, Béguin “was not popular with the 
locals” due to claims that he “he held pro-German views.”102   
Despite his tarnished record, Béguin obtained work in 1940 as a civilian 
employee of the FCIH, a job translating artillery manuals.  He then worked with the 
Service Complémentaire Féminin, or female auxiliary, under Major General Muralt. 
Béguin was eventually fired from this position, a decision that he blamed on his politics 
and the fact that he was twice divorced.
103
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Béguin then obtained a commission in the Swiss Army in as an ordnance 
officer.
104
  This ill-advised appointment was almost certainly due to the national state of 
emergency and manpower shortage in the Swiss Army, although this does not explain the 
decision to place Béguin in charge of soldiers of other nationalities.  Béguin was given 
the responsibility of organizing several disciplinary internment camps at Kalchrain, 
Herdern, and Tobel, and he eventually assumed command of the camps.  When the 
commander of the sector conducted an investigation into a riot at Kalchrain, Béguin was 
again relieved of his command and reassigned due to “incompatibility of temperament 
with the Frauenfeld Sector Commander.”  Béguin blamed the decision on an old political 
enemy from Yverdon.  He claimed that the “brutal dismissal from my duties as 
commandant” was “a direct blow to my honor,” and argued that “I consider myself to 
have done my soldierly duty as a Swiss officer and I do not deserve such disciplinary 
measures.”105  In fact, the punishment for this reprimand was short-lived.  In July 1941, 
Béguin was moved to a new sector and given command of Wauwilermoos, a post he held 
until August 1945.
106
   
Béguin’s administration of Wauwilermoos raised concerns in the Swiss Army 
well before the arrival of the first Americans in the camp.  Colonel Robert Jaquillard, the 
Chief of Swiss Counterintelligence, wrote to the Swiss Army Chief of Staff about André 
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Béguin’s professional competence as early as January of 1942 after conducting an 
investigation of Béguin for possible espionage activity with Nazi Germany.
107
  Although 
Jaquillard could not substantiate allegations of spying, he unearthed other incriminating 
evidence “likely to require a decision regarding [Captain Béguin] by the commander or 
by military justice.” He reported several disturbing facts about Béguin’s past: he was the 
leader of a pro-Nazi organization in Switzerland; he continued to wear his Swiss Army 
uniform in 1938 after his discharge and claimed a military command that he did not hold; 
he falsely reported that he lived in France rather than Germany from 1938-1939.
108
   
Jaquillard also uncovered evidence of more recent misconduct that dated to 
Béguin’s command of Wauwilermoos: he was financially in arrears to both civilian and 
military creditors; he admitted in correspondence to committing adultery; he displayed 
pro-Nazi bias and mismanagement at Wauwilermoos.  According to Jaquillard, a Swiss 
soldier under Béguin’s command at Wauwilermoos accused him of unfair treatment in 
October of 1941.  Béguin also intervened to help a Swiss soldier who was described as 
“suspected of being an undercover Nazi agent.”  With Béguin’s help, the soldier was 
released from prison.  Béguin’s supervisor, Colonel Treu, reprimanded him for improper 
record keeping at the camp.  Another Swiss Army colonel in the FCIH called Béguin a 
“bad officer” and a “no-good, unpatriotic liar,” and an officer of the Lausanne security 
police called him “someone with few scruples, [and] with very dubious morals.”  
According to Jaquillard, “the post of internment camp commander requires someone with 
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a less clouded past than Béguin’s, who certainly would appear to be out of place.”109  For 
unknown reasons, the FCIH declined to act on Jaquillard’s report and allowed Béguin to 
retain his command of Wauwilermoos. 
In February 1942, Major Humbert, the chief medical officer and commander of 
Büren Hospital, wrote to the chief medical officer of the FCIH to complain about 
“serious irregularities” in Camp Wauwilermoos.  The camp first caught his notice 
because admissions to the hospital that month were highly irregular.  According to 
Humbert, Wauwilermoos internees made up “37% of all [hospital] entries” in early 
February, despite the fact that the Hospital serviced a total of “45 camps and detachments 
of 5,372 men” throughout FCIH Sector Seeland.  This was Humbert’s first indication that 
“morale at the Wauwilermoos camp is at rock bottom.”  He also interviewed twenty-two 
internees from the camp, and recorded their statements.  He found that “Béguin insults 
[the internees] violently for nothing,” and he also “denies them any opportunity to talk 
with the commandant of the camp.”  Punishments were extreme, such as “5 days arrest 
for an unfasten button [in formation],” or arrest for “going to the lavatory without being 
fully dressed, with belt and all buttons fastened, which is positively absurd from a 
hygienic standpoint.”  Other strict practices included the prohibition of listening to radio 
news, as well as “being escorted by police dogs on the way to [Sunday] mass.”  New 
arrivals to the camp first spent “5 days in the [confinement] barracks before reaching the 
open barracks,” and men who attempted escape were punished “without psychological 
discrimination from drunks or [those with criminal minds].”  As a result, Humbert 
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claimed that the “difficult elements” and the “former escapees of good character” were 
inappropriately commingled.
110
    
Humbert requested that his superior “order an investigation” into the conditions at 
Wauwilermoos.  He also requested to “bring a complaint and ask for sanctions against 
Captain Béguin” as a result of his interviews of the internees at the camp.  Humbert 
unambiguously complained that he considered Béguin “psychologically unfit to serve as 
commander of a punitive camp.”  He also recommended that internees be transferred 
from Wauwilermoos to a different confinement camp in Büren.  Humbert claimed that his 
requests were motivated only by his desire “to preserve the honor of the service.”111 
As with Jaquillard, the FCIH evidently did not take Humbert seriously, as none of 
his recommendations were favorably considered.  Instead of ameliorating conditions at 
Wauwilermoos, Col. Vuichoud, the chief medical officer of the FCIH, later directed that 
Wauwilermoos patients “should not remain at the hospital any longer than strictly 
necessary for their healing,” and that they “must be returned immediately to 
Wauwilermoos.”112  Vuichoud’s directive was a result of pressure from the FCIH’s chief 
prosecutor, who informed Vuichoud that that the patients sent from Wauwilermoos were 
simply malingering.  Vuichoud was told that the internees were not “not seriously ill,” 
                                                 
110
 Letters from Major Humbert to Chief Medical Officer for Internment, Bern, dated February 18, 24 and 
27, 1942, SFA, Box E5791, 1000/949, Vol. 739. 
111
 Ibid. 
112
 Memo from Col. Vuichoud, Chief Medical Officer for Internment, to Commandant of Hospital Büren, 
“Concerne détenus en traitement à l’hôpital,” dated January 28, 1943, SFA, Box E5791, 1000/949, Vol. 
784. 
      115 
but rather were complaining in order “to get themselves transferred [to B ren Hospital] 
and escape the camp’s discipline.”113   
Béguin also attracted complaints from high-ranking foreign detractors.  In 
November of 1943, General Bronisław Prugar-Ketling, one of the senior Polish officers 
interned in Switzerland, wrote to a senior FCIH official to report his concerns about the 
command at Wauwilermoos.  Earlier that month, a sentry at Wauwilermoos shot two 
Polish internees over a misunderstood verbal order, an incident that Prugar-Ketling 
claimed “sheds a glaring light on the conditions prevailing in the Wauwilermoos camp.”  
According to Prugar-Ketling, the shooting incident was the direct result of the “unusual 
style with which the camp’s Swiss management is imbued and the orders given by the 
camp commander, Captain Béguin.”  Prugar-Ketling believed that the methods at 
Wauwilermoos “exceed acceptable norms and rise to the level of totally unacceptable 
harassment.”  He informed the FCIH that such incidents had already occurred on several 
occasions, and were bound to taint the legacy of Swiss internment.
114
 
Béguin’s rebuttal to Prugar-Ketling’s charge was abrupt and unapologetic.  He 
argued that the general’s assertions about the camp administration were “based on false 
or biased information,” and that the discipline at Wauwilermoos was “the same as that 
prevalent in the [Swiss] army.”  Béguin claimed that the camp’s sense of order was 
required to control its “substantial contingent of bad characters,” evidenced by the many 
riots that occurred at the camp.  He explained that the shooting incident was merely a 
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case of “a convergence of circumstances resulting from a delayed reaction,” and was not 
a product of the command climate.  According to Béguin, internees were warned “on the 
first day of entering the camp” that “guards will shoot if a first challenge goes 
unanswered.”  Finally, Béguin found the authority for the policies at Wauwilermoos in 
the 1907 Hague Convention, which he cited to justify the practice of confining internees 
in prisons.  He claimed that “internees are not de jure prisoners of war,” which meant that 
they were not technically guaranteed the same protections as POWs.  Rather, Béguin 
claimed that “interned troops in no way have the benefit of extraterritoriality, but are 
under the jurisdiction of the state interning [foreign belligerents].”115  Thus, he 
demonstrated the knowledge that the treaty law governing internment in neutral countries 
was ambiguous and therefore susceptible to exploitation. 
In January 1944, a new scandal broke on the treatment of Russian internees in 
Wauwilermoos.  An expose published by the Berner Tagwacht newspaper revealed that 
three Russian officers interned in Wauwilermoos accused Béguin and his subordinates of 
using military guard dogs in an “undignified manner,” namely to terrorize the internees.  
One Soviet soldier recounted that he was in the Wauwilermoos stockade as a result of a 
failed escape attempt, and refused to return to his cell because “he was sick” and wanted 
to be transferred to the infirmary.  In response, a Swiss guard reportedly ordered his dog 
to attack the Russian, and “the dog dragged him down to the ground and ripped his 
clothes, while the soldier gave him a couple of kicks for good measure.”  In a separate 
incident during an inspection of the barracks, another Russian claimed that a Swiss guard 
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drew his pistol and ordered his guard dog to attack without provocation.  Yet another 
complaint alleged that when Russian internees refused to carry an excessive amount of 
firewood, “in response, a few dogs were set on them and shots were fired into the air.”  
According to the Russians, “the Swiss soldiers who were involved in such inhumane 
conduct were not punished in any way by the camp commandant, Capt. Béguin.”116 
An investigating magistrate—another Swiss Army officer with the same rank as 
Béguin—performed an inquiry into whether the commandant should be charge with 
“non-compliance with service regulations” in connection with the incidents.  The 
magistrate noted that “camp Wauwilermoos is a military camp in all its aspects,” and thus 
“the entire business is run as a military operation, with special emphasis on maintaining 
military discipline, as it should be.”  He reasoned that since the camp’s mandate was to 
punish the undisciplined, the use of force was appropriate at times.  He acknowledged 
that “Capt. Béguin is strict,” but tempered his evaluation with the claim that the 
commandant was “more [strict] in what he demanded from the Swiss soldiers than from 
the internees.”  The magistrate claimed that the only consistent complaints about Béguin 
were that “that he was insulting, [and] that he always walked around with a riding crop.”  
The magistrate applauded Béguin’s use of the riding crop, since the commandant “carried 
neither pistol nor saber,” and “he would intervene in the biggest brouhahas without 
weapon or guards.”  The magistrate supported Béguin’s use of non-lethal force, and 
argued that although “police dogs, water hoses and tear gas may seem disagreeable . . . 
for maintaining or restoring discipline they are always less dangerous than firearms..”  
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Therefore, he defended the use of dogs against prisoners since it meant that “the Swiss 
guns do not go off as readily as do others . . . for instance, those in German prison 
camps.”  In conclusion, the magistrate recommended that the accusations against Béguin 
should not be transferred to a military prosecutor.
117
 
Only weeks after Béguin was exculpated for the allegations of mistreating 
Russian internees, a riot occurred in Wauwilermoos that left one Russian dead and 13 
others wounded by gunfire.  The Swiss media initially accused Béguin of ordering the 
shooting, but apparently the commandant was not personally present during the riot.
118
  
The incident was sparked by a fight between several Russians who were celebrating “Red 
Army Day,” the anniversary of the 1918 proclamation of the Soviet cabinet that 
conscripted peasants and workers into the military.
119
  According to the investigating 
magistrate, a guard dog was injured and warning shots were fired into the air when a 
Swiss guard team attempted to break up the melee.  Other Swiss guards apparently fired 
after hearing the warning shots, a mistake that resulted in the many casualties.  The 
magistrate found some fault with the decision to fire warning shots when the other Swiss 
soldiers “quite obviously had reached a boiling point.”120  However, the majority of the 
blame was placed on Viktor Krischow, an interned Russian soldier from Moscow who 
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was charged with brawling, mutiny, noncompliance with service regulations, and 
attempting to escape.  Krischow was sentenced to 18 months in prison, and fined 425 
Swiss Francs.
121
 
In spite of the many complaints against Béguin and his policies, the FCIH allowed 
him to retain his command of Wauwilermoos through 1944 when Americans were first 
confined in the camp.  In his position as camp commandant, Béguin had no sympathy for 
the Americans under his charge; his correspondence reveals that he found American 
internees to be undisciplined and ungrateful, claiming that they were “spoiled by their 
stay in hotels in the mountains and do not react well to strictly military treatment.”  
Béguin also looked down on the Americans because of their common background as 
airmen, claiming that due to their brief military education “they are specialists, not 
soldiers.”  He believed that “the rank they carry represents more of a salary grade than a 
level of responsibility.”  To support this view, Béguin argued that “they know neither the 
life on a base nor that of the soldier in the field; they are workers and technicians in 
uniform who fly airplanes.”   In his opinion, this lack of professional military education 
produced an absence of “the most basic forms of courtesy and politeness,” resulting in an 
“atmosphere … as painful for us as it is for them.”122 
Béguin was correct that the Americans interned in Wauwilermoos did not 
understand his variety of “strictly military treatment.”  According to one American 
internee, the hygiene facilities were sorely lacking, as the latrine was a slit-trench that ran 
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the length of the barracks, which was washed once per week and produced extremely 
unsanitary conditions.
123
  Internees were permitted to use an “outdoor faucet” for hygiene 
use, but no soap or hot water was available.
124
  Some internees slept together to stay 
warm.
125
  According to Staff Sergeant Morris Seifert, the Americans “slept on boards and 
straw with one blanket to either cover with or sleep on,” and the barracks were infested 
with “lice and rats.”  Seifert was placed in solitary confinement after his escape attempt, 
and he recalled that there “was no light in [the cell]” except for one hour in the evening, 
and prisoners were required to defecate into a bucket.
126
  Staff Sergeant George reported 
that an American internee was confined in “a damp, dirty dungeon” at Wauwilermoos, 
and that “the left side of [the American’s] body was severely ‘chewed up’ by lice and 
other vermin that infested the place of his imprisonment.”127 
As a result of the sanitary conditions, diseases such as skin boils, lice, dysentery, 
and gingivitis affected nearly all of the American internees who were confined at 
Wauwilermoos for a sustained period.
128
  Medical care at the prison camp was described 
by one internee as “pretty much non-existent,” although many Americans were 
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subsequently hospitalized after their release from Wauwilermoos.
129
  Food rations 
consisted of “black bread” and “watered-down soup” which were well below the level of 
subsistence and described as “not fit for human consumption.”130  Two American officers 
who were incarcerated at Wauwilermoos reported that they each lost forty pounds 
throughout the duration of their internment, primarily as a result of inadequate 
nutrition.
131
  According to Technical Sergeant Anthony Giamettie, prisoners at 
Wauwilermoos “hardly ever got anything to eat,” and “looked just like skeletons when 
they got out of there.”132 
In response to the complaints of American internees, Béguin professed that the 
discomfort experienced at Wauwilermoos was due to overcrowding; the officer barracks 
were designed for only twenty occupants, but had eighty-six by the fall of 1944.  As a 
result, he explained that he could no longer provide amenities such as sheets and shaving 
mirrors for officers below the rank of captain.  Firewood to heat the barracks stoves was 
also in short supply.  In response to the Americans “who [threatened] to cut up tables and 
benches to warm themselves with them,” Béguin claimed surprise at “the mentality of the 
officers who wished to burn all the furniture,” and resolved that “if they insisted on 
behaving like vandals we would no longer treat them like officers.”  He claimed that the 
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allocation of firewood was greater than the quantity rationed to Swiss soldiers, a 
comparison used to justify many conditions around the camp.  Béguin also stressed that 
the barracks were built according to regulations, and despite their shortcomings, were 
“constructed of wood of the sort used by the [Swiss] Army.”  He bluntly professed that 
“to give in [to American pressure] would be a form of weakness,” and attributed 
American complaints to internees who “do not understand the slowness of our military 
justice system.”133 
Officials at the U.S. Legation in Switzerland disagreed with Béguin’s tempered 
description of conditions at Wauwilermoos.  According to General Legge, the camp was 
“of the stockade type,” and the barracks were “surrounded by barbed wire, constantly 
patrolled by dogs and guards with sub-machine guns.”  Conditions were “unreasonably 
severe,” with internees sleeping on loose straw, food “at the lowest subsistence level,” 
and mud “ankle deep.”  General Legge labeled these conditions “disgracefully bad” and 
considered them worse than those in German POW camps.  Prior to the escape attempts 
of the summer of 1944 the Swiss sent only a few American internees to Wauwilermoos, 
normally for “drunkenness and disorderly conduct” and with the tacit approval of the 
U.S. legation.  Once the escape attempts began in earnest, the Swiss government sent 
every offender to Wauwilermoos, normally for two or three months without trial.  By the 
fall of 1944, over 100 American internees were incarcerated in Wauwilermoos, and the 
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Swiss government threatened to keep them there without trial for six to seven months.
134
  
Many of the American internees in Wauwilermoos were eventually charged in the Swiss 
military justice system, an experience that forever changed their perceptions of Swiss 
neutrality.
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V.       U.S. Internees on Trial  
The majority of Americans held in Wauwilermoos in the fall of 1944 were in 
pretrial confinement, awaiting a military tribunal by the Swiss Army for the crime of 
attempting escape.  The tribunals were convened by territorial courts, whose jurisdiction 
was established by decree of the Federal Council in 1939.
1
  Operating under the Swiss 
Military Court Regulations of 1889 and the Swiss Military Penal Code of 1927, the 
tribunal panels consisted of a mix of six officers and noncommissioned officers under a 
judge, or “chief justice.”  The panel members and judge were elected by the Federal 
Council for three-year terms and retained their regular military positions while serving 
the court.  The judge was not required to be trained in law despite his position as 
“chairman of the court,” although the Military Court Regulations specified that he must 
“at least hold a major degree.”  Also present at tribunals were a prosecutor, defense 
attorney, court clerk, and in the case of foreign defendants, a translator.
2
   
The authority to try military internees was written into the original Military Penal 
Code, which meant that the intent to apply internal Swiss law to internees predated World 
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War II.
3
  Internees on trial for escape normally faced charges for “disregard of 
regulations,” an article of the Military Penal Code that allowed punishment of up to six 
months of penal servitude or imprisonment in times of war.
4
  However, the Military Penal 
Code did not specify a minimum sentence and even permitted the downgrade of the 
offense to disciplinary punishment in “mild cases.”5  This subjectivity gave military 
tribunals wide latitude to treat escape attempts as minor infractions, or instead classify 
them as serious criminal offenses.   
Once a tribunal convened, the burden of proof was normally met by escape 
reports from internment camp commanders, arrest reports from local police, and 
interrogations conducted after the internees were recaptured.
6
  An official investigator 
appointed to the court for a three-year term had the responsibility to assemble this 
evidence.
7
  The preliminary investigation was a laborious process of cataloging all of the 
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relevant paperwork, and did not facilitate the swift execution of justice.  Adding to this 
burden was the fact that many internees traveled across Switzerland before their 
apprehension, which required the investigator to obtain depositions from diverse 
locations.  The rash of escape attempts in the summer of 1944 quickly overwhelmed the 
Swiss military justice system.  At least 183 Americans were charged by military tribunal 
from 1944 to 1945, but only about 55 of these men ever received verdicts due to the 
combination of the time it took to complete a trial and the large number of internees that 
were repatriated or successfully fled the jurisdiction in the interim.  For the minority of 
indicted internees who eventually received verdicts, the average sentence was seventy-
four days in prison, but the average time to complete the investigations and military 
tribunals was eighty-two days, underscoring the American criticisms of the Swiss 
military justice system.
8
  Some internees waited even longer for due process for escape 
attempts.  One technical sergeant spent 105 days in jail before his arraignment and 
conviction of only 30 days in prison, a process he claimed “was a mockery.”9    
Sgt. Dale Ellington, a young gunner on a B-17 bomber based in England, was 
bombing an aircraft factory near Munich in April 1944 when his airplane was shot down 
by German anti-aircraft fire.  The airplane was shot at again by Swiss fighters and anti-
aircraft batteries after crossing the Swiss border and then landed in Dübendorf, 
Switzerland, with no fewer than thirty-five shell and bullet holes in its fuselage.  
Miraculously, the aircraft made it to Switzerland despite severe damage to a fuel cell, 
severed control cables, one engine out, and only forty minutes of fuel remaining.  
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Interned in Adelboden, Switzerland, Ellington remained in his internment camp until 
September, when he heard that American forces were approaching the Swiss border with 
France.  On September 17, 1944, Ellington slipped out of Adelboden and used his 
passable German to purchase train tickets for himself and three other internees.  Dressed 
in civilian clothes, the group managed to travel undetected to a city near France, only to 
be questioned and arrested by an observant Swiss soldier on a bicycle only miles from the 
French border.  The Americans were first confined in the Basel city jail for three days 
and then transferred to Wauwilermoos, where Ellington recalled “barbed wire, straw 
bunks, and guard dogs.”  After nearly a month in Wauwilermoos, Ellington and his 
fellow would-be-escapees were transported to Bern to appear at the arraignment for their 
military tribunal.
10
   
At the arraignment each defendant was given a copy of the poorly translated 
charges, in fact the only trial record they received.  The document was titled “Act of 
Accusation,” and methodically listed the identities of the defendants, the charges against 
them, a catalog of evidence, and the names of their tribunal jurors.  The internees faced 
the charge of disregard of regulations, listed on a translated indictment as “non-
compliance of the rules of service.”  The evidence on the indictment was listed as 
“documents of [preliminary] examination,” and “production of the four defendants.”  The 
defendants were brought in front of the tribunal panel, which consisted of three Swiss 
officers and three enlisted soldiers, the highest ranking of which were two captains.
11
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The panel jurors were permitted to question the defendants to determine the validity of 
the charges, part of the normal arraignment process.
12
  During this interrogation, a Swiss 
captain on the jury panel asked the Americans why they had traveled so far from their 
camp at Adelboden.  In response, one of the airmen defiantly informed the juror that “We 
were chasing butterflies.”  According to Ellington, this lack of candor was not well-
received; the officer was “obviously vexed by the remark,” and immediately responded: 
“You have served thirty days at the detention camp and you will now return there and 
serve forty five more!”  The captain was good to his word; Ellington was returned to 
Wauwilermoos until 1 December.
13
    
The verdict for Ellington’s tribunal was not delivered for another twenty days, by 
a slightly altered panel in which one of the Swiss captains had been replaced by another 
officer of the same rank.  The verdict was seventy-five days confinement for all four 
defendants, with forty-five days deducted for pretrial confinement.  In addition, the 
defendants were assessed their pro-rated share of the trial cost, 17.5 Swiss Francs.
14
  The 
defendants were not present for the verdict, as a personal appearance was only required 
during the arraignment phase of the tribunal.
15
  According to the Military Court 
Regulations, “the accused under arrest can petition to be present only then when the 
hearing takes place where he is being detained,” and trials were not conducted at 
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Wauwilermoos.
16
  Ellington was unaware that the tribunal continued after his departure, 
and was never informed of the actual verdict.  He believed that the statement made by the 
Swiss officer at his arraignment was the reading of his sentence, when in fact it was 
probably a rebuke for being in contempt of court.
17
  Ellington’s confusion at his 
arraignment demonstrates that internees had difficulty comprehending their experience 
with Swiss military justice due to both language and cultural differences, and the fact that 
they were effectively serving their sentences in advance of the tribunal verdicts. 
Ellington served his remaining time in Wauwilermoos, and then was returned to 
Adelboden.  Now even more eager to escape than before, he “wasted no time in forming 
a new plan.”  The difference was that this time he had help from the U.S. Legation in 
Bern.  Ellington and his fellow escapers were instructed to take a taxi to Bern with 
civilian clothes under their uniforms.  The airmen procured a taxi for $50 per internee, 
“stripp[ed] off [their] pants and shirts” in the taxi, and then disembarked in downtown 
Bern.  In the city Ellington called a contact and told him in German that “there was a 
‘package’ for him at the Schweitzerhof Hotel.”  The airmen then made their way to the 
hotel and followed a guide “[through] stores, back streets and back alleys.”  The route 
ended at the U.S. military attaché’s office, where an Army officer named Lt. Rexford 
allowed them to stay for about five days.
18
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After the number of escaped internees at the attaché’s office grew to over 20, the 
group of airmen were spirited at night to a garage in a residential area and then loaded 
into a moving van.  They were driven to a farm house, given back-packs of medical 
supplies to ferry across the border, and then followed a French resistance guide through 
“half-frozen swampy terrain.”  After a time the guide announced “Gentlemen, you are in 
France!”  In a short time two U.S. Army trucks arrived and drove the Americans to 
Annecy, and then to Lyon.  From here the airmen caught a transport to England, and their 
European adventure was over.
19
 
Ellington’s belated assistance by the U.S. Legation was no accident; many other 
internees caught after failed escapes were subsequently assisted by the official escape 
network because their legal predicament and imprisonment raised their priority in the 
eyes of U.S. officials.  Ellington’s case was unusual in that when his verdict was returned 
he was among only about five Americans in confinement who had received actual 
sentences from military tribunals.  This left an estimated ninety-five other American 
prisoners in legal limbo at Wauwilermoos, underscoring the fact that the Swiss military 
justice system was overburdened and ill-equipped to handle the massive numbers of 
escaping internees.
20
   
Another veteran of the Swiss military justice system was Technical Sgt. Daniel 
Culler.  A turret gunner on a B-24 bomber based out of England, Culler’s airplane was 
shot down by German anti-aircraft fire while bombing Friedrichshafen on March 18, 
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1944.
21
  Culler recalled an explosion under the left wing, and flames emerging from the 
left inboard engine.  The damage immediately caused the aircraft to lose airspeed and 
drop out of formation.  After verifying the massive fuel loss, the pilot asked the navigator 
to plot a direct course to Switzerland.  Soon the bomber was intercepted by Swiss fighter 
aircraft, and the crew began destroying classified equipment before they were forced to 
land at Dübendorf airfield near Zurich.
22
 
Culler was first confined at the U.S. internment camp in Adelboden.  Less than 
two months after his arrival in Switzerland, Culler attempted to escape from Adelboden 
along with his former crewmember Staff Sgt. Howard Melson and a British soldier, 
Matthew Thirlaway, a former POW who had escaped from an Italian POW camp.
23
  The 
trio had planned to escape over the Italian border at Bellinzona and seek refuge with a 
family that had previously sheltered Thirlaway during his initial escape from captivity.  
The group successfully made the journey to Bellinzona by train, but then became lost in 
the mountains.  After eating poisonous berries and becoming ill, Culler turned back and 
made the return trip to Adelboden.  From here he was placed in solitary confinement in a 
local jail for twelve days, and then returned to Adelboden under house arrest.  The local 
Swiss military commander informed him that he would now be sent to a federal prison 
and was “no longer a military prisoner, but was now classified as a civilian prisoner.”24 
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Culler was transferred to Wauwilermoos in June 1944, where he was in fact a 
military prisoner in a military-run penitentiary.
25
  However, in his grouping with soldiers 
of various nationalities who had committed various crimes, Culler did not receive the 
legal protections or rights that a military prisoner would normally expect.  Very few 
Americans were confined in Wauwilermoos until August 1944, and as a result Culler 
only briefly saw one other soldier who might have been an American during his first 
month in the compound.  Forced to bunk with Russian prisoners, Culler was repeatedly 
raped and assaulted by fellow inmates, but his complaints to the guards and camp 
commandant went unheeded.  Eventually Culler developed open boils all over his body 
and contracted tuberculosis, which went untreated for a considerable time.  After a month 
in Wauwilermoos, Culler was informed that he would be leaving the compound not for 
medical treatment, but for his military tribunal arraignment in Baden.
26
 
Culler was tried along with his fellow would-be-escapees, who were recaptured 
by Swiss border guards during the ill-fated escape attempt.  Culler was unaware that his 
former crewmember, Sgt. Howard Melson, and the British soldier, Matthew Thirlaway, 
had both been imprisoned in civilian jails and then confined in Wauwilermoos in a 
different barracks.  Melson had made an additional attempt to escape from 
Wauwilermoos in June, and was apprehended and jailed in the district prison at Bern.  
Culler and Melson were both charged with disregard of regulations for leaving 
Adelboden without permission.  Thirlaway was not charged with this article of the 
Military Penal Code because as an escapee he was in a different legal category than the 
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military internees, and thus subject to different regulations.  All three defendants were 
charged with disobeying general orders, in this case traveling across Switzerland without 
permission with the intent to cross the border.  This article of the Military Penal Code 
targeted infractions that contravened “publicly advertised regulations or general orders” 
from the Federal government, Swiss Army command, or cantonal governments, and 
authorized punitive measures from disciplinary punishment to prison time.  In this case, 
the infraction violated the Swiss Federal Council Resolution of September 25, 1942 
regarding the partial closure of the border.
27
 
Culler’s appearance at his military tribunal arraignment was preceded by a 
meeting with his defense attorney, a well-dressed man named Max Brand who spoke 
English.  Although not in uniform, the fact that the courtroom guards came to attention 
and saluted Brand gave Culler the distinct impression that he was a Swiss officer.  Brand 
produced a message that Culler had previously passed to a British soldier in 
Wauwilermoos describing his severe treatment, in the hope that it would make its way to 
the U.S. Legation.  Brand informed Culler that the message had been passed to the Swiss 
Embassy, and would now be used as evidence against him at trial.  Culler attempted to 
tell Brand about the severe treatment he had experienced at Wauwilermoos, but the 
attorney “wouldn’t listen to any of my complaints,” and “kept harping on that message I 
illegally sent to the British Embassy.”  In the process of his conversation with Brand, 
Culler became excited and “began to cough up blood and other sickening fluids into a 
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wastebasket by the table.”  This was the extent of the contact that Culler had with his 
attorney, who subsequently “moved even farther away from me—probably not wanting 
to catch what he thought I had.”28 
When brought in front of the tribunal panel with his co-defendants, Culler was 
surprised by “a person who was seated front and center before the judges’ bench” who 
stood and recited a brief family history of each of the accused in English, including 
parents’ names and home addresses.  Presumably, this was the court clerk or translator.  
The recitation of family history unsettled Culler, who wondered exactly how the Swiss 
had obtained information that he had never offered to them.  The remainder of the 
tribunal hearing was conducted in German, and since Culler’s lawyer never spoke to him 
in English during the proceedings, he therefore had very little understanding of what 
transpired.  He recalled that “Many times all six judges and my defender were looking me 
up and down while they talked, and several leaned over the bench to get a better look at 
me.  Several times, as he spoke, my defender would make [gestures] towards me and 
everyone had big smiles on their faces.”29  Culler tried to speak, but each time he was 
silenced.  He remembered that “I didn’t even get to open my mouth,” and as a result he 
never had “a chance to tell my side of the story.”  In his view, his defense was completely 
inadequate.
30
 
At the end of the hearing, the same person who had given Culler’s family history 
approached him and read from a paper: “The judges took into account that you are a very 
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young soldier who took too seriously the orders to escape that came from your 
commanders in England . . . If you had been older and wiser, like most of the others in 
the internment camp, you would have realized escape was impossible.  There is nowhere 
to go, even for those lucky enough to cross the border.”  Culler was given a translated 
copy of his indictment which, like Ellington’s, only listed the defendants, charges, and 
jurors.  Confused, he wondered why “the accusation papers never mentioned how long 
we would be sentenced for, or how long we had already served.”  Culler inquired about 
his verdict and the length of his sentence, and was told that he would be informed after 
returning to Wauwilermoos.  He then became agitated, yelling: “You mean you’re 
sending me back to that hellhole, Wauwilermoos?”  This finally elicited a response from 
his defender in English: “Yes!”31 
Although unknown to him at the time, Culler’s only court appearance was merely 
the arraignment for his military tribunal, and the tribunal would not produce a verdict 
until the following week under a different set of judges in Bern.  As with Ellington, 
Culler also misunderstood the function of the arraignment process due to language and 
cultural barriers.  Culler was later convicted of disregard of regulations, and received a 
sentence of ninety days imprisonment with fifty-two days deducted for pretrial 
confinement.  His codefendant, Sgt. Howard Melson, was also convicted of disregard of 
regulations, and received a stiffer penalty of 105 days imprisonment.
32
  The increase in 
his sentence relative to Culler’s was almost certainly due to Melson’s second escape 
attempt, as well as the fact that Culler had voluntarily returned to his camp in Adelboden.   
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Although the tribunal judges may have legitimately believed that they were 
exercising leniency in Culler’s case, any chance at gratitude was lost between the 
prospect of further incarceration at Wauwilermoos and the lack of transparency during 
the tribunal proceedings.  Culler claimed that during his trial he “felt much resentment 
coming from the judges, my defender, and the Swiss military establishment.”  Perhaps 
this perception was a misunderstanding, but it was a foreseeable consequence of a 
prosecution conducted in a foreign language.  The process produced a lifelong critic of 
the Swiss notions of justice and adherence to the rule of law.  In Culler’s opinion, his day 
in court “was nothing more than a mock trial, so the Swiss could clear the records—just 
in case someone, sometime, might question my sentencing and treatment without a court 
trial.”33   
Matthew Thirlaway was the sole defendant convicted of disobedience of general 
orders, and was sentenced to the forty days he had already spent in prison; 
“ausgestandene Untersuchungshaft,” or time served.34  Despite the fact that Thirlaway 
committed roughly the same offenses as Culler and Melson, he was treated more 
leniently by the court because of his status as an escaped POW, which afforded him 
different rights than internees.  According to the 1907 Hague Convention (V), “a neutral 
Power which receives escaped prisoners of war shall leave them at liberty,” which meant 
that Switzerland had less legal standing to regulate Thirlaway’s movements and restrict 
him to a camp.
35
  The court therefore determined that he had not committed an offense 
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under military law, and instead treated him “as a civilian, regardless of his status as an 
escaped prisoner of war.” Although originally charged with the same disobedience of 
general orders as Thirlaway, Culler and Melson were not convicted of this crime.  
Ostensibly, the tribunal determined that convicting them of both disregard of regulations 
and disobedience of general orders would amount to illegally punishing them twice for 
elements of the same underlying offense of attempted escape.
36
   
Culler was eventually assisted by a British sergeant major who noticed him while 
visiting Wauwilermoos to check on his own men.  The sergeant major issued a blunt 
threat to Captain Béguin, promising to have him charged with war crimes if Culler were 
to die for lack of medical care.  The sergeant major arranged for Culler’s transfer to a 
Swiss hospital in Lucerne.  Here a surgeon repaired his torn rectum, and he was 
diagnosed with tuberculosis and covered in ointment to treat his skin infections.  Culler 
was also placed on oxygen, and later was told that both of his lungs had partially 
collapsed.
37
  When he was well enough to travel he was transferred to a tuberculosis 
sanitarium, where an officer from the U.S. Legation contacted him and assisted him to 
escape from Switzerland.  The Legation arranged for a rail pass and a taxi to transport 
Culler and several of his original crewmembers to the French border.
38
  Culler reached 
the border with this group, but they were spotted by Swiss border guards while 
attempting to cross.  The guards opened fire on the Americans without warning, and 
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Culler’s pilot, 1st Lt. George Telford, was shot through the leg.39  The other internees 
dragged Telford into France, where they eventually reached American lines.
40
 
The same legal processes experienced by Ellington and Culler also applied to 
escaping American officers.  Copilot 2
nd
 Lt. Russell Sherburne arrived in Switzerland on 
July 21, 1944 after his B-24 was hit by intense anti-aircraft fire over the target, Munich.  
Sherburne’s pilot, 2nd Lt. Stanley Scott, described the fire as “the most intense flak ever 
witnessed throughout my ten missions.”  After dropping the bomb load on target, the 
pilot felt a “severe jerk” on his throttle.41  The waist gunner soon reported on the 
intercom “There’s something running out of the right wing,” which could only mean that 
the bomber was leaking fuel.  The crew hurriedly transferred the remaining fuel to 
another wing tank.  The crew surveyed the bomber’s condition, and found that one engine 
was knocked out, another was damaged, and there was insufficient fuel to return to 
England.  They assessed that their options were either to land or parachute into Axis 
territory, or “attempt to get down to Switzerland.”  The crew chose the neutral option, 
and so they followed a heading to Swiss territory.
42
  
As soon as their bomber broke through the clouds, Scott and Sherburne were fired 
on by Swiss anti-aircraft batteries.  They immediately “put down the landing gear” and 
“fired green flares” in order to indicate that they were seeking interment.  The anti-
aircraft fire stopped and the bomber was intercepted by two Swiss fighter planes and 
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guided to a short landing field in Basel “not long enough for a B-24.”  The pilots applied 
full brakes upon landing, but nevertheless the bomber careened off the end of the runway, 
through a fence, across a field, through a second fence, and finally came to rest.  The 
entire crew miraculously survived the ordeal unhurt.
43
 
Scott and Sherburne were interned with the other American officers at the Rhätia 
hotel in Davos.  When Sherburne read in a newspaper that the U.S. forces reached 
Marseille in late August 1944, he resolved to escape and “return to allied control.”  He 
approached only Scott with his plan, as he figured that two people were the optimal 
number to escape at one time in order to ensure freedom of movement, “mutual 
assistance,” and also a “minimum of disagreement.”  The officers were unaware of any 
escape networks, and so they resolved to leave camp at night and travel on railroad tracks 
to the French border.  Their provisions consisted of a map from a Davos store and 
chocolate bars purchased with ration stamp.  Amazingly, Scott and Sherburne both wore 
their flying uniforms, although the clothing had been altered by a Swiss tailor “to have a 
civilian look.”  The pair also made “dummies” in their beds out of pillows in order to 
delay the discovery that they were missing.  Sherburne acknowledged that his plan was 
“rather nebulous,” but he figured that it was “certainly better than waiting in Davos for 
the end of the war.”44   
The two lieutenants absconded from Davos on the evening of August 25, and 
soon discovered that railroad tracks were extremely difficult to walk along at night 
without incurring minor injuries.  The next day Scott and Sherburne passed through the 
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towns of Andermatt and Gletsch.  They risked buying food from a local proprietor at the 
top of Furka pass, and successfully avoided any questions they could not answer.  
Sherburne found that “We attracted no more attention than any other pair of hikers out on 
a beautiful August day.”  That night the officers slept in a barn, and the next day made 
their way to a town called Nyon on Lake Geneva after hitching rides with several 
motorists.  The officers considered “borrowing” a boat to cross to France, but the boats 
seemed very secure and they noticed patrol boats out on the lake.  A French-speaking 
family offered them lunch, and the pilots were told that “they could not provide any help” 
despite their sympathy for the Allied cause, as “the border was tightly controlled.”45   
That evening Scott and Sherburne were surprised by a roadblock manned by 
Swiss soldiers.  The airmen “surrendered without a fight,” and were told that they would 
be returned to their original internment camp.  However, the next day they were instead 
taken by train to Wauwilermoos, where the men were greeted by “a Swiss officer with a 
police dog.”  Sherburne described the camp as surrounded by barbed wire, and full of 
other nationalities such as Russians, Poles, and Germans.  They were assigned to barracks 
of about 100 by 30 feet, consisting of “stalls for each person” which were filled with 
straw, and a common room for meals. The inmates divided a loaf of bread for breakfast, 
and received a ration of stew for lunch and dinner.  The officers closely watched the 
routines of the guards, who took the Americans’ shoes away at night “to keep us from 
trying anything.”  They decided not to escape until they received some legal due process, 
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as the officers at Wauwilermoos were “promising a trial” and the Americans hoped that 
an acquittal would make escaping from the camp unnecessary.
46
   
One evening a Swiss Army lieutenant informed the Americans that he would be 
escorting the Americans to Lucerne for their arraignment.  The next day the three men 
travelled by train to Lucerne, and then walked to the city’s municipal building.  Scott and 
Sherburne were then interrogated by a Swiss officer, who asked them to “recount how 
[they] had gotten out of Davos and to [Nyon]” where the men were caught.  The 
Americans gave an accurate account of their route, but omitted the food they had 
purchased and the hitchhiking with Swiss motorists to avoid incriminating their 
benefactors.  However, by omitting the help by Swiss motorists the Americans 
unwittingly raised the suspicions of the interrogator, who was “incredulous” about the 
seemingly impossible claim that they had walked over the Oberalp and Furka mountains 
in the same day.  The Swiss officer asked where they purchased their clothes, and the 
Americans answered “Davos” without incriminating the Swiss tailor.  Scott and 
Sherburne claimed they had received no help, and had not talked to anyone during the 
trip.  When asked what they would do if returned to Davos, they replied unrepentantly 
that they would “Try again” to escape from internment.  Evidently the interrogator was 
unsatisfied with the answers, as the questions were repeated a second time.  According to 
Sherburne, “The whole thing lasted about two hours,” and then they were escorted back 
to Wauwilermoos via train.  The Swiss lieutenant serving as their escort was kind enough 
to tell the Americans that this was merely the arraignment, as “[they] would have another 
trial later.”  After their arraignment Scott and Sherburne decided that there was little 
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chance of their release without punishment.  Therefore, they immediately began “detailed 
plans for escaping from Wauwil.”47   
The American lieutenants received assistance from several of their fellow 
inmates.  One prisoner was in charge of taking the mail to the nearby village, which gave 
him the limited authority to leave the camp with only loose supervision.  The inmate 
could arrange for a taxi to meet any escapers outside of the camp, provided that they 
designated “a time and place” as well as a hefty fee.  Other American inmates who were 
also caught escaping gave Scott and Sherburne the address of a house in Zurich where 
Americans could count on shelter and assistance.  This formed the basis of their new 
escape plan.  The lieutenants chose a date two weeks away, “E-night,” and passed word 
for the taxi to meet them on that evening at 7:00 PM at a secluded location recommended 
by some of their fellow Polish prisoners.
48
   
On the afternoon of the escape from Wauwilermoos, Scott and Sherburne pre-
adjusted the barbed wire on the perimeter fence while other inmates served as lookouts to 
warn them when the Swiss sentries approached.  According to Sherburne, the guards 
could “be watched from inside the barracks so that the fence worker could [be] alerted by 
a signal from an east window.”  That evening they gave their well-worn “GI oxfords” to 
the Swiss guards as per the normal routine, and then donned a second pair of shoes that 
they had procured by bartering with other inmates.  The lieutenants crawled out a back 
window in their barracks, slid under the fence, crossed through the second fence, and 
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then took cover in a drainage ditch.  After about thirty minutes they reached their 
prearranged taxi, and sped off to Zurich.
49
 
The Americans made it to their safe house, where they were fed, bathed, and then 
moved to a second house in the escape network.  Scott and Sherburne were given civilian 
clothes and rail tickets, and then followed a civilian guide on the train from Zurich to 
Geneva.  The guide took them to a bistro in a suburban area of the city, and the 
Americans waited until the other customers departed, leaving “no one except [the 
lieutenants] and the proprietor.”  The Americans were then ushered into the wine cellar, 
where they soon were given British Army pants and overcoats.  The Americans were then 
hidden among a group of over 150 British soldiers who were being repatriated from 
Switzerland in exchange for an equal number of German troops.  The train went through 
France, and so the American “shed [their] British coats” and jumped off near Annecy and 
completed their escape.  They soon located the OSS liaison officer in Annecy, who was 
in contact with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and coordinated to 
transport the men to London.  In about ten days a C-47 cargo plane landed at night in a 
cow pasture outside of Annecy, spiriting the Americans back to England.
50
   
At their arraignment Scott and Sherburne had been indicted for disregard of 
regulations, the standard charge for escaping internees.  However, since both Americans 
escaped before the case came to trial, the Swiss Army prosecutor subsequently dropped 
the charges, noting that the Americans were “probably abroad” and thus out of Swiss 
jurisdiction.  The prosecutor noted in the Americans’ file that they were nevertheless 
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“culpable of repeated breaches of duty,” indicating that they eventually would have faced 
a guaranteed conviction in a trial that they would not be allowed to attend.
51
  Scott and 
Sherburne’s case was typical in that approximately seventy percent of Americans who 
were caught escaping went on to escape again or were repatriated before they were ever 
brought to trial.
52
  The case also demonstrates that the Swiss equally applied the same 
regulations and punishments for escaping to both officers and enlisted airmen, despite the 
fact that punishing officers excessively would ostensibly result in a much greater chance 
of complaint and reciprocity.  However, anecdotal evidence suggests that Scott and 
Sherburne were treated somewhat better than many of the enlisted airmen incarcerated in 
Wauwilermoos, perhaps due to the fact that the guards at Swiss prison camps felt that 
they had more license to mistreat enlisted soldiers due to a lower likelihood of 
reciprocity.  The American officers were also kept better informed of the pending legal 
proceedings and what they meant, such as the fact that their hearing in Lucerne was 
merely an arraignment rather than a full trial.  This courtesy was not extended to the 
enlisted airmen who were punished for the same offense.  While Scott and Sherburne 
were informed of their arraignment in advance, Ellington and Culler believed that their 
arraignments were in fact trials and were never so much as notified of the verdicts from 
their military tribunals. 
All American internees caught escaping were imprisoned for considerable periods 
while awaiting due process from the overburdened Swiss military justice system.  This 
problem did not escape the notice of the U.S. Legation.  Although U.S. officials were 
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concerned about the Swiss military’s version of pretrial confinement and their methodical 
timetable for dispensing justice, they also contested the Swiss interpretation of 
international law that allowed prosecution of internees under the Swiss Military Penal 
Code.  In the view of the U.S. Legation, the Swiss military justice system circumvented 
the protections of international law and produced open-ended verdicts that were 
disproportional to the crime of escape, an antithetical practice for a neutral state that 
claimed to hold the rule of law in high regard.  This issue will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 6.  Although American internees were punished excessively for the 
crime of escape, they were not the only victims of the wartime policies of the Swiss 
government.  
  
 
 
 
 
VI. Swiss Civilians on Trial  
  Escaping from internment in Switzerland was a risky proposition for Americans 
due to the isolation of internment camps as well as the cultural differences that made 
Americans stand out among the Swiss population.  Therefore, successful escape often 
depended on the assistance of sympathetic Swiss citizens.  American internees frequently 
received illicit help from Swiss proprietors whom they befriended.  This assistance was 
strictly forbidden by the FCIH, which directed that Swiss citizens would not “help the 
internees in any way or form to escape, or in their preparations to escape,” and threatened 
violators with prosecution under the Swiss Military Penal Code.  Thus, although many 
American suffered the consequences of failed escape attempts during the war, the Swiss 
citizens who helped them often incurred consequences that lasted well beyond the 
departure of the last internees.   
 These Swiss benefactors were driven by motives that included ideology and 
financial gain.  Those who helped Americans out of ideology represented an extralegal 
attempt to regulate and preserve cultural values that were undermined by formal Swiss 
neutrality.  Some of these values were tied to Switzerland’s humanitarian mandate, as 
well as forces of nationalism extending beyond the country’s borders.  Although this 
contestation was not directly motivated by the punishment of foreign internees, it 
nevertheless comprised a reaction to Switzerland’s interpretation and enforcement of 
international law.   Therefore, those Swiss residents who helped Americans were 
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contributing to the enforcement of new customary rules governing internment during 
wartime. 
The interaction between civilians and internees in Switzerland was strictly 
regulated, and internees were forbidden from entering private dwellings or even 
businesses without explicit permission from the FCIH.  Internees were also specifically 
prohibited from purchasing many items that might be used to further an escape.
1
  Despite 
these rules, many merchants in the mountain villages that housed the Americans often 
provided the internees with prohibited civilian suits or rail passes.  Equally important 
were other Swiss who lived near France; they provided safe houses and then assisted 
internees to cross the border and contact the French resistance.   
 Pierre Mussard and his son Alex belonged to a multi-cultural Swiss family living 
in Lausanne that assisted many escaping American internees cross the border at Geneva.  
The Mussard family supported the Allied cause for strong ideological reasons linked to 
their French and American heritage, reasons that made them unusually radical even 
among a French-Swiss population that largely supported the Allies.  Pierre was born in 
Austria, but he identified strongly with France since he served in the French Foreign 
Legion during World War I and had another son fighting in the French Army during 
World War II.  Pierre’s father was Swiss, and so the remainder of the family opted for 
Swiss citizenship as a matter of “family tradition.”  Pierre’s wife Helma was an American 
originally from Wisconsin, which undoubtedly led the family to sympathize with 
Americans during the war.  Pierre and his family lived in France until the fall of France at 
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the beginning of World War II, at which time they moved to Switzerland.  After moving 
to Lausanne, Pierre was mobilized into the Swiss Aerial Reconnaissance and Observer 
Corps, where he served until 1942.  Alex also attended recruit training in 1942, and 
participated in several training rotations with his infantry unit as a rifleman.  Despite 
these obligations of Swiss citizenship, both Pierre and Alex actively supported the French 
resistance by ferrying weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as occasionally 
fighting the Germans themselves.  Their contacts with the French resistance also made 
them ideal for smuggling American internees across the border.
2
   
Pierre’s son Alex was born in France but became a Swiss citizen upon moving to 
Switzerland in 1940.  As he still “experienced feelings of devotion [for France],” Alex 
asked a resistance contact to “give him the opportunity to be useful to France.”  He was 
twenty-two years old in 1944, and that year his Swiss Army unit was ordered to 
mobilize.
3
  However, Alex received a waiver in August of 1944 that delayed his service 
due to a bout of scarlet fever.  Around the same time he helped his father engineer the 
escape of ten Americans into France.  This was only the first of several occasions where 
the Mussard family took substantial risks in order to help interned Americans.
4
  
One of the interned Americans who sought out the Mussards’ help in August 
1944 was Lt. Eugene Metz, an officer who crash-landed in Zurich, Switzerland in April 
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after his B-17, nicknamed Butch, was severely damaged by German anti-aircraft and 
fighters.  While interned in Davos he developed a strong friendship with a local Austrian 
national, who as a child was “adopted by a group of Shell oil workers from Brooklyn.”  
Thus the Austrian “spoke perfect English with a heavy Brooklyn accent,” and affiliated 
strongly with America.  When Lt. Metz and a fellow internee resolved to escape from 
Switzerland, they soon heard about Pierre Mussard.  Metz described Pierre as a “most 
unforgettable individual” with a reputation for helping Americans cross the border.  
According to Metz, Pierre was “a patriot whose entire life and considerable fortune was 
at the beck and call of anyone fighting the Nazis.”  Pierre’s smuggling resources were 
extensive, since he was “a Frenchman with dual Swiss citizenship,” as well as “a business 
man with offices and [a] home in Paris.”  The Americans contacted Pierre, who 
immediately agreed to help them.
5
   
Metz asked his Austrian friend to purchase several restricted railroad tickets and 
civilian clothes in preparation for the escape.  This enabled the Americans to travel to 
Lausanne, where the Mussards were waiting to help them cross the border into France.  
The Americans snuck out of Davos the evening of August 10, 1944 “after everyone was 
asleep.”  Metz and his companion first “dressed in our civilian slacks and jackets,” and 
then “climbed through an unguarded rest room window” on the first floor of the hotel.  
The Americans walked to the train station, where by luck the train “went all the way to 
Lausanne requiring no change of trains.”  Metz’s Austrian friend provided the Americans 
local newspapers, which the men pretended to read for the duration of the trip.  
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According to Metz, “we didn’t dare talk to each other for fear that someone would 
overhear us speaking in English.”  After reaching Lausanne, Metz and his friend “soon 
reached the home of our benefactor, Pierre Mussard.”6 
Lt. Metz and his friend hid at the Mussard’s house in Lausanne for several days.  
On the night of a large thunder storm, Metz and his friend “slipped down to the 
waterfront,” where they linked up with several other escaped Americans at a cottage on 
Lake Geneva.
7
   The internees “waited for [Pierre Mussard] to pick them up in a large 
row-boat,” and during the intense storm the group headed across the lake to the French 
down of Evian.
8
  According to Alex, rowing to the French coast was “quite a feat, 9 
miles!”9  The group “sneaked, single file, into the town of Evion [sic],” and stayed the 
night at a small hotel.  The next day the Americans were escorted to the local “Marquis 
[sic] headquarters,” where Metz agreed to help fight the Germans before returning to U.S. 
lines.
10
 
Pierre and Alex’s border-crossings took a turn for the worse on September 1, 
1944, when the pair attempted to smuggle an illegal shipment of firearms across the 
border and into the hands of the resistance.  Pierre and Alex first procured dozens of 
rifles, automatic pistols, and ammunition from a local gun dealer in Lausanne, and then 
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contacted a member of the French resistance who also served in the Swiss Intelligence 
Service.  The trio hired a taxi to drive them to the border, and made the trip successfully 
only to be interrupted by border guards while literally unloading the weapons and 
carrying them onto French soil.  In the ensuing commotion Alex and the resistance 
contact were able to escape into France with the shipment of weapons, while Pierre and 
the taxi driver were arrested and jailed.  Alex remained in France for over a week, during 
which time he joined a resistance group and was compelled to skirmish with German 
troops on at least one occasion.  On 10 September he crossed back into Switzerland and 
returned to his home in Lausanne.
11
 
 At the same time as Alex returned to Switzerland, an interned American B-17 
bombardier, 1
st 
Lt. Ferris Martin, was contemplating his escape from the internment camp 
at Davos.  Martin prepared his escape meticulously, spending nearly 150 Swiss Francs to 
purchase prohibited civilian clothing such as a raincoat, hat, and trousers.  He also saved 
nearly 500 Francs to pay his necessary train and taxi fares.
12
  The lieutenant heard of 
Pierre Mussard while interned in Davos, where the smuggling activities of the patriarch 
were “common knowledge.”  Early in the morning of 23 September, Lt. Martin placed a 
phone call to the Mussard residence in Lausanne.  Alex answered the call, and Martin 
explained that he had escaped from his internment camp and needed help crossing the 
French border.  Alex agreed to help Martin and allowed him to hide in his house while 
they waited for several other escaped American airmen.  The other Americans met with 
Alex and Lt. Martin at a local restaurant in Lausanne that evening, and then took a taxi to 
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the border town of Vallorbe.  While preparing to cross the border the entire group was 
arrested by a Swiss border guard, “drawn, no doubt, by the headlights of the taxi.”13  
According to the testimony of several border guards, “there is no doubt that Mussard 
belonged to the FFI, as we have seen him repeatedly at the [border].”  Alex confessed to 
his arresting officers that he was crossing the border “on a special mission,” that of 
“[helping] American internees cross the border illegally.”14 
During several interrogations by police officers, Alex denied any active affiliation 
with the French resistance, claiming “I was never part of their organization, and I even 
went back to Switzerland when I thought they were planning to recruit me.”  The police 
were skeptical, particularly after they obtained letters that Alex authored describing 
firefights with German soldiers.  Alex made no effort to conceal his French allegiance, 
and informed his interrogators that “actually, I’m still feeling very attached to France.”  
Alex also denied his history of helping Americans escape from Switzerland.  According 
to Alex, the help he gave to Lt. Martin and the other American airmen was a purely 
spontaneous event, and was “the only time I was mixed up in this sort of business.” He 
explained that “that I had no intention of crossing the border but was simply going to take 
the Americans as far as Vallorbe.”  Alex claimed that when phoned by the American 
lieutenant he felt “morally obliged to help [Martin].”  According to Alex, “Martin came 
to me as my mother’s compatriot and was relying on me, so I didn’t think I could refuse 
him my assistance.”  Alex pointed out that he accepted no money from the Americans, 
and even paid part of the taxi fare to get the group to the border.  When asked how Martin 
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knew to contact him, Alex explained that “given that my mother is American, we are 
known in the Anglo-American expatriate circles in Switzerland, and so it is not surprising 
that my name came up in conversations between these Americans and their 
acquaintances.”15   
The military tribunal convened in December 1947 did not believe that his border 
crossing was an isolated incident, nor was the panel convinced that he had not engaged in 
belligerent acts with the French resistance.  Therefore, the tribunal convicted Alex of 
“general disobedience of orders, or federal regulations governing the maintenance of 
neutrality,” “violation of the regulations concerning the partial closure of the border,” 
“assisting an escape attempt,” and “military service abroad.”   Alex was sentenced to 60 
days imprisonment, suspended for two years, and ordered to pay the pro-rated cost of the 
trial, 57 Swiss Francs.  His father Pierre was also convicted of violating regulations 
governing Swiss neutrality, and was sentenced to a fine of 400 Swiss Francs and his pro-
rated share of the trial cost, 50 Francs.
16
  Alex and Pierre’s sentences both appear 
particularly light in contrast to the gravity of their offenses.  The court’s leniency may 
have reflected the fact that Swiss officials fully expected the men to abandon Switzerland 
and return to France, which they both eventually did.  The trial also occurred well after 
the end of the war, which meant that violations of neutrality in favor of the Allies posed 
far fewer difficulties for the Swiss government.   
After his trial, Alex decided that “it seemed wise to lie low and return to my 
studies in Zurich,” considering that “by this time the Swiss had gotten to know most of 
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our [smuggling] efforts.”  According to Mussard, “I was ‘persona non grata’ in 
Switzerland” as a result of the conviction for helping the Americans and violating Swiss 
neutrality.
17
  Alex was allowed to leave Switzerland in March of 1948 since his sentence 
was suspended, and he first travelled to Paris.  Shortly after this he married his fiancée, 
obtained several travel visas, and left France for the United States.  However, Mussard 
was not exempted from his Swiss Army service obligations despite his conviction, and 
his commander, Captain Stoudmann, sought to mobilize Alex again with a new “order to 
march.”  Finding that Alex had departed to the United States, Stoudmann wrote to his 
superiors and expressed that “this case must be judged with severity.”  Not surprisingly, 
Alex’s wartime activities resulted in “some incompatibility of temper between him and 
his commander.”18  Accordingly, Alex was brought up on more charges of “absence 
without leave and failure to comply with service regulations.”  He was convicted in 
absentia by a military tribunal in September of 1949 and sentenced to three months 
imprisonment and “the costs of the trial,” 27 Swiss Francs.19   
According to Alex, “for five years I could not return to Switzerland,” since there 
were outstanding warrants for his arrest.  He recalled that he was “even arrested once in 
Vienna because there was a search on for me… but the Austrians released me.”20  The 
warrants were evidently expunged at some point, since Alex was eventually allowed to 
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return to Switzerland.  However, he chose instead to reside in France.  Although Alex 
never lived in Switzerland for long and thus likely failed to develop the same attachments 
to the country as he had to France, he nevertheless was a Swiss citizen who effectively 
lost his citizenship rights as result of his partisan wartime activities.  For Alex, the value 
of protecting Swiss neutrality was perhaps outweighed by the cost of tolerating the Nazi 
domination of Europe.  In his estimation, helping the resistance and interned Americans 
were well worth risking his personal liberties.  According to Mussard, “I am confident 
that I acted in the interest of Switzerland, first in contributing to accelerate the defeat of 
Germany, but also in attempting to demonstrate that all the Swiss did not agree with their 
government’s policy toward Germany, and that we were a freedom-loving nation.”21 
 Another Swiss citizen who chose to help Americans escape from internment was 
1st Lt. Max Regazzi, a twenty-five year old pilot in the Swiss Army Air Force.  Regazzi 
came from a prominent Italian-Swiss family in Locarno, a city located in the Swiss 
canton of Ticino at the foot of the Alps.  His father was a federal magistrate, and Regazzi 
was following in his footsteps as a law student at Fribourg.  In March 1944 a mutual 
friend introduced Regazzi to American 2
nd
 Lt. James Vitiello, an interned B-17 navigator 
who landed in Switzerland in September of 1943. According to Regazzi, “[Vitiello] is 
American but Italian-born.”  This ethnic kinship helped Regazzi identify with Vitiello, 
and they soon became close friends.  Although Vitiello successfully escaped from 
Switzerland in the summer of 1944, he first asked Regazzi if he “would help some 
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[interned American] comrades of his who were interned in Davos to escape.”  According 
to Regazzi, “I agreed to do it.” 22     
An interned American officer wrote to Regazzi in late October 1944, asking if he 
could travel to Davos for an afternoon.  Regazzi accepted the invitation, and he met with 
Cpt. Gaspar, the senior American officer, as well as several other interned Americans.  
According to Regazzi, the officers “arranged everything for the escape,” and “we already 
agreed upon the date” of 23 November.  The plan was for Regazzi to procure two taxis to 
drive to a road outside of Davos, and transport several dozen internees to the border in 
Geneva.  The day prior to the event, Regazzi went to the Deffelon garage in Fribourg and 
hired two taxis at a rate of 90 cents per kilometer.  According to Regazzi, “I told [the taxi 
service] it was a private matter,” and explained to them that “I had to pick up some 
comrades in Davos.”  The following morning the taxis departed from Fribourg and drove 
nearly eleven hours until encountering heavy snow in Küblis, only twenty-five kilometers 
from Davos.  At this point Regazzi informed his chauffeur about the covert purpose of 
the trip, observing that the taxi driver “wasn’t very pleased, but finally [decided] he had 
no choice but to go along.”  Regazzi asked the taxi drivers to wait in a nearby cafe since 
“it was not possible for them to continue on because of the snow,” and set off on foot to 
retrieve the Americans.  After about eight hours of hiking through snow-covered hills, he 
returned with fourteen exhausted internees in tow.
23
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Private Schwager was one of the Swiss soldiers who caught the group of would-
be-escapees on their way to Geneva.  That evening, he received orders from his captain to 
set up a vehicle checkpoint at Landquart.  The roadblock was no accident, as the local 
commander received a report about the taxis.  According to Schwager, “we suspected 
immediately that what we were dealing with was an action to free someone from 
internment.”  Schwager and another soldier “blocked the road,” and soon netted the prize 
of Regazzi and his two taxis full of American airmen.  The taxis stopped immediately, 
and the occupants emerged with their hands over their heads.  According to the private, 
Regazzi made quite a spectacle with his outfit, which included a Swiss Army uniform 
complete with “flying boots and fur-lined U.S.-made flight jacket.”  Regazzi claimed that 
he donned the clothing because his own boots and jacket were soaked from the long 
march.  Regazzi was led into the barracks under the guard of a machine gun, and when he 
complained during a body search a Swiss guard testily threatened “that he would deck 
[Regazzi].”  Another Swiss officer soon arrived on the scene, and after learning of 
Regazzi’s arrest he immediately asked to see him “because I couldn’t quite believe it.”  
Upon viewing Regazzi in the American flight jacket, the Swiss officer remarked 
sarcastically that he was “a beautiful bird,” and told him that he “looked more like an 
American cowboy than a Swiss Army Officer.”   The humor was lost on Regazzi, who 
knew very well that his career in the Swiss Army was over.
 24
 
Regazzi pled guilty at his military tribunal in August 1945, apparently gambling 
that the panel would sympathize with his ideological justifications.  As a law student he 
probably knew that a conviction was all but certain, and this may explain why he focused 
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on mitigating factors rather than trying to prove his innocence.  He explained his motives 
for assisting the American internees, and claimed that there was “a certain ideological 
base to my behavior.”  He professed that “I feel a lot of sympathy for the Americans,” 
whom he considered comrades in arms.  In his view “these American officers risk their 
lives fighting the Germans,” a common enemy he saw as “a danger to our country.”  
Thus, Regazzi believed that “these Americans are acting directly on our behalf,” and he 
rationalized that “I would be doing the country a service, if I helped the Americans 
escape and make it possible for them to carry on the fight [against the Germans].”  In his 
mind he simply “helped the cause of an ally to end the war earlier.”  The judge asked 
Regazzi, “do you not have to admit that we are a neutral country and that there is even a 
federal decree which requires every Swiss to have a neutral stance?”   Regazzi 
acknowledged that he had such a duty, but also protested that he did not understand the 
strategic goals behind neutrality with respect to the Germans.  He explained that his 
strongest feelings toward the Germans dated to 1940, when he fought in aerial combat 
against German fighter pilots who flew across the Swiss border.  By his description, he 
“was on surveillance patrol and became involved in a dogfight between Swiss and 
German aircraft,” resulting in the death of a close friend who he frequently flew with.  He 
complained that his commanding general then forbid engaging German pilots flying 
above 1000m inside Swiss airspace, an order that he believed put Swiss reconnaissance 
pilots “much at a disadvantage.”  Regazzi was incensed by this command and “was able 
to reconcile it with neutrality only with difficulty.”25    
 Regazzi’s defense strategy failed.  The military tribunal panel judged that his 
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“antipathy toward Germany” and longing for Allied victory “cannot be held against the 
accused, who had lost a close friend in aerial combat with German planes.”  However, 
they also reasoned that by mid 1944 it was obvious that Germany “no longer represented 
a serious threat to Switzerland,” therefore, “it seems doubtful if [Regazzi] really believed, 
as he contends, that he was doing Switzerland a service in freeing these internees to 
return to the fight against Germany.”  Furthermore, “as an officer and a lawyer, [Regazzi] 
should have been aware to a special degree that he endangered the interests of the country 
by his conduct,” since the premature release of interned belligerents was a violation of 
Swiss neutrality.  Accordingly, the panel adopted all of the prosecutor’s 
recommendations.  Regazzi was convicted of “liberation of the internees,” infringement 
of a 1942 federal decree regarding the partial closure of the Swiss border, and “general 
disobedience of orders.”  He was sentenced to 150 days in prison, relieved of the rank of 
first lieutenant, and charged the pro-rated cost of the trial, 356.97 Swiss Francs.
26
      
The two Swiss taxi drivers from Fribourg were also convicted of liberating 
internees and violating the federal decree regarding the closure of the border, and were 
each sentenced to 30 days in prison and fined 118.99 Swiss Francs.  According to the 
panel members, their lighter sentence was justified since “they were in a certain 
predicament because they likely feared that they would not be paid the fare and would 
turn back empty-handed” if they refused.  The reduced sentence was also based on the 
fact that they “are in good repute and are considered to be hard-working, decent 
people.”27  As for the American internees, they were taken to a local jail at Chur, and then 
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most were transferred to punishment camps.
28
  The airmen never faced trial because it 
took over nine months to present the charges to a military tribunal.  By the time the 
tribunal convened, the prosecutor noted that “all of the accused [Americans] are no 
longer present in Switzerland,” since two escaped successfully and the rest were 
repatriated in early 1945.  The prosecutor made a sarcastic entry that “in view of these 
facts, it seems appropriate to suspend the proceedings for the duration until such time as 
they are encountered in Switzerland again.”29    
Not all Swiss who aided escaping Americans did so for strictly ideological 
reasons.  While Alex Mussard and Max Regazzi took no money for their services, other 
Swiss benefactors profited handsomely for their efforts.  One for-profit smuggling ring 
was comprised of at least four employees of the Hotel Rhätia and Palace Hotel in Davos, 
the same hotels where the interned American officers were lodged.  The majority of the 
smugglers worked at the hotels, and all but one were Swiss citizens.  From September to 
November 1944, this group assisted at least thirteen Americans to escape from 
internment.
30
    
Luigi Belotti, a hotel waiter of Italian nationality, was apparently the most active 
of the Davos smuggling group.  Belotti personally escorted at least ten American officers 
to Lake Geneva or other border crossings in the fall of 1944, receiving over 720 Swiss 
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Francs in compensation.
31
  He described one of the trips in mid September 1944 during 
an interrogation, claiming that several American officers asked the staff of the Hotel 
Rhätia “to help them with their escape, particularly when it came to securing [rail] 
tickets.”  Belotti was happy to assist for the right price: 200 Swiss Francs.  Belotti 
provided both Americans with civilian clothes, a “pair of pants and a jacket” for one 
officer, and “pants, jacket, and a raincoat” for the other.  The Americans wore their 
civilian clothes and carried their uniforms in suitcases, a safeguard against the accusation 
of espionage in the event that they were caught.  Belotti travelled with the internees to the 
French border in a trip that lasted a total of four days.   He purchased rail tickets for the 
group, and they travelled from Davos-Platz to Landquart, Zurich, Bern, and finally 
Lausanne.  Here they attempted to secure passage via boat across Lake Geneva, as the 
lake itself was the border with France.  Two Swiss fishermen turned them down, but a 
third agreed to smuggle the Americans across the lake the next morning for 500 Swiss 
Francs.  The officers agreed to meet Belotti at the train station the next morning at 9 
o’clock to return his clothes and pay for the services rendered, but the Americans failed 
to show at the rendezvous.  Belotti was upset, claiming that “both the Americans 
promised to return the clothes to me.”  He claimed that one outfit was “still brand new,” 
and that the apparel cost him 575 Swiss Francs.  Instead of a profit, he left with only a 
150 Swiss Franc deposit and a rail ticket.  Belotti grumbled that his monthly salary was 
more than this amount, “200 Swiss Francs a month – plus room and board.”32 
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Belotti repeated multiple smuggling trips to the French border despite a 
confrontation with the Swiss military police in early October of 1944.  When accused of 
helping the Americans to escape, he “denied that I had anything to do with the 
smuggling.”  Belotti continued to push his luck, and finally was caught by Swiss police 
on 13 October while helping three Americans travel via train to Zurich, a gamble that 
promised a lucrative payoff of 300 Swiss Francs.  After Belotti was arrested, his landlady 
also made a discovery that further implicated the smuggler.  While changing the linen in 
the common laundry room, Mrs. Beilleter-Bossert discovered that one of the drawers on 
the linen chest was locked.  She removed the other drawers to investigate, and uncovered 
another secret: Belotti’s hidden earnings.  In the chest were over 2,000 Swiss Francs, as 
well as various quantities of U.S. Dollars, English Pounds, French Francs, Belgian 
Francs, Italian Lira, and German Reichsmarks, all wrapped neatly in a towel.  The 
landlady called the local detective bureau, and a search of the premises revealed a 
laundry basket stuffed with American pilot uniforms, as well as letters that implicated 
Belotti and other members of the Hotel Rhätia staff in the smuggling operation.
33
 
Although Belotti initially denied helping Americans on multiple occasions, he 
confessed after he was confronted with the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.  He told 
the examining magistrate that “I knew it was forbidden to help internees escape,” 
although he claimed ignorance about the restriction over providing internees with civilian 
clothing.  He was charged with the crime of liberation of internees, violating the Federal 
Council Decree on the partial closure of the Swiss border, and disobedience against 
general orders.  On June 5, 1945 Belotti was sentenced by a military tribunal to 240 days 
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confinement and fined 366 Swiss Francs in trial costs and other fees.  His stiff sentence 
may reflect both the fact that he was a repeat offender, as well as the profit motive behind 
the smuggling.  Although Belotti’s actions were perhaps no more egregious than those 
committed by the Mussards or Lt. Regazzi, the panels apparently found that ideology was 
a more redeeming motive than profit for violating Swiss neutrality.
34
 
The Mussards, Lt. Regazzi, and Belotti were only a few of the over fifty Swiss 
residents who were caught helping interned Americans escape the country.
35
  These 
residents helped Americans for a variety of reasons ranging from ideology to greed.  
Those who helped the Americans for no compensation despite great personal risk 
represented the majority of the Swiss population who strongly sympathized with the 
Allied cause.  These benefactors also proved that the reaction of the Swiss population to 
formal decrees of neutrality was hardly monolithic.  Although the Swiss government 
relentlessly punished these types of violations of neutrality, many Swiss nevertheless 
disagreed with the government’s stance and instead placed a higher premium on the 
freedom of Europe.  These values certainly influenced Swiss perceptions on the national 
posture of neutrality, but also how the policies governing the maintenance of neutrality 
were carried out with respect to interned soldiers.  The debate over how interned 
Americans – particularly escaping internees – should be treated eventually went beyond 
the level of the military courts and Swiss sympathizers.  The disagreement between U.S. 
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and Swiss authorities instigated a diplomatic crisis over the scope and intent of 
international law.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII.       Debate over International Law 
 
The U.S. position on the punishment of internees was not hastily conceived, but 
rather founded on an argument that evolved from the expanded protections for POWs in 
the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.  This view 
on emerging customary law was first championed and circulated by the ICRC at the 
outbreak of World War II, and was subsequently adopted by most foreign governments as 
well as many Swiss civilians and officials.  During the war these actors all exerted 
diplomatic or individual pressure on the Swiss state in an attempt to mold internment 
policies into compliance with their views of the minimum humanitarian protections 
required under international law.  This debate over seemingly trivial distinctions between 
the various interpretations of international law is nevertheless revealing, because it 
demonstrates that many factors often influence the enforcement of such rules prior to 
their codification as treaty law.    
The debate that emerged over the application of international law to American 
internees was also a debate over Swiss neutrality, as the creation and enforcement of this 
law was interwoven with the principles of neutrality that ensured Switzerland’s 
reputation as an exceptional state perpetually devoted to peace and humanitarian 
principles.  According to Hans Kohn, “The Swiss national idea is not based upon race or 
biological factors, it rests on a spiritual decision.”1  However, many Swiss still identified 
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strongly with their ethnic and cultural roots.  With this in mind, the ideological model of 
the Swiss state, termed “civic exceptionalism” by some scholars, was a necessary part of 
the campaign to overcome the ethnic and cultural plurality that might otherwise override 
a unified Swiss nationalism.  During World War II, Swiss civic exceptionalism was 
strongly tied to the enforcement of humanitarian law, since this mandate represented “the 
voluntary commitment to a set of values and institutions” that distinguished Switzerland 
from other countries in Europe.
2
  Within this context, the decision by Swiss officials to 
limit the application of international law would not have been taken lightly, as it could 
potentially challenge the very basis of Swiss neutrality and statehood.   
In embracing its mandate as the guardian of international law during World War 
II, Switzerland accepted a considerable responsibility as the designated “protecting 
power” on behalf of thirty-five different belligerents.3  This designation entailed acting as 
a proxy for a state that had severed diplomatic relations with its enemy, in order to 
“safeguard the [state’s] interests and its nationals in relation to a third State.”4  Among its 
219 wartime mandates, the Swiss represented U.S. interests in 12 separate enemy 
countries, including Germany, Italy, and Japan.
5
  The duties of a protecting power were 
rooted in customary international law, but were first codified in the 1929 Geneva 
Conventions.  These duties included the establishment of a bureau of relief and 
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information concerning POWs, representation of POWs and belligerent countries in 
disputes over the application of the Conventions, provision of legal counsel for POWs in 
military tribunals, and even the responsibility to ship reading materials to POWs.
6
  In 
World War II, some of the protecting power responsibilities were partly delegated to the 
ICRC, such as inspecting POW camps and maintaining a Central Agency for Prisoners of 
War that tracked each prisoner and facilitated personal correspondence.   
The ICRC, founded in 1863, depended entirely on Swiss neutrality to carry out its 
mandate.  The ICRC had a total of 2,500 employees in twenty-seven offices in 
Switzerland by the end of the war.
7
  The central ICRC assembly, or governing body, was 
permanently fixed at a maximum of twenty-five Swiss citizens, and the president was 
normally a former Swiss diplomat.
8
  During World War II, members of the assembly 
included active Federal Councilor Philippe Etter, as well as several former Swiss 
ministers to foreign countries.
9
  The ICRC was independent of the Swiss government, but 
was heavily influenced by Swiss politics due to the crossover of leadership and the fact 
that it still depended on the Swiss government for over two-thirds of its regular income.
10
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On occasion, ICRC officials represented both the ICRC and the Swiss government at the 
same time, such as when ICRC President Max Huber represented the Swiss government 
at the 1932 Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in Geneva.
11
  
According to one author, Huber often functioned “as the guardian of two crosses, one 
red, the other white.”12  Thus, despite the independence of the ICRC in principle, the 
Swiss government could certainly influence the actions of the committee, as it did in 
World War II to prevent an ICRC declaration against the Holocaust.
13
  The ICRC also 
collaborated closely with the Swiss government in the arena of influencing developing 
international law of armed conflict.
14
  However, the ICRC mandate was broader than that 
of Switzerland, since the Swiss obligations as a neutral only apply during times of 
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interstate war, whereas all of the ICRC’s humanitarian activities continue whether or not 
an international conflict is in progress.
15
   
The ICRC’s humanitarian mandate made it an authority on the international law 
of armed conflict, including the law which protected internees of neutral countries.  
During World War II, concern over potential abuses of the law prompted the organization 
to clarify the customary international law of internment.  According to a retrospective 
ICRC analysis of World War II policies published in 1948, the ICRC’s position on 
treatment of military internees during the war was that “in the absence of definite treaty 
stipulations covering conditions of internment and treatment, the Committee always laid 
stress on the principle that conditions of internees in a neutral country should be at least 
equal to those in force for [POWs] in enemy hands.”16  However, the ICRC conceded that 
only Articles 11 and 12 of the 1907 Hague Convention (V) as well as Article 77 of the 
1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War directly applied 
to internees in neutral countries during World War II.
17
   
The 1907 Hague Convention was silent on the exact administration of internment 
policies, and only enumerated the requirement to provide basic humanitarian protections 
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such as supplying internees with “food, clothing, and relief.”18  The treaty also required 
neutral powers to intern belligerent forces “at a distance from the theatre of war” in 
camps, fortresses, or other “places set apart for this purpose.”19  Since the convention 
failed to “specify the system [governing administration of] military internees in neutral 
countries,” upon the outbreak of World War II, the ICRC took the initiative to 
recommend “ad hoc measures in cases where conventional international law does not 
provide sufficient basis to assure victims of the war precise treatment in accordance with 
humanitarian principles.”20   
In circular letters of April 1940, addressed to all neutral powers in the conflict, 
ICRC President Max Huber maintained that the provisions of the 1929 Convention 
should be the minimum protection for military internees.
21
  Under this interpretation 
internees would receive the same explicit minimum guarantees as POWs in the provision 
of internment locations, housing conditions, food and clothing rations, sanitary amenities, 
and medical care.
22
  The 1929 Convention also provided legal protections to POWs, 
stipulating that “escaped prisoners of war who are retaken before being able to rejoin 
their own army or to leave the territory occupied by the army which captured them shall 
be liable only to disciplinary punishment,” which by definition limited punishment for 
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escape to a maximum of thirty days local arrest.
23
  The 1929 Convention further specified 
that “preventative arrest shall be reduced to the absolute minimum,” and “in no case may 
prisoners of war be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prisons, penitentiaries, 
convict prisons, etc.) there to undergo disciplinary punishment.”24  It is clear that 
affording American internees the rights of the 1929 Convention would have precluded 
their detention in Wauwilermoos for attempting escape and also limited the time of their 
detention to a maximum of thirty days.  The ICRC circular thus attempted to clarify the 
legal status of internees.  Not unlike an amicus brief to a court, such a circular had no real 
standing in law, but given its source it should certainly have influenced the neutral 
governments.  The history of internment was relatively short even by World War II, and 
so it could be argued that "customary" international law—the law as defined by 
commonly accepted practice—had not settled on a single solution.  The 1940 circular 
sought to fix custom and close loopholes in the written conventions, but could not carry 
the full weight of either. 
Nevertheless, in response to the circular the ICRC “received assurances from 
most belligerent governments that the same 1929 Convention is also extended by analogy 
to internees who are enemy civilians, as well as military internees in neutral countries.”25  
Neutrals such as Hungary and Romania accepted the ICRC interpretation of the 1929 
Convention without reservation.  The consulate general of Hungary informed Mr. Huber 
that tighter restrictions were applied to internees based on “mass escapes,” but despite 
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this problem “the Hungarian Government is prepared to consider the provisions of said 
Convention regarding the treatment to be accorded members of the Polish military 
interned in Hungary.”  Hungary also agreed to allow ICRC inspectors to visit the 
internment camps “whenever it is requested.”26   
In a marked and even ironic contrast, the Swiss government, “whilst admitting 
that the stipulations of the Convention were by analogy applicable to internees,” also 
expressed the reservation that “the 1929 Convention could not well be applied” to certain 
scenarios in neutral countries.  In particular, Switzerland claimed that disciplinary 
punishments in the Conventions were an insufficient deterrent to internee escape 
attempts.  The Swedish government expressed similar reservations in 1940, claiming that 
“it would not be fair to add to [neutral states’] problems by subjecting them to the 
extremely detailed provisions of the 1929 Convention” which were “difficult to apply to 
military internees.”27  Thus, when faced with the prospect of enhanced protections for 
internees, both states chose practices that best served their own interests rather than those 
which conformed to the spirit of humanitarian principles. 
Other ICRC publications from the same period affirmed similar views as the April 
1940 circulars.  A March 1940 article published in the International Review of the Red 
Cross discussed the obligations of neutral countries toward different categories of 
military refugees, including internees.  According to the author, Paul des Gouttes, 
“military internees (for example, flyers belonging to a warring army who crashed on 
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neutral territory) into whatever category they may fall, cannot be treated differently by 
the neutral states than soldiers of a warring army that they have taken in,” a clear 
reference to the duty to treat internees at least as well as prisoners of war.  Des Gouttes 
claimed that several states were following this interpretation, and cited the example that 
“the Slovak Red Cross has stated expressly that it does not make a distinction between 
prisoners of war and military internees.”28  Des Gouttes’s opinion carried significant 
weight, as he was the primary author of both the 1906 and the 1929 Geneva 
Conventions.
29
 
Other ICRC circulars from as early as 1939 demonstrate that the organization also 
invoked the “by analogy” interpretation of the Geneva Convention for other categories of 
war captives, such as civilians interned by enemy belligerents.  The ICRC reportedly 
sought “as a temporary measure, to have the clauses of the 1929 Convention dealing with 
treatment of prisoners of war applied to civilian internees,” since these protections were 
“understood as being applicable by analogy.”30  In October 1942 the same argument 
appeared in a draft declaration against the Holocaust, where the ICRC claimed that 
“because people who have participated more or less directly in armed conflict are 
afforded guarantees, civilians in general should be even better protected.”31  However, 
the declaration was never released.  According to political scientist David Forsythe, 
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Swiss President and ICRC central committee member Philippe Etter “did not want the 
ICRC to run the risk of offending Nazi sensitivities with a public statement,” and the 
remainder of the committee “deferred to the wishes of President Etter” and shelved the 
declaration.
32
  Although political considerations undoubtedly played a major role in this 
decision, there was also a fundamental legal difference in the protection of civilians 
versus military internees.  Unlike the proposal to enfranchise military internees, the ICRC 
had no formal mandate that covered civilian detainees.  The committee acknowledged 
that the proposal to extend POW protections to civilians only applied to the belligerent 
powers who expressed a willingness to do so, and there was apparently no consensus on 
this step.  Therefore, the ICRC only sought to apply the 1929 Conventions to civilian 
internees as an “interim step” until protections for civilians could be further codified in 
treaty law.
33
   
As the legal recommendation of a universally recognized organization operating 
under international mandate, the ICRC circular opinions represented “soft law” that while 
not yet binding on states, reflected the emerging customary international law of the 
period.
34
  According to one legal scholar, a rule that was once soft law becomes 
customary international law or “hard law” once it attains the condition of general state 
                                                 
32
 David P. Forsythe, The Humanitarians: the International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 48.  According to Forsythe and Reiffer-Flanagan, “the ICRC’s policy 
positions concerning the Holocaust injured the reputation of the organization, at least to some extent.”  See 
David P. Forsythe and Barbara Reiffer-Flanagan, The International Committee of the Red Cross: A Neutral 
Humanitarian Actor (London: Routledge, 2007), 17. 
33
 “Documents émanant du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge,” 281. 
34
 Ingrid Detter, The International Legal Order (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994), 178, 212.   
      175 
practice, or “common and widespread practice among many states.”35  As expressed by 
the ICRC, both “physical and verbal acts” can constitute state practice, such as “military 
manuals, national legislation, national case-law, instructions to armed and security forces, 
military communiques during war, diplomatic protests, opinions of official legal advisers, 
comments by governments on draft treaties, executive decisions and regulations, 
pleadings before international tribunals, statements in international fora, and government 
positions on resolutions adopted by international organizations.”36  Many of these acts 
were clearly evident in the debate over the legal rules governing treatment of internees in 
Switzerland, demonstrating that a condition of general state practice nearly existed during 
this period.  Thus, the proposed protections for internees nearly satisfied a key element to 
becoming a customary rule. 
The legal position of the U.S. government over internment rights was the same as 
that of the ICRC, in that U.S. diplomats and their attorneys espoused the view, in the 
same phrase, that military internees enjoyed, “by analogy,” the full benefits of the 1929 
Conventions.
37
  For example, in November 1944, General Legge reported to Leland 
Harrison, the minister of the U.S. Legation in Switzerland, that internees were held 
incommunicado in civilian prisons in violation of Article 56 of the 1929 Convention; 
possessions were confiscated in violation of Article 6; sentences to Camp Wauwilermoos 
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were often six to seven months in violation of Article 54; Red Cross packages were 
refused in violation of Article 37; and conditions in Camp Wauwilermoos were “worse 
than in enemy prison camps according to reports in possession of American Interests.”38  
General Legge also advised the U.S. War Department that strong action was necessary to 
make the Swiss “act promptly,” and he coordinated with Harrison to present the case to 
the Swiss Foreign Office.
39
  Official protests were personally authorized by Acting 
Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, who cabled that “The [State] Department approves 
the action contemplated by the Legation,” and gave Harrison permission to “present the 
case as strongly and convincingly as circumstances warrant.”  According to Stettinius, 
“Should the Swiss say that they do not consider themselves bound to apply the terms of 
the Geneva Convention to interned military, the Legation may state in reply that this 
Convention is generally accepted as the minimum standard of treatment of all persons 
who are interned.”  The State Department also forwarded the recommendations of the 
War Department: 
“[The protest] should be based on the fact that the conditions are unreasonable in 
relation to prevention of escape.  Common humanitarian considerations dictate 
the necessity for alleviating the conditions under which our personnel are being 
detained.  The Swiss should promptly remove them to a camp with better 
conditions and should restore any personal effects that have been confiscated 
unless the latter might assist in another escape.  Facilities for recreation and 
exercise should be given to the men interned.  In our opinion, the present 
unnecessary hardships being visited on our personnel are not consistent or 
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compatible with the duties imposed upon a neutral country in upholding the terms 
of the Hague Convention No. V of October 18, 1907 and international law.”40     
 
The U.S. complaints to Swiss officials were presented by General Legge to high-
level Swiss authorities: the FCIH Commissioner and the Minister of the Swiss Federal 
Military Department.
41
  The U.S. legation emphasized the two most widespread 
violations of international law in its complaints.  First, the incarceration of internees at 
Wauwilermoos for months or indefinite periods violated the 1929 Convention, which 
stated that “the duration of a single punishment may not exceed thirty days.”  General 
Legge believed that under the “by analogy” interpretation of the 1929 Convention, 
“internees certainly should not suffer worse punishment for [attempted escape] than 
prisoners of war.”42  He made the distinction between internees punished for disciplinary 
infractions, as opposed to those who were “detained simply because they tried to escape 
to join their army.”43  Second, the deplorable conditions in the camp violated multiple 
provisions of the 1929 Convention, such as requirements that POWs “be lodged in 
buildings or in barracks affording all possible guarantees of hygiene and healthfulness” 
and receive food rations “equal in quantity and quality to that of troops at base camps [of 
the detaining Power].”44  Legge and Harrison could both attest to these conditions, as 
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they had visited Wauwilermoos on November 3, 1944.
45
  Legge elevated the tenor of the 
protests with the inclusion of language that was thoroughly undiplomatic.  He told the 
FCIH commissioner that the conditions in Wauwilermoos “will certainly be harmful to 
Swiss-American relations when this entire matter comes into the light.”46   Legge evoked 
the possibility of damage to Switzerland’s humanitarian reputation as well as lasting 
diplomatic consequences.  He informed the FCIH commissioner that “your splendid 
national traditions of service to belligerent nations [are] world renowned and I am sure 
that a just criticism of treatment of those internees . . . would be painful to the public 
conscience.”  Legge bluntly threatened that “our military chiefs in Washington are 
seriously concerned about these matters,” and urged General Dollfus to release the 
imprisoned internees “before the storm which is brewing breaks.”47  He also informed the 
FCIH that he would notify the ICRC of the Swiss Army’s actions at Wauwilermoos that 
violated international law.
48
  
Minister Harrison presented the U.S. case separately to the Minister of the Swiss 
Political Department, Marcel Pilet-Golaz.  He outlined that “many American airmen have 
tried to escape,” but that as many as eighty or more were captured and imprisoned by the 
Swiss authorities.  Harrison claimed that the internees were treated like “ordinary 
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criminals,” and often “held incommunicado for days” if they refused to “talk and say who 
helped them.”  Finally, the internees were sentenced to Wauwilermoos, where “the 
detention lasted for weeks or even months.”  Harrison stressed that he was “surprised that 
[the Swiss] have a more severe attitude toward [escaping internees] than if they were 
prisoners of war.”  He claimed that this was a violation of Articles 6, 45, 47, 50, and 54 
of the 1929 Geneva Convention.  Harrison “urged [Pilet-Golaz] to intervene” on behalf of 
the internees, claiming that “a campaign could be triggered that could disturb the good 
relations that we want to maintain between the United States of America and 
Switzerland.”49 
Pilet-Golaz was not sympathetic to Harrison’s appeal from a legalistic perspective 
of strictly enforcing treaty obligations, but rather from an appraisal of simple diplomatic 
priorities.  He used his influence to pressure the Swiss Military Minister, Karl Kobelt, to 
find a solution to the standoff, and in doing so he became yet another enforcer of 
emerging customary law.  In a letter to the Swiss Military Minister he mentioned the 
American interpretation of the 1929 Geneva Conventions, but claimed that he did not 
“[wish] to discuss the purely legal side of the question” and focused instead on the 
potential postwar consequences of the Swiss policy.  Pilet-Golaz told the minister that the 
situation could create “create a strain in the U.S. Army Air Force operating in Europe and 
in the public opinion of this great country that would be prejudicial to our interests and 
our good relations,” and this might erase “some of the [political] benefit of the internment 
and hospitalization.”  He raised the fact that the internees caught escaping were 
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“subjected to treatment and restrictions that seemed to them humiliating, unnecessary and 
unjustified,” and that confinement in Wauwilermoos “left much to be desired from the 
standpoint of health conditions and diet” and often lasted for months.  Pilet-Golaz 
expressed that he thought that escapes should ideally be punished with “fifteen days or a 
month” of incarceration, not the sixty to eighty days actually meted out by the Swiss 
authorities.
50
  Pilet-Golaz’s tacit endorsement of the American position was important 
because although he was not the Swiss minister most directly responsible for 
administering internment, he nevertheless wielded significant influence on the Swiss 
Federal Council.  The fact that he became involved at all also suggests that the issues of 
internment practices were heavily influenced by diplomacy, which was within his 
jurisdiction as the head of the Swiss Political Department. 
In concert with U.S. diplomatic efforts, the staff in the British legation in Bern 
protested the same mistreatment of British internees in Wauwilermoos.  Wing 
Commander W.O. Jones, the assistant air attaché to the British Legation, wrote the FCIH 
commissioner protesting the length of imprisonment, as well as the conditions.  Drawing 
from his own experience as a POW, Jones claimed that conditions at Wauwilermoos were 
“inferior to everything I saw during my 20 months of imprisonment in Italy,” and added 
“I am sure that the Swiss Government does not desire to subject the imprisoned British 
soldiers located on your territory to conditions worse than those existing, under this 
report, in the camps of prisoners in the countries of our enemies.”51  In response, the 
                                                 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Letter from Wing Commander Jones to Swiss Federal Commissioner of Internment and Hospitalization, 
dated November 8, 1944, SFA, Box E27/1450G, British Internees 1940-1948. 
      181 
FCIH commissioner claimed that internees were simply under different regulations than 
POWs and therefore subject to penalties surpassing thirty days of confinement.
52
 
As a result of the diplomatic protests, U.S. and Swiss authorities met several times 
to address the accusations of noncompliance with international law.  General Legge 
visited Minister Karl Kobelt, the head of the Swiss Military Department, several times 
between mid-1944 and early 1945.
53
  However, the Swiss government never outwardly 
conceded the validity of the U.S. legal position.  After a meeting with Minister Kobelt in 
January 1945, General Legge reported to the U.S. War Department that trials for 
internees who had attempted escape “will continue with punishment at discretion [of] 
Swiss Military Courts without reference by analogy to 30 day confinement of POW’s 
under [the 1929] Geneva Convention,” since “our internees are under Swiss law,” as 
opposed to the protections of international treaties.  Legge had hoped to convince the 
Swiss that in view of the approaching end of the war, the Swiss “might consider 
shortening sentences.”54  Although the Swiss staunchly refused to administer the same 
protections afforded by the 1929 Geneva Convention, senior FCIH administrators were 
concerned about the U.S. diplomatic pressure, particularly U.S. threats to leak the debate 
to the international press.
55
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In addition to the Allied protests, Swiss military and civilian observers also 
bombarded Swiss internment officials with concerns about Captain Béguin’s competence 
and the effects of internment policies at Wauwilermoos.  In November 1944, Swiss Army 
Major W. Huber wrote the Federal Commissioner of Internment and Hospitalization 
worrying that “Switzerland is blatantly violating the minimum guarantees of the Geneva 
Convention of 1929 on the treatment of prisoners of war” with respect to internees in 
Wauwilermoos.  Huber, an officer assigned to the Swiss Army’s Office of the Chief of 
the General Staff, complained that “it is hard to understand why Switzerland treated the 
internees much more harshly than Germany's prisoners of war.”  He claimed that 
“[internment officials in Wauwilermoos] do not believe that the rules apply to them since 
they do not have any prisoners of war, just internees,” and that they used this distinction 
as a pretext to mistreat them.  Huber supported this claim with evidence that “deficient 
accommodations, food, and shelter in [Wauwilermoos] severely harmed the health of the 
internees.”  Specifically, he charged that American internees had developed mental health 
problems, tuberculosis, scurvy, inflammation of the eyes, and “serious skin diseases.”  
Huber blamed these conditions on Captain Béguin and other officers at Wauwilermoos 
who “have grossly exceeded their authority.”  He also claimed that confinement in the 
camp “is from 80 days to 5 months without any proceedings,” and indicated that he 
agreed with the American view that the length of confinement and lack of due process 
was “not only a violation of the Geneva Convention, but a violation of any law per se.”56   
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In Huber’s opinion, the damage from Wauwilermoos was widespread.  He 
claimed that conditions in the camp had resulted in Americans losing “all respect for the 
Swiss Army and Switzerland,” and that the internees had “learned to hate the country and 
the Swiss people.”  Huber stated that simply releasing the internees was not enough to 
restore Swiss credibility and repair the damage cause by the internment crisis.  Rather, he 
argued that the perception that “a large contingent of Swiss officialdom and the Army 
authorities are hostile to [Americans]” must also be rebutted “by evidence that the 
American internees’ execrable treatment was not ordered by the responsible departments 
in Bern and did not reflect the country’s official policies nor popular sentiment.”57  The 
direct intervention of an outsider like Huber demonstrates that there were some in the 
Swiss Army who were concerned about how adherence to the spirit of international law 
would affect the legacy of Swiss neutrality beyond the end of the war. 
Another unsolicited voice in the debate over treatment of American internees was 
the Swiss press.  Despite wartime censorship of the Swiss media, various newspaper 
editors felt that it was their duty to report violations of neutrality to the government even 
if they lacked unfettered access to the public.  The Swiss press was closely monitored by 
the Press and Radio Section, a censorship organization that began under the Swiss Army 
in 1939 and eventually was nominally transferred to the Swiss Justice and Police 
Department in early 1942.
58
  The section was authorized by a decree of the Swiss Federal 
Council, and utilized passive censorship in which articles were screened after publication 
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for content that was deemed incendiary.  Of particular concern were any articles that 
overly antagonized neighboring Germany, as some members of the Swiss government 
believed that the Germans might invoke the hostile Swiss press as a pretense for invasion.  
The Swiss censors therefore issued instructions that forbid any publications “that harm or 
jeopardize Switzerland’s independence, security, or neutrality,” a standard that could be 
interpreted subjectively.  Violations were punishable by sanctions ranging from 
reprimands, bans on future publication, and even imprisonment.
59
  However, the fact that 
the media were only censored retroactively meant that editors had some limited agency to 
criticize government policies, including those regulating the internment of foreign 
military personnel.    
Paul Altheer was one journalist who was highly critical of the federal internment 
policies when it came to punishing escaping internees.  It was perhaps no coincidence 
that he was the editor of the Davos Newspaper published in the same city where many of 
the American officers were interned.  In late October 1944 Altheer appealed on behalf of 
the Americans in Wauwilermoos to the Swiss Army’s “Army and Home” section, a 
propaganda organization meant to influence the morale of the troops and strengthen the 
bond between the Swiss Army and the civilian population.
60
  Altheer explained to Army 
and Home that the officers at Wauwilermoos were experiencing a “real hardship,” a 
reference to the conditions at the camp.  He elaborated that the internees were confined 
under “unhealthy and unhygienic” conditions, including no bathing facilities to speak of, 
a “primitive” latrine that produced “a terrible stench,” straw beds infested with bed bugs, 
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inadequate clothing, and no access to recreation.  Altheer reported that internees suffered 
from skin diseases, yet medical care was “not easy to find,” and the commandant was 
entirely unsympathetic to the problems of the internees.  According to the editor, this 
situation was unacceptable because the Americans “did not commit any crimes,” and they 
were only confined in Wauwilermoos as a result of failed attempts to escape and “get 
back into action.”  Altheer therefore asked the Army to open an investigation and 
mitigate the problems at Wauwilermoos “in order to preserve the cordial relations and 
friendship [of the Americans].”61 
Another concerned journalist was Albert Adler, editor of The Wartime Observer, 
who personally visited Wauwilermoos on October 25, 1944 as a result of “persistent 
rumors spread in Davos that mentioned the penal camp Wauwilermoos . . . where 
appalling conditions prevail that would be no credit to our country.”62  He did not visit 
the camp with the objective of obtaining “as much relief as possible for the Americans,” 
but rather “to help avoid having unnecessary harshness or flawed policies do great 
damage to [Switzerland].”  After spending four hours at the camp, Adler confessed that 
“what I found surpassed my worst fears.”  He described crowded barracks surrounded by 
barbed wire and mud, hygiene facilities and latrines “in the most primitive state,” and 
leadership which refused to distribute Red Cross aid parcels.
63
  According to Americans 
who previously escaped from captivity in Germany, “at that time [German POW] camps 
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were far better than [Wauwilermoos].”  Adler wrote about his concerns to the local 
internment authorities in Davos, who in turn passed his report to federal internment 
officials.
64
 
Looking beyond the problem of simply ensuring the confinement of internees, 
Adler saw the issue as one of ideology.  How could Switzerland, with its mandate to 
inspect compliance with international law in “just about every prison camp in the world,” 
fail to uphold the same standards itself?  Adler’s conversations with interned Americans 
convinced him of the damaging effects of the internment policies.  Airmen who had 
previously espoused kinship with the Swiss had experienced a radical change of heart, 
such that “the Swiss people in general are not seen as neutral, but considered exactly the 
same as nationals of the enemy.”  The cause, he explained, was that “people do not 
consider an escape attempt as dishonorable,” and although escape attempts justified some 
manner of legal response, the punishment meted out at Wauwilermoos was “in no way 
proportional to the offense.”  The American internees informed Adler that “they will 
never set foot on Swiss soil again, and that when they returned to the United States they 
will do all they could to enlighten the people there about this ‘degrading’ treatment and 
keep them from ever again having anything to do with Switzerland.”65   
Adler realized that the legacy of Swiss actions would affect Switzerland’s postwar 
position among the world powers, and predicted that “we can be sure of the severest 
consequences for our country if we keep on punishing the escape attempts by American 
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internees in the same manner.”  In his opinion, the current policy reflected “sheer 
legalism” and certainly could be falsely justified “with enough juridical and bureaucratic 
contortions,” but this symptomatic approach only addressed immediate diplomatic 
complaints.  Failure to rectify the underlying problems of Swiss military justice and the 
conditions in Wauwilermoos would result in the shift of public opinion against 
Switzerland, which Adler believed would cause “incalculable, imminent damage” to the 
country.  In his view, “the [Swiss] citizenry would probably be astonished to find out 
how these American pilots view our country today and that they are determined to let 
others elsewhere know about it later on.”66 
Huber, Altheer, and Adler’s protests reveal that the Swiss attitude toward the 
application of international law to internees was hardly monolithic.  Rather, these 
individuals sought to influence the government policies for both the sake of the internees 
themselves as well as the implications that legal recalcitrance posed for the Swiss 
national reputation.  This dispute can therefore shed light on the cultural values that were 
threatened by the FCIH policies.  According to legal scholar José Marina, “Law is a part 
of the regulatory system of a culture, which coercively imposes the compliance of certain 
rules and procedures to solve conflicts.”  He believes that law was created to preserve a 
society’s “fundamental values” from social conflict, values such as peace, justice, 
survival, and public order that are necessary for coexistence.
67
  Perhaps the values that 
Huber and Adler sought to protect were in part the rule of international law and 
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commitment to humanitarian principles, both important facets of Swiss exceptionalism.  
The enforcement of questionable internment policies may have served the purpose of 
ensuring Swiss sovereignty by demonstrating strict neutrality and possibly averting 
German reprisals, but at what cost?  If Switzerland sacrificed the ideals that it stood for, 
then the price was too high for many Swiss citizens. 
Huber, Altheer, and Adler’s resistance to the government’s administration of 
international law is also speaks to the ways that culture can influence the law through the 
pursuit of cultural justice.  According to legal scholar Andrew Ross, this type of 
contestation occurs when legal processes are “too mechanistic in their attention to 
procedural rules, and not sensitive enough to the cultural security and social aspirations 
of citizens.”68  Although Ross was referring to more traditional national or local law, the 
internee debate suggests the way similar processes could operate on international law, in 
its formation, evolution, and even “enforcement.”  In this case the resistance of Swiss 
observers can be seen as attempts to ameliorate FCIH policies that were at odds with 
Swiss culture, with the more generalized effect of buttressing emerging customary 
international law and encouraging Swiss governmental compliance with that law.  To be 
sure, international law lacked (and lacks) the level of enforcement applied to intra-
national law; the success of this type of justice, therefore, depends on how egregious the 
violation is perceived to be, and how far its detractors are willing to go to circumvent the 
offending legal process.  Huber, Altheer, and Adler were all willing to provide 
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unsolicited complaints about the FCIH’s treatment of internees, but their resistance to 
these policies was apparently limited to procedural redress. 
It is also important to note that individuals like Huber, Athleer, and Adler 
contested more than the Swiss government’s legal position over internment.  They also 
reserved criticism for the subjective manner in which these laws were carried out, 
practices which were perhaps more egregious than the policies that enabled them.  The 
distinction is important because, as analyst Susan Sibley has argued, “disciplinary 
policies and practices are shaped both by the structure in which they occur and [by] the 
semi-autonomous individuals who participate in them and who enact the policies.”69  The 
Swiss legal position enabled the conditions at Wauwilermoos by denying the protections 
of the Geneva Conventions that would have limited the length and type of punishments 
available to military tribunals.  However, the mistreatment in Wauwilermoos was not 
inevitable simply because internees were punished under the Swiss Military Penal Code.  
Other preventable factors also promoted mistreatment of internees, including inept 
leadership and the fact that the Swiss government authorized punishment at special 
disciplinary camps.  Finally, the Swiss military tribunals frequently sentenced American 
airmen to lengthy prison terms rather than the authorized reduction to disciplinary 
punishment.  Had any of these additional factors been mitigated, it is conceivable that 
Americans might not have suffered abuse despite the lack of explicit protections under 
international law.  In this scenario, the debate over international law would never have 
occurred.    
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Although the complaints by the Allied governments and concerned Swiss citizens 
provided incentives to adhere to emerging customary law, these pressures were ultimately 
insufficient to change underlying Swiss policy.  However, they did lay the framework for 
future changes in treaty law concerning the legal rights of internees.  The Swiss Federal 
Military Department’s rebuttal began with a strictly legalistic interpretation of 
international law.  Swiss Military Minister Karl Kobelt argued that treating military 
internees as POWs was inconsistent with existing precedents and would itself amount to 
a violation of international law.  In contravention to the legal position outlined in earlier 
correspondence with the ICRC, he maintained that the “by analogy” extension of POW 
protections to internees was “nowhere stipulated” in the 1929 Convention.  Therefore, 
absent the protection of international law over escape attempts, internees would be 
“governed by the domestic law of the contracting parties.”  In this case the domestic law 
was the Swiss Military Penal Code, which permitted open-ended punishments that the 
Swiss argued were “proportionate to the offence committed and the necessity of 
preventing re-occurrence.”70   
The Swiss Chief Prosecutor reportedly expressed the view that Switzerland was 
“unequivocally obligated” by the 1907 Hague Convention to “to guard troops of warring 
armies interned by it in a manner that keeps them from taking further part in hostilities,” 
including “by means of force.”  He claimed that this force necessarily included long-term 
imprisonment and criminal sanctions, as anything less would be ineffective.  According 
to the prosecutor, disciplinary punishment with a maximum of thirty days confinement 
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was inadequate to curtail escape attempts, and therefore failed to satisfy Swiss legal 
obligations.  In this scenario, he claimed that Switzerland would “run the risk of being 
forced out of [its] neutral posture.”71  Other Swiss officials also claimed that failure to 
adequately punish U.S. internees for escape attempts could be regarded as a violation of 
their obligation to uphold the 1907 Hague Convention, and therefore incite Germany “to 
reprisals or even hostile measures” against Switzerland.72  
The Swiss military also cited case law as a precedent for denying the protections 
of the 1929 Convention to military internees.  After the internment of the Forty-fifth 
French Corps in 1940, Swiss military tribunals determined that internees could be 
punished more severely than POWs.
73
  The precedent was set by the trial of Polish 
internee Stanislaw Tabaka, who was interned as a member of the Forty-fifth French 
Corps in June 1940.  Tabaka promptly attempted to escape in July because “he had a 
longing for his family living in France; he hadn’t had any news from them since the 
month of May.”  Tabaka was apprehended before he reached the Swiss border, and a 
territorial court convicted him of disregard of regulations, the same article of the Swiss 
Military Penal Code later used to charge escaping American internees.  Tabaka appealed 
his three-month prison sentence on the basis that the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War “which by analogy also applies to internees, an 
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escape may only be punished disciplinarily.”  Therefore, he argued that his punishment 
violated international law, since his three-month sentence exceeded the thirty-day limit 
specified in the 1929 Convention.  This was essentially the same legal argument adopted 
in 1944 by the U.S. Legation in Switzerland to protest the confinement of American 
internees, with the exception that Tabaka only protested the length of his sentence, 
whereas the U.S. protested the length of sentence as well as multiple conditions of 
confinement.
74
   
The Swiss Federal Court of Cassation, an appeals court, accepted and deliberated 
Tabaka’s case.  The judges determined that “nowhere is it stipulated that [the 1929 
Convention’s provisions limiting punishment of POWs] apply by analogy to members of 
a warring power who are billeted with neutrals.”  They also decided that the 1929 
Convention did not specify “any other provisions concerning internment arrangements, 
the treatment of internees, etc.,” and therefore by default the administration of internment 
“was left to the signatory parties [to the Hague Convention] to work out the details of 
how to treat internees in accord with the respective country’s laws.”  The judges also 
reasoned that Switzerland was legally “obliged to keep [custody] of the internees,” and so 
it would be inappropriate to reduce Tabaka’s sentence, as this “could possibly cause 
[Switzerland to have] disagreements with the belligerent countries.”  Therefore, the 
judges rejected Tabaka’s appeal and set the precedent for future cases involving escaping 
internees.
75
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This argument from law reflected real structural pressures. The Swiss position 
seemed dubious to the U.S. legation, but this policy had been in force well prior to the 
internment of the first American airmen in 1943, and reflected the immense burden that 
internment imposed on the Swiss government.  During the war, Switzerland provided 
safe haven for nearly 300,000 refugees, over 100,000 of whom were military refugees.
76
  
At the beginning of the war approximately 10,000 Swiss soldiers were detailed to guard 
military internees and refugees, representing an enormous logistical burden that also 
undermined defense against violations of Swiss neutrality.
77
  The considerable expenses 
of internment were also shouldered by Switzerland, with little likelihood of 
reimbursement in the case of internees whose countries were under occupation and 
governments in exile.  In this light, harsher punishment of internees to enhance control 
likely seemed prudent to Swiss authorities, who were almost certainly overwhelmed by 
the many problems posed by internment.   
In some cases, Swiss officials simply could not conceptualize the need to afford 
internees the same protections as POWs.  General Dollfus was one such official who was 
well-insulated from the actual implementation of his policies as the FCIH commissioner.  
He saw the harsh punishment of escaping internees as a necessity reaction to the 
“extremely numerous” American attempts to flee from internment.  Dollfus cited that no 
less than 318 American internees attempted escape between August 28 and October 25, 
1944, a figure that comprised over twenty-five percent of the total American internee 
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population in Switzerland.  In his view, confinement to prison camps was essential in 
order to faithfully discharge “the duty to prevent the Americans from escaping” 
according to international law.  Dollfus also saw no reason to treat internees differently 
simply because they were “carrying out orders” in their attempts to escape.78 
In rebutting claims that internees should receive the protections of the 1929 
Geneva Convention, Dollfus explained that “as a private citizen but using my common 
sense, it seems to me that it does not make sense to put Swiss internees, who live 
unrestrained and more or less unguarded in hotels and are able to circulate freely within a 
fairly large area, on a par with prisoners of war.”  He made this distinction because he 
claimed the internees escaped from hotels, rather than the “barbed wire and machine 
guns” of a traditional POW camp where prisoners “risk their lives in trying to escape.”  
Dollfus certainly knew that once caught escaping, subsequent escape attempts were from 
barbed-wire compounds like Wauwilermoos, where conditions were harsh and machine 
guns were fired at escapees.  Yet he was silent as to whether those in punishment camps 
were now deserving of POW protections by virtue of their surroundings.  If Dollfus 
believed his excuses, then he legitimately thought that the accusations about 
Wauwilermoos conditions in November 1944 were “completely untenable,” implying 
that they were not in fact comparable with Axis POW camps.
79
  This attitude can perhaps 
be explained by the mixed signals that Dollfus received about camp conditions, as well as 
his relative isolation from those who actually carried out the policies of the FCIH. 
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VIII.  Inspections and Reactions to Diplomatic Crisis 
Although the Swiss refused to modify their legal position, the internal and 
external pressures in response to internment conditions did have some effect, at least in 
that Swiss officials took measures to inspect Wauwilermoos and other camps for proper 
conditions.  Inspection of the camp fell under the joint purview of the Swiss government 
and the ICRC, since both shared the duties of a protecting power.  While apparently well-
intentioned, these inspections reveal the problems inherent in the requirement for a 
protecting power to police itself.  Both Switzerland and the ICRC used current and 
former Swiss Army officers to inspect conditions at Wauwilermoos, resulting in reports 
that often praised Captain Béguin and gave the camp a clean bill of health.  The Swiss 
government also exerted an element of influence over the ICRC that made it impossible 
for the organization to carry out its duties impartially. 
Inspections for the Swiss government were performed by officers of the FCIH.  
Swiss Army Major Florian Imer, the Chief of Internment Legal Services for the 
Commissariat from 1941-1945, personally inspected conditions in Wauwilermoos during 
this period.
1
  In May 1942, Imer reported to his superior that “the complaints by internees 
about their treatment at Wauwilermoos are not justified, and for the most part, 
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exaggerated.”  He acknowledged that Wauwilermoos “is more rigorous than a regular 
camp,” but claimed that these punitive aspects of the camp were necessary to enforce 
discipline.  Imer found no fault with the camp’s leadership and actually singled out 
Béguin for praise in his reports, claiming that “I took away an excellent impression from 
my visit to the camp; Captain Béguin is just the kind of man needed to command this 
kind of camp.”2   
When the FCIH investigated Béguin in July 1945, Imer reiterated that throughout 
his inspections from 1942 to 1945, he “I regularly came away with a favorable 
impression and the feeling that Captain Béguin was truly the kind of man who is made to 
run a penal camp.”  He called Béguin a “good organizer and a fine psychologist” who 
displayed “the qualities of a teacher of men and a true leader.”  According to Imer, 
“beneath [Béguin’s] severe and rigorous demeanor beats a kind and understanding heart.”  
This was apparently an attempt to reconcile his claims that Béguin was both strict and 
empathetic at the same time.  Several weeks later, Imer investigated the conditions of 
Russian military internees at Wauwilermoos. He again adopted an apologetic stance 
toward Béguin, claiming that articles in the press “distorted” the facts and displayed an 
“absolutely biased intent.”  Imer also reported that some Russian internees told him that 
Wauwilermoos had “a spirit of fairness and camaraderie . . . something not always to be 
found in the other camps.”  He claimed that internees had two opportunities per week to 
raise complaints to the commandant during his speeches, and that “[the Russian 
internees] never complained about anything.”  Other than a distinct lack of freedom of 
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movement, he believed the internees “had the exact same freedoms as in normal camps.”  
Paradoxically, in the same report Imer cited several manslaughter investigations against 
Russian internees as well as a mutiny among the same group in February 1944, both of 
which seemed at odds with claims of “good fellowship.”3   
Major Imer again came to Béguin’s defense after the commandant was relieved 
and under investigation pending trial in 1945.  He explained that the prisoners “display a 
great and moral peacefulness” in the camp “in spite of the barbed wire and police dogs,” 
since Béguin “regularly grants them audiences to hear their requests and grievances and 
personally supervises their clothing and equipment issue.”  Imer concluded that “the 
reasons for the unhappiness and claims regarding the way internees are treated at 
Wauwilermoos stem not from the organization of camp Wauwilermoos or from the 
atmosphere fostered in it by Captain Béguin.”  In contrast, he claimed that “the camp’s 
state of mind is indeed excellent which has very good effects on the internees.”4  Imer 
portrayed Béguin as a scapegoat despite overwhelming evidence of his negligent 
behavior that led to the commandant’s removal.  He continued to defend Béguin even 
after Wauwilermoos received a scathing report from an ICRC inspector, perhaps out of a 
desire to avoid contradicting his earlier endorsements of the commandant. 
The ICRC inspections of Wauwilermoos, also conducted by a Swiss Army 
officer, were only slightly more critical until after the war’s conclusion.  The ICRC 
recorded 864 inspections of military internment camps in Switzerland from 1944 through 
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the end of the war; thus inspections of Wauwilermoos comprised a mere fraction of the 
camps under its mandate.
5
  Wauwilermoos received only four ICRC inspections from 
1944 to 1945, all performed by ICRC delegate and Swiss Army Colonel M. Auguste 
Rilliet, the former commander of the Second Infantry Brigade in Geneva turned chief 
ICRC delegate to Switzerland for internment issues.
6
  In his first inspection in May 1944, 
Rilliet described the camp as “surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by armed sentries, 
accompanied by a detachment of army dogs,” and having the capacity for 400 internees.  
Only 216 inmates were in the camp on the date of the inspection, of which the majority 
were Polish and Italian soldiers.  The remaining prisoners were German, Russian, 
English, French, Yugoslav, American, and Greek.  Rilliet recorded only six Americans in 
the camp, and noted that the barracks of the English and American internees were “the 
least well kept.”  Food rations were reportedly lower for “internees of the camp placed 
under arrest,” which ostensibly applied to the Americans and other prisoners confined for 
escape attempts.   Rilliet was critical of the latrines, which were located inside the 
barracks.  In his opinion, a separate latrine would be “more hygienic.”7    
In relation to punishment at Wauwilermoos, Rilliet found that the officer barracks 
in the camp “made the most distressing impression on me during this visit.”  According 
to Rilliet, most of the interned officers he questioned “do not know why they are in this 
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camp,” and he cited the case of one Polish officer who already had been incarcerated for 
nine months without explanation.  Another Yugoslav prisoner was studying in Lausanne 
prior to his incarceration, but the delegate could not ascertain “the motive for his 
punishment.”  Rilliet wanted to interview the men confined to local arrest in the stockade, 
described as “a small, two-man cell, [with] straw, bucket, [and] pitcher,” but the men 
were reportedly unavailable for interview “because of repairs underway.”  In spite of 
these apparent inconsistencies, Rilliet’s overall assessment was that “the discipline in the 
camp and the uniform order made a good impression.”8   
Colonel Rilliet’s next inspection of Wauwilermoos in October 1944 documented 
the arrival of twenty American officers among a population of 283 inmates.  The camp 
had been enlarged since his last visit, and now had the capacity for 600 internees.  Rilliet 
noted that the internees who were awaiting military tribunals often spent longer in pretrial 
confinement at Wauwilermoos than the sentences they eventually received.  He noted 
remarks by the commandant, Captain Béguin, who blamed the Swiss military courts for 
the plight of the military internees and called their situation “unfortunate.”  Béguin also 
told Rilliet that “it is highly regrettable” that the soldiers sentenced to Wauwilermoos for 
attempted escape receive widely disparate sentences, as if he believed that would-be 
escapees were being punished unnecessarily and unfairly.
9
  He claimed that there should 
be a “special military tribunal” that exclusively handled internment cases and delivered 
more consistent verdicts.  These sentiments seem dubious in light of Béguin’s 
disparaging comments about interned Americans in his private correspondence to the 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Auguste Rilliet, Rapport No. 19A, dated October 16, 1944, ICRC Archives, B/G2, Internés en Suisse. 
      200 
FCIH commissioner, particularly since the American internees almost certainly 
constituted the majority of would-be escapees in the camp at that particular time.
10
  
Therefore, it is likely that Béguin made these comments simply to put his apologetic 
comments on the record, since he was the person most likely to be blamed for any 
misconduct at Wauwilermoos. 
Second Lieutenant James Misuraca was one of the Americans in Wauwilermoos 
during Rilliet’s inspection in October, 1944.  Misuraca was a B-24 bombardier from the 
Eighth Air Force who arrived in Switzerland in April 1944, and later ended up in the 
prison camp after an unsuccessful escape attempt from Davos.
11
  He noticed that the food 
rations improved considerably during the ICRC visit, such as “a second potato or a 
cabbage,” which appeared to be an attempt to artificially bolster the camp’s conditions.  
Misuraca reported this observation to the ICRC inspector, presumably Rilliet, who 
informed him that “of course we will investigate this.”12  The complaint, however, was 
not entered into the report of inspection.  Rilliet recorded only that the food quantity was 
“sufficient” by virtue of the “skill of the commander of the camp” and a vegetable garden 
that reportedly supplemented the normal rations.
13
  After the ICRC inspection team 
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departed, Misuraca recalled that the camp administration went back to serving the normal 
rations of “soup in a garbage can.”14 
Although inspections of Wauwilermoos appeared superficial, it is clear that the 
ICRC’s attention was often directed at other humanitarian concerns within the FCIH.  By 
late 1944 the ICRC was extremely critical of the FCIH and frequently cited widespread 
abuses that went unremedied.  Correspondence between ICRC officials and the Swiss 
government reveal that the ICRC took the mandate to protect internees and refugees in 
Switzerland quite seriously, but were frequently opposed by the FCIH.  The ICRC 
assembly member responsible for transmitting ICRC reports and ameliorating conditions 
of confinement within Switzerland was Dr. Paul E. Martin, a Swiss Army colonel and 
professor of history at the University of Geneva.
15
  He corresponded directly with several 
Swiss officials, including the FCIH commissioner, the head of the Swiss Federal Military 
Department, other cabinet ministers on the Swiss Federal Council, and intermediate 
officials who carried out the directives of the Swiss government.
16
  Martin’s 
correspondence with Swiss FCIH and government officials in 1944 reveals that the 
relationship between the two organizations steadily deteriorated over the issue of 
internment conditions. 
According to the ICRC, Switzerland only granted “occasional” internal camp 
visitations by the Red Cross until April 1944, after which regular inspections were 
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permitted.
17
  This fact, while seemingly inconsistent with the mandate of the ICRC, can 
be explained by the changing conditions of internment and leadership in Switzerland 
during the war.  At the outset of the war, the ICRC “did not think that assembling a 
delegation to visit the camps [in Switzerland] was useful then,” partly because most of 
the nations with internees in Switzerland also had diplomatic missions in the country.  
The ICRC believed that these missions would look after the “natural protection” of their 
own citizens, and in theory safeguard them from abuse at the hands of Swiss authorities.  
They also reasoned that there was no need to inspect internment conditions since the 
FCIH’s first commissioner, Major General Jean de Muralt, declared that his office would 
“apply the principles and provisions of the Geneva Convention dated July 27, 1929 
relating to the treatment of prisoners of war to the internees in Switzerland.”18  Ironically, 
at the time Muralt was both the FCIH commissioner and the president of the Swiss Red 
Cross Society, and in 1944 became the Chairman of the League of Red Cross Societies.
19
  
Therefore, Muralt’s guarantees of fair treatment certainly carried weight with the ICRC.   
The situation changed in early 1943, when Swiss Federal Counselor Eduard von 
Steiger, head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police, asked the ICRC to 
intervene on behalf of escaped Russian prisoners of war in Switzerland.  This was 
necessary because of “the lack of a Russian diplomatic mission in Switzerland,” which 
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resulted in the need for a protecting power to ensure humanitarian provisions.  After large 
numbers of Italian internees and escaped prisoners of war also required representation in 
September of 1943, the ICRC sought to permanently extend its mission to cover these 
categories of individuals.
20
   There was precedent for ICRC inspections in neutral 
countries, as the ICRC had already inspected internment conditions in Romania, 
Hungary, and Ireland.
21
  As the issues under the ICRC’s purview in Switzerland 
“multiplied and became more complicated,” the Swiss delegation of the ICRC increased 
its staff from two to three officials to over twenty-five personnel in 1944.
22
   
The ICRC faced stiff resistance from the FCIH as soon as it adopted the mandate 
of protecting foreign military personnel in Switzerland.  The ICRC lacked a complete 
roster of “name registers for internees and evadees in Switzerland,” and in particular had 
“received no information about German soldiers, Americans, and very little about the 
French.”23  The FCIH withheld this information based on security concerns, claiming that 
ICRC interviews revealed “secrets of national defense.”24  The FCIH also insisted on 
prior censorship of all ICRC inspection reports, a directive that originated from Swiss 
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Army Commander in Chief General Henri Guisan.  Guisan reportedly desired that 
inspection reports “should first of all be reviewed by the Army Command prior to release 
to foreign powers, this in order to avoid providing information relevant to the Swiss 
Army.”25 
The ICRC response to the FCIH demands was that committee delegates were 
unable to monitor all statements and complaints submitted for national security 
information.  The committee also claimed that “criticism can be constructive” and “might 
give rise to action for the improvement of the [internment] regime.”26  The ICRC was 
concerned that prior censorship of inspection reports would risk jeopardizing the 
organization’s neutral position.  According to one delegate, “the process [of allowing the 
censorship of inspection reports] presents a danger, in the sense that people outside the 
institution may view such a process as hemming in the ICRC’s freedom of action, by 
being subjected to prior censorship.”  Furthermore, the committee desired “that the main 
reports that its delegates write be truthful, and therefore, that the criticisms formulated in 
them will not be concealed.”  In spite of these concerns the ICRC eventually bowed to 
FCIH pressure and consented to a “gentlemen’s agreement” wherein the ICRC would 
“submit to the General a very discreet draft report” summarizing the inspection results.  
Thus, the ICRC would not pass along the entire report in order to safeguard their 
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neutrality, and the Swiss Army could still “identify a particular section of the report that 
should not be transferred abroad.”27   
This compromise reflected the enormous influence that the Swiss government 
held over the ICRC, in that a similar secret arrangement with the governments of other 
neutral or belligerent countries would ostensibly be an unthinkable violation of the 
ICRC’s principles.  In particular, the arrangement violated the ICRC’s fundamental 
principles of neutrality and impartiality.  Paradoxically, at the same meeting that 
produced the compromise, ICRC President Max Huber proclaimed that “the ICRC is a 
Swiss-based institution, but only in its staffing.”  He claimed that the ICRC “enjoys a 
position of full independence which is essential if it is to pursue its mission,” and that this 
independence would enable delegates to visit Swiss internment camps “in as impartially a 
manner as in other countries.”28    
It is apparent that the FCIH did not share the same humanitarian concerns as the 
ICRC, and saw the inspections of internment camps as an unwarranted encroachment on 
their affairs. The FCIH went to great efforts to undermine the ICRC inspections, 
particularly when inspections focused on nationalities with no diplomatic representation.  
FCIH administrator Colonel Probst accused one ICRC delegate who inspected Russian 
internment conditions, Georges Dessonnaz, of being a foreign spy.  The ICRC dismissed 
such accusations as absurd, stating that “Mr. Dessonnaz must continue his mission 
without letting himself be deterred by accusations or charges which appear to be based on 
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minute and questionable facts.”  The ICRC believed that these were not isolated 
accusations, but rather claimed that they were “part of a campaign directed against the 
ICRC in Switzerland.”29   
Complaints by ICRC officials over internment conditions reveal that the ICRC 
considered the FCIH in violation of several treaty obligations.  From mid to late 1944, the 
ICRC attempted to spur the FCIH to ameliorate widespread humanitarian problems that it 
detected in internment facilities.  Italians were the largest group of military internees in 
the country by early 1944, and numbered approximately 20,000.
30
  Therefore, they 
absorbed much of the time and energy of the FCIH administrators and ICRC inspectors.   
ICRC delegates reported that Italian internment camps “leave much to be desired in 
several respects and exhibit particularly serious deficiencies from the standpoint of 
hygiene and sanitation.”31  One delegate reported that a zealous guard shot an Italian 
internee, and that guards casually referred to Italian internees as “lazy,” “bastards,” and 
other derogatory terms.
32
  Another delegate reported that a camp of German internees 
“completely lack clothing, shoes, and underwear.”  Several other camps were seen to 
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have “a large shortage of underwear, socks, clothes, and especially pants.”33  Many 
delegates also reported that the interned soldiers reflected “a state of mind that to us 
seems deplorable.”  According to the ICRC, the interned soldiers “generally have a great 
deal of difficulty understanding and accepting the reasons for their internment in camps 
and also with willingly adapting to living conditions imposed on them by the Swiss 
authorities.”34  Although primarily concerned with humanitarian conditions, the ICRC 
also took up the cause of internees who were punished excessively in the Swiss judicial 
system.  This included those punished for unsuccessful escape attempts. 
 In June of 1944, Dr. Paul Martin appealed to FCIH Chief of Staff Colonel Simon 
to remit the punishment of an interned Polish officer imprisoned by the Swiss for several 
unsuccessful escape attempts.  There were over 10,000 interned Poles in Switzerland at 
this time, and they eventually made over 5,900 escape attempts, approximately 4,100 of 
which were successful.
35
  According to Martin, “the responsible Swiss authorities have 
sentenced recaptured persons [who attempted escape] to from 3 to 8 months confinement 
or more.”  The Polish officer noted that escaped prisoners of war only underwent less 
than 30 days of disciplinary punishment in “territories occupied by warring powers.”  The 
officer further testified that interned French officers from his unit, the Forty Fifth French 
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Corps, “have been punished for attempting to escape from Switzerland with nothing more 
than confinement to barracks.”   Martin cited the applicable articles of the Geneva 
Convention of 1929 requiring that prisoners punished for escaping “shall be liable only to 
disciplinary punishment,” and that “the duration of any single punishment shall in no case 
exceed 30 days.”  Martin then informed Col. Simon that “The ICRC is finds itself 
compelled to ask the Swiss authorities if they do not consider the abovementioned 
articles of the Geneva Convention of 1929 as applicable by analogy to military 
internees.”36 
 Colonel Simon responded to Martin’s inquiry by quoting the authority to punish 
internees in the Swiss Military Penal Code of 1927: "Whoever is guilty of failure to 
comply with a regulation or other general requirements of the service shall be punished 
by imprisonment up to 6 months. The offense is punishable by disciplinary action if it is 
of a non-serious nature. During wartime, the judge may order confinement or 
imprisonment."  According to Simon, “after the practice that has been established by the 
territorial courts, normal cases are punishable by three months imprisonment,” which 
could be reduced by a month depending on circumstances.  He professed that “I see no 
contradiction between this case law and [the Geneva Convention of 1929].”  In reference 
to the interned Polish officer, Simon added that “assuming your information that Polish 
internees were sentenced to 8 months confinement is not erroneous, I think it must 
involve internees that were sent to a penal camp like Wauwilermoos.”37 
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 Martin responded by asking “if it would be possible to mitigate the severity of 
sentences imposed for escape attempts?”  He appealed to the equity of the analogy 
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, reflecting that “with regard to military 
internees per se, it may seem strange that disciplinary sentences for an escape attempt in a 
neutral country are harsher than they are for prisoners of war committing the same 
offense in a belligerent country.”  It was clear that Martin was not confident in the 
legality of his position, and so he merely asked “whether or not the views of the Adjutant 
General of the Army [on punishing escaped internees] are final or if they could still be 
modified” rather than demand a change to comply with international law.38  His request 
fell on deaf ears, as the FCIH officials were apparently unwilling to mitigate punishment 
that they saw as necessary to maintain control over their foreign internee population.    
Martin explored the possibility of turning his request into a demand, but he was 
not qualified to make this determination on his own.  Therefore he wrote to Dr. Jean 
Pictet, a senior attorney in the ICRC who specialized in international law.  Martin 
claimed that “[the ICRC has] always sought to have the Geneva Convention of 1929 
applied by analogy to military internees in Switzerland. However, Switzerland seems not 
to feel obligated to do so.”  Martin wanted to know whether the ICRC could “intervene 
once more to ask that such offense be punished only with disciplinary penalties?”39  In 
reply, Pictet noted that “Switzerland has made no commitment” to enforce the 1929 
Geneva Convention by analogy, and claimed that “the troops who request internment 
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implicitly accept that they must submit to the laws of the country that is taking them 
when it is not obligated to do so.”  He referred to this agreement as “a kind of contract 
between the interning country and troops who ask for internment in order to escape a 
deadly fate.”  He also noted that “the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 stipulates that the 
internees can be ‘locked into fortresses,’ which gives a neutral power almost unrestricted 
latitude in this area.”  He recommended accepting the view of the FCIH, although he 
noted that there “should nevertheless be an inquiry into the sentence of 8 months that has 
been imposed on the internees,” since “it exceeded the maximum prescribed by the 
Military Penal Code.”40  Pictet apparently viewed the “by analogy” interpretation of the 
Geneva Convention as pending customary international law that was not yet binding on 
unwilling states.  This interpretation effectively stripped Martin of the leverage to make 
further appeals on behalf of internees punished for escape, since he believed that the law 
was against him. 
The ICRC ended its argument for the reduction of internee punishment for escape 
attempts, but it did not cease protesting the deplorable conditions of internment.  By 
October of 1944, the ICRC concluded that the FCIH would not act on its suggestions 
without outside intervention.  Therefore, ICRC officials went over the heads of the FCIH 
leadership and appealed directly to the Swiss Federal Military Department, headed by 
Minister Karl Kobelt.  Paul Martin wrote to Kobelt in early October, expressing that 
“your intervention seems necessary” since the “action [of the FCIH to implement ICRC 
suggestions has come] to a dead stop,” and “we need to give it a new impetus.”  Martin 
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also warned that the lack of “favorable answers [from the FCIH] risks compromising the 
ICRC’s humanitarian work.”  In particular, Martin highlighted widespread deficiencies in 
billeting, clothing, and the provision of adequate food to internees.
41
  Kobelt replied that 
he would direct an investigation into these problems, but apparently no such inquiry 
occurred to the ICRC’s satisfaction.  Martin wrote to Kobelt again in late October, 
reminding the minister that “winter is fast approaching and especially the clothing 
situation of many internees appears to be very inadequate.”42  Similar notes in November 
adopted an even higher tone of urgency.  Martin asked “if it would be inappropriate to 
hasten the current investigation,” and informed Kobelt that “since early October, in fact, 
the situation in many camps has not improved.”  In particular, “the cold season brings out 
the deficiencies in some internees’ clothing,” and “there does not seem to be enough food 
everywhere.”43 
The failure of Dr. Martin’s appeals to the FCIH and Federal Military Department 
finally prompted the ICRC President to intervene in November of 1944.  President Huber 
wrote to Minister Kobelt asking the Federal Military Department to enforce 
“Switzerland's obligations as a contracting party of the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 
and the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929,” and claiming that “the ICRC’s 
position has not been satisfied in all respects.”  President Huber reminded the minister 
that simply because the ICRC was helping to provide food and clothing to internees did 
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not relieve the Swiss Government of its primary responsibility in these areas, and claimed 
that the ICRC could not manage these obligations alone.  Huber reiterated the request that 
the Swiss government provide military internees with proper clothing and feed them “like 
members of the Swiss Army” as required by treaty obligations.  According to Huber, “not 
only are large numbers of military internees clothed inadequately but they are also 
inadequately nourished.”  Huber reminded Minister Kobelt that “[the Swiss 
Confederation] is basically obliged under international law to pay for the clothes of 
military internees in the country.”44   
The repeated contestation over basic provisions reveals that the FCIH evidently 
did not share the ICRC’s views of baseline humanitarian principles.  In some cases this 
difference can perhaps be attributed to incompetence or criminality within the FCIH 
administration, but there were also elements of Switzerland’s humanitarian mission that 
directly conflicted with the mandate to intern belligerents.  One example was the FCIH’s 
legal obligation to both guard internees and treat them in a humane manner, which 
ultimately became a fundamental conflict of interest.  If not for the intervention of senior 
ICRC officials, it is difficult to imagine that the FCIH would have independently 
identified or rectified any problems associated with the administration of internment. 
Despite the initial failure of ICRC diplomacy to ameliorate the punishment of 
escaped internees, the Swiss government eventually compromised on the treatment of 
American prisoners in Wauwilermoos.  The compromise was tailored for only a select 
few nationalities—primarily Americans—and reflected the diplomatic pressure exerted 
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by the U.S. Legation as well as internal complaints by concerned observers.
45
  In early 
November 1944, the FCIH commissioner directed that Americans in punishment camps 
would be allowed to receive supplemental rations in the form of Red Cross parcels.  
Internal FCIH correspondence captured General Dollfus’s belief that “These punitive 
measures [denying Red Cross parcels] do not correspond to the international 
conventions.”46  A day later Dollfus informed his subordinates that “the Wauwilermoos 
prison camp no longer is adequate in any way for the ever growing number of inmates,” 
claiming that “the sanitary arrangements are inadequate” and “the wet location softens 
the ground and brings with it muddy conditions and sickness.”  Accordingly, he directed 
a FCIH section chief to “immediately begin studying the construction of a second camp 
to take the pressure off Wauwilermoos and to finish it in the shortest possible time 
period.”  According to Dollfus, the new camp should exclusively house “escapees and 
flight risks,” and thus was intended for “military personnel, who are to be assessed 
differently from the difficult elements for whom Wauwilermoos was originally opened.”  
Although the new camp was intended to be more comfortable than Wauwilermoos, 
Dollfus still directed that “all precautions [will be] taken against escape attempts.”47  
Apparently Dollfus sought to differentiate confinement based on honorable versus 
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criminal offenses, an apparent return to the custodia honesta model originally proposed 
by the Swiss Federal Council. 
A week after General Dollfus directed the creation of new punishment camps for 
interned Americans, he also brokered a deal to release the majority of the Americans in 
Wauwilermoos back to their regular camps on thirty-day paroles.
48
  As discussed in 
Chapter 4, paroles entailed written “promises” by the internees to refrain from further 
attempts to escape, countersigned by the U.S. Legation.  This placed both the internees 
and the U.S. government under a binding obligation to “respect the terms” of the paroles.  
Thus, a breach of parole through escape was “an offense against the laws of war” and 
required the return of the internee in question.
49
  Granting the paroles facilitated the 
evacuation of eighty American internees, leaving five still confined at Wauwilermoos.  
Of these five, one remained in Wauwilermoos because he refused to sign a parole, and 
the remaining four because they had already been sentenced by military tribunals.  
General Legge considered this only a partial solution, negotiated in a “typically evasive 
manner” by the Swiss, who refused to put any of their concessions in writing.  FCIH 
officials also refused to concede the position that the requirements of the 1929 
Convention should apply to internees by analogy.  Legge found this “inexplicable” from 
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a legal perspective since he believed that Swiss officials “have a conclusive answer to 
any German protest by quoting the Geneva Convention.”50   
Although the compromise released most American internees from 
Wauwilermoos, the paroles were only a temporary solution.  General Clayton L. Bissell, 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2) on the War Department General Staff, 
refused to authorize subsequent extension of the paroles, explaining that “further use of 
paroles only compromises the integrity of our position and is contrary to their obligations 
as members of US armed forces.”51  This position was consistent with U.S. policy at the 
time, which normally prohibited the authorization of paroles, but allowed them by 
exception so long as they were obtained with the permission of a military superior.
52
  
General Legge described the Swiss as “actively antagonistic” in direct reaction to the 
U.S. refusal to grant further paroles.  American internees were not sent back to 
Wauwilermoos upon expiration of the paroles in mid-December 1944, but instead were 
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confined to the “isolation” camps at Hünenberg, Greppen, and Les Diablerets until the 
majority of remaining internees were repatriated in mid-February 1945.
53
 
In an apparent reaction to American diplomatic pressure, the Swiss military 
tribunals also transitioned to punishments that were more proportional to the crime of 
attempted escape.  Although tribunals continued for American internees after the release 
of most Americans from Wauwilermoos in mid-November 1944, the sentences dropped 
considerably from the penalties assessed through late 1944.  When interned B-17 
navigator 1
st
 Lt. James Mahaffey was convicted of multiple escape attempts and 
sentenced to 300 days imprisonment on December 5, 1944, the average American 
sentence for such “disregard of regulations” stood at 87 days.  However, after mid-
January 1945 the average sentence dropped to only forty-eight days, not including at least 
a dozen escape cases that were reduced to disciplinary punishment in lieu of prison 
time.
54
   
The decision to downgrade escape charges to disciplinary punishment normally 
occurred in lieu of referral to a military tribunal.  Local camp commanders had the 
authority to impose five days of arrest, sector commanders could impose ten days, and 
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only a senior FCIH official could impose twenty days.
55
  In at least one case in April 
1945 a judge downgraded charges that had already been referred to a tribunal.  On trial 
were Sgt. Joseph D’Atri and Sgt. James Stanley, who both escaped from their 
confinement camp at Les Diablerets and were arrested while trying to cross the French 
border on March 7, 1945.  According to a letter from the FCIH section chief, Colonel 
Probst, “the preventive detention suffered seems sufficient to offset the detention penalty 
imposed.”  Probst may have also taken pity on D’Atri and Stanley because they were 
caught in a snowstorm prior to their arrest in March, and subsequently hid in a stable for 
three weeks while subsisting on scavenged food and rations from Red Cross parcels.  As 
a result, both internees explained to their arresting officer that “we [were] very ill and 
were nearly dying.”  However, both men were already repatriated by the time the charges 
were dismissed, which raises doubts about the real motivation behind the decision.  As 
with over 100 other cases, when Americans were repatriated or successfully escaped, 
their tribunals were halted because the Swiss Army could no longer enforce a verdict 
when the internee was out of their jurisdiction.  This fact in itself would be a normal 
justification to dismiss the charges.  Instead, the FCIH section chief emphasized that the 
hardship of the prior detention was punishment enough, reflecting a distinct shift from 
earlier hard-line views on enforcement of FCIH policies.
56
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In February 1945, the Swiss Chief of Legal Services also announced a formal 
policy shift under which internees convicted of escape attempts would serve a maximum 
of forty-five days imprisonment.
57
  A sentence of greater than thirty days was still 
excessive under the U.S. interpretation of international law, but the policy shift 
nevertheless indicated the Swiss government’s desire to accommodate the U.S. position 
and bring their policies into conformance with the spirit if not the letter of the law.  Swiss 
officials were also well aware of the many dissenting opinions within the government, the 
ICRC, and the population at large.  It is possible that Swiss officials were also influenced 
by these voices that argued for the adoption of more proportional punishment for 
escaping internees.  However, political leverage was perhaps the primary motivation for 
the compromise, and political negotiations do not occur in a vacuum.  The relationship 
between the U.S. and Swiss governments was dynamic and constantly influenced by 
forces well beyond the control of the officials on the ground in Switzerland. 
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IX.  The Web of Diplomacy in Switzerland 
 
The treatment of American internees was determined by a host of factors beyond 
mere quibbling over the exact meaning and application of international law.  Perhaps 
most importantly, at the same time U.S. diplomats were protesting the mistreatment of 
U.S. internees, USAAF planes committed numerous and repeated violations of Swiss 
neutrality.  These violations, in the form of accidental bombings, airplane crashes, and 
territorial incursions, jeopardized the U.S. diplomatic position and likely prolonged the 
resolution of internment issues.  The value of the U.S. intelligence collection in 
Switzerland, as well as the Swiss integration with and support of Germany’s wartime 
economy were other factors that also influenced Swiss-American relations. 
On the afternoon of April 1, 1944, General Legge walked through the smoldering 
wreckage of the city of Schaffhausen, the capital of Switzerland’s northernmost canton 
on the border with Germany.  At the time the civilian death toll stood at 28 dead and over 
100 wounded, but the number of deaths would later climb to 40, including a national 
councilor.  Over 1,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged, and some were still on fire.  
The losses included Schaffhausen’s railway station, the city museum, several factories, 
and numerous houses.
1
  Earlier that morning, two waves of USAAF B-24 bombers from 
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the 392
nd
 Bombardment Group dropped their incendiary payloads on the city under the 
mistaken belief that they were over Freiburg, a nearby German town with a strategic 
railway junction.  The bombing of Schaffhausen caused a significant diplomatic rift that 
undermined relations between the U.S. and Switzerland for the remainder of the war, in 
terms of both U.S. influence and financial indemnity.
2
   
 Within a day of the bombing American diplomats sought to mitigate the fallout 
from the Schaffhausen incident by agreeing to immediate initial reparations of $1 million, 
with more funds forthcoming if necessary.
3
  U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull offered 
a formal apology.
4
  General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, Commanding General of the 
USAAF, promised that “the responsibility for and the causes of [the bombing] will be 
thoroughly and promptly investigated,” and gave assurance that “every possible 
precaution will be taken to avoid any repetition of such an error.”5  Unfortunately, within 
days of the incident the U.S. Strategic Air Forces Command for the European Theater 
released a communication blaming the bombing on “unfavorable weather conditions,” 
which contradicted the testimony of Swiss observers in Schaffhausen who reported only 
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light clouds.
6
  This provoked a storm of criticism in the Swiss press such as “The excuse 
of ‘bad weather’ is worthless,” and “Stick to the Truth, Please!”7  These reactions 
prompted General Legge to recommend that the U.S. “accept full responsibility without 
seeking reasons to excuse.”  He recommended full settlement for the damages prior to a 
conclusive investigation, reminding the War Department that “our prestige [is] at stake.”8  
Similarly, Minister Harrison wrote the Secretary of State to express that the explanation 
of poor weather “has had an unfavorable reception,” and argued that the “attempt [by] 
headquarters to minimize severe misfortune and [the] distortion [of] facts must be 
energetically rejected.”9   
The week after the bombing, Charles Bruggmann, the Swiss Minister in 
Washington, D.C. informed the U.S. Secretary of State that the incident “has caused 
consternation among the Swiss people and anxiety as to the future.”  He therefore 
delivered a new statement relaying that: 
“The penetration of the Swiss air space by American planes resulting in the 
bombing of Schaffhausen constitutes a most serious violation of Swiss 
sovereignty and territory.  The mistake which caused in broad daylight the partial 
destruction of a Swiss city is so grave an incident that the Government of the 
Swiss Confederation cannot consider it settled by its protest and by the expression 
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of regret of the American Government.  It is essential that the causes of this tragic 
error be determined exactly and that effective measures be taken to eliminate 
them in the future.”10 
 
The consequences of the bombing were not merely diplomatic.  The U.S. 
Legation in Switzerland knew that the incident would also directly affect the relationship 
between American internees and their Swiss hosts.  Immediately after the bombing, 
Legge cancelled all non-urgent passes and instructed the internees that “in view of the 
unfortunate events of April 1
st
 at [Schaffhausen], it is more than ever necessary that we 
conduct ourselves with proper modesty and decorum in the eyes of the Swiss.”  He 
further instructed internees that “if the subject [of Schaffhausen] is approached, there will 
be no outside discussion of or conjecture as to the cause of the incident.”  Internees were 
allowed only “to express regret.”11  American diplomats in Switzerland were given 
similar instructions and told to “avoid public places.”  In spite of these precautions, 
several fist-fights involving Americans occurred, reportedly over news coverage that 
“maps carried by United States fliers do not show Switzerland.”12   
Second Lieutenant Sidney Bolick witnessed the Swiss reaction to Schaffhausen 
firsthand.   Interned only weeks before the bombing, he was boarding a train to 
Adelboden when he learned of the incident.  According to Bolick, “[Schaffhausen] 
changed [the Swiss] attitude toward us dramatically,” and “the Swiss yelled insults and 
shook their fists at us.”  The airmen were derided as “murderers” and “butchers,” and one 
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man even ran alongside the train screaming “Jew York, Jew York” in a bizarre attempt to 
insult the Americans.
13
    
Technical Sergeant Richard H. recalled the reaction to the bombing in Adelboden.  
According to Sergeant H., the U.S. Legation confined the American internees to their 
hotels for several days.  The only way that the internees could leave was if they wanted to 
attend religious services, but the only approved church was Catholic.  Richard was not 
Catholic, but he attended in spite of this qualification in order to escape the confines of 
the hotel.  As a result he felt quite awkward at church, since he “didn’t know what to do” 
during the service.
14
 
Legge and Harrison also correctly understood that the Schaffhausen incident 
would significantly undermine their diplomatic leverage with the Swiss, who had already 
accused the Allied forces of bombing the town of Samaden in October 1943.  Since this 
was not the first Allied bombing of Switzerland, promises were made that new steps 
would be taken to avoid repeat incidents.  General Legge coordinated with the Chief of 
the Swiss Air Corps to clarify national boundaries on U.S. pilot maps, to create a system 
of marking the border to make it visible from the air, as well as to establish a fifty-mile 
safety zone around the Swiss border in which no bombings should be attempted.
15
 
Only three days after the bombing of Schaffhausen, General Henri Guisan 
rescinded the earlier policy for Swiss anti-aircraft batteries and fighters to attack only 
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formations of foreign aircraft.  According to Guisan, “experience has shown that isolated 
belligerent aircraft were using our territory to escape persecution or to prepare for an 
attack.”  Accordingly, he ordered “the opening of fire…on all foreign aircraft, even 
isolated, which fly over our territory, except those apparatus that are clearly in trouble or 
those who demonstrate intent to land on our soil.”16 
Some Swiss anti-aircraft units used their expanded authority to justify unprovoked 
hostilities against American aircraft seeking to land in Switzerland.  Lt. Ralph Jackson’s 
aircraft lost an engine while bombing Augsburg, Germany, on April 13, 1944, less than 
two weeks after the Schaffhausen incident.  Jackson’s pilot flew to Switzerland, and 
although it “did not come under enemy fire [while in Germany],” the aircraft was 
attacked by Swiss anti-aircraft batteries while crossing Lake Constance.   The bomber 
was then intercepted by Swiss fighters and directed to land on a grass field near Zurich, 
where the crew was quickly arrested by Swiss soldiers with submachine guns.  Jackson 
recalled being taken to a building for interrogation by a Swiss officer who was educated 
in the United States and “spoke excellent English.”  Jackson was extremely 
uncomfortable, as he was still wearing his thick, “fur-lined” flying suit.  The Swiss 
officer wanted to know all the details of his mission, but Jackson wisely “refused to give 
more than name, rank and serial number.”  Jackson changed the subject to the 
unprovoked the attack on his aircraft, informing the interrogator that one of his crew was 
wounded by the Swiss.  In response, the Swiss officer “seemed proud that we were hit,” 
saying that the Swiss batteries “were [supposed] to hit us if they shot at us.”  The officer 
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then “voiced strong indignation” over the recent Schaffhausen bombing.  The Swiss 
officer apparently found the incident so egregious that he believed it justified a 
proportional response from the Swiss military, such as the attack on Jackson’s airplane.  
Jackson “was unaware of the Schaffhausen fiasco” at the time, and he therefore 
“vehemently denied that the U.S. had bombed Switzerland.”17 
Other aircrews were also interrogated about Schaffhausen in an apparent attempt 
to find aircrews to hold accountable.  On July 11, 1944, 2nd Lt. James Green’s B-24 
Bomber Jaw-Ja Boy was hit by anti-aircraft fire while bombing Munich.  The aircraft 
was knocked out of formation, lost an engine, and was rapidly losing fuel.  The pilot 
chose to head to Switzerland, deciding that the only other options were to “bail out at the 
coast [of France] and become German POWs” or bail out over the English Channel.  
After the aircraft crossed the Swiss border it was hit a second time by Swiss anti-aircraft 
fire.  According to Green, “Loud cracking, banging, booming explosions” filled the 
bomber, as well as multiple shrapnel holes and the pungent odor of cordite.  The 
damaged aircraft set down on an airstrip near St. Gallen, where the crew was quickly 
arrested.
18
 
The crewmembers of Jaw-Ja Boy were interrogated by a Swiss Army major who 
spoke fluent English.  The major was uninterested in the crew’s current mission to 
Munich, and instead asked whether they had participated in the April mission that 
bombed Schaffhausen.  The entire crew responded with “what’s a Schaffhausen?”  The 
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crew was lying, as they had in fact bombed Schaffhausen on their very first mission.  
According to Green, their lead navigator missed the target by ninety miles, and they were 
not told of the error until several days later.  The crew apparently felt little guilt about the 
bombing, as they had no hand in the navigational mistake that caused the incident.  Green 
related that the bombing “meant very little to us other than it counted towards the 25 
[missions] we had to fly.”19  The Swiss interrogator probably knew that crew’s 
bombardment group had perpetrated the Schaffhausen bombing, but clearly was unable to 
prove that they were the minority of the group who were personally complicit in the 
incident.  No charges were filed by the Swiss, although this outcome might well have 
changed if the crew had admitted its involvement.         
Other aircrews that participated in the Schaffhausen bombing apparently felt more 
remorse about the mistake.  A reporter visited the 392
nd
 Bombardment Group’s base near 
Norwich, England, the day after the incident, and noted that “it was unusually quiet today 
at this base.”  Many of the airmen were reportedly “too distressed to talk” after they 
learned of the mistaken bombing, but others expressed regret and noted that “Switzerland 
had provided a haven for distressed bombers whose crews now are interned there.”  
According to one lieutenant, “there are a lot of our airmen alive today because they were 
able to come down there instead of in enemy territory.”20   
Had the bombing of Schaffhausen remained an isolated incident, it is likely that 
the U.S. Legation successfully would have quelled most of the resultant diplomatic 
rancor with apologies and reparations.  However, as the Allied air campaign expanded 
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east, aerial violations of Swiss neutrality grew in frequency, establishing, in one 
historian’s words, a “pattern of violation, apology, reparation, and new violation.”21  A 
particularly volatile set of incidents occurred in September 1944, beginning with an aerial 
dogfight between Swiss and U.S. fighters on September 5, 1944.  The Swiss fighters were 
escorting two U.S. bombers to Dübendorf Airfield in Zurich when two USAAF P-51 
Mustangs appeared and engaged the Swiss aircraft.  According to a Swiss observer on the 
ground, “I [saw] fairly high in the northeast sky four fighters which [were] entangled in 
combat, diving and banking.”  The observer heard the “sharp report of the aircrafts’ 
weapons,” and a Swiss fighter was hit.  The Swiss fighter “[spewed] out a large smoke 
plume and [went] into a spin like a leaf falling.”22  The U.S. fighters shot down both 
Swiss aircraft in the incident, killing one Swiss pilot and seriously wounding the other.
23
  
Errant shells from the battle also ignited the roof of a carpentry shop and damaged 
several residential neighborhoods in Zurich.
24
  The intense aerial combat shocked the 
local population, who reportedly flocked outdoors and stood “gesticulating” and “looking 
up at the heavens.”25 
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Only days after the dogfight between U.S. and Swiss fighters, U.S. P-51s again 
violated Swiss airspace and attacked the railway stations at Delémont and Moutier, 
destroying a locomotive and injuring four civilians.  On September 9, a freight train was 
attacked at Rafz, injuring three Swiss civilians.  In addition, 42 Allied violations of Swiss 
airspace near the city of Jura were reported.
26
  On September 11, over thirty violations of 
Swiss territory occurred, including an attack by two American P-47 Thunderbolts on the 
Zurich-Basel express train.  This violation was less defensible than many other violations 
of Swiss neutrality, as the Rhine River clearly defined the Swiss border in this region.
27
  
These violations also affected all other diplomatic exchanges between the U.S. and Swiss 
governments.  General Legge eventually reported that the repeated failure to observe the 
post-Schaffhausen agreement “not to bomb any target within 50 miles of [the] Swiss 
frontier” was “impairing [U.S.] prestige and causing bitter feelings.”28   
Swiss newspapers reflected a shift of opinion among the population, particularly 
“impatience and irritation” over the continued attacks.  The Gazette of Lausanne 
expressed that “We hoped after Schaffhausen that precise instructions had been given to 
American aviators in [the] future to respect our air space,” and demanded that “[an] 
inquiry be made to establish clearly [the] responsibilities of those who killed one of our 
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young [Swiss] aviators.”  The newspaper claimed that “Swiss public opinion has been 
greatly aroused by these repeated violations of our air space and attacks by American 
aviators.”  Similarly, the Tribune of Geneva accused American airmen of being “less 
careful than others to respect our neutrality,” and noted that “their knowledge of 
geography seems far less than that of the English [fliers].”  The Swiss editors encouraged 
more draconian measures of reciprocity to avoid future incidents, since “the Yankee 
pilots seem less easily stopped by legal and political considerations.”29 
The U.S. Legation in Switzerland had little influence over operational 
employment of U.S. bombers in England and North Africa, and therefore was unable to 
affect or limit violations of Swiss neutrality beyond sending suggestions to senior 
USAAF leadership and attempting to placate Swiss authorities.  Early feedback from the 
U.S. Legation in Switzerland suggested that many aircrews lacked adequate maps of 
Switzerland, and recommended “that navigators be given suitable maps of neutral 
countries near [their routes].”30  As a result of the incidents in September 1944, General 
Legge sent descriptions of Swiss airplane markings to General Arnold in the hope that 
this would aid U.S. pilots to differentiate between Swiss and German fighters.
31
  This was 
considered a contributing factor in misidentification of Swiss aircraft, since the Swiss Air 
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Force possessed Messerschmitt Bf 109E fighters, which were manufactured and 
predominantly used in Germany.
32
  Legge also passed on details of Swiss efforts to avoid 
a repeat of aerial attacks, including the painting of Swiss crosses on fields and the roofs 
of houses along the border, flying observation balloons with Swiss colors, and even 
Swiss Army Commander in Chief General Henri Guisan’s suggesting the attachment of 
Swiss military observers to a higher U.S. Army headquarters.
33
  General Legge “[urged 
General Arnold] to support this [request] as [a] means of smoothing over [the] present 
difficult situation.”34  However, senior U.S. commanders resisted such requests, and often 
tried to avoid responsibility for the bombings.
35
  In October 1944, U.S. Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson proposed that “it is known that on occasion the Germans have repaired 
and flown Allied aircraft forced down in Axis territory,” and “it therefore is not 
impossible that violations of Swiss neutrality by aircraft with United States markings may 
have been made by the Germans.”36  The next month General Arnold invoked the same 
argument to U.S. intelligence officials, claiming that the Germans were intentionally 
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trying to damage relations between the U.S. and Switzerland.  The assertion was deemed 
utterly absurd by intelligence officials on the ground in Switzerland.
37
   
The U.S. and Swiss efforts to curb accidental bombings were to no avail, as the 
cities of Basel and Zurich were bombed by B-24s of the USAAF’s 392nd and 466th 
Bombardment Groups on March 4, 1945.
38
  This was the 392
nd
 Bombardment Group’s 
second major violation of Swiss neutrality in less than a year, as the same group had also 
bombed Schaffhausen in April 1944.  In the newest incident, six bombers from the 392
nd
 
dropped at least twenty-five demolition bombs and several incendiary bombs on the 
Schwamendingen suburb of Zurich.  Two houses were destroyed and twenty were 
damaged, killing five residents and injuring twelve others.
39
  At roughly the same time, 
eight bombers from the 466
th
 and one errant plane from the 392
nd
 dropped forty to fifty 
bombs on the railroad freight station at Basel, injuring seven civilians and destroying a 
warehouse and several homes.
40
  The bombings shattered any remaining illusion that the 
USAAF control measures were effective in preventing accidental violations of Swiss 
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neutrality.  Accordingly, U.S. officials realized that they could not simply recycle the 
same diplomatic apologies and promises of reparations. 
After learning of the bombings at Basel and Zurich, U.S. Army chief of staff 
General George C. Marshall informed Lt. General Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the U.S. 
Strategic Air Forces in Europe, that “the successive bombings of Swiss territory now 
demand more than expressions of regret.”  Marshall therefore ordered Spaatz to 
“personally leave immediately for Geneva” and “present to [the] appropriate Swiss 
officials first hand information as to the causes of these incidents, the corrective action 
undertaken, and a formal apology.”41  Spaatz remarked to Lt. General James Doolittle 
that “the President is very unhappy,” “the State Department is very unhappy,” and even 
“General Eisenhower has called me” over the bombings.  “What the hell do I say [to the 
Swiss]?” he asked Doolittle.42  
Spaatz reluctantly travelled to Switzerland and met with the Swiss Political 
Minister and Military Minister, as well as General Guisan.  He conveyed his “personal 
regrets” over the violations, in particular “for the Swiss lives which had been lost as a 
result.”  Spaatz briefed the Swiss authorities on his new control measures, a zone 150 
miles from the Swiss border “within which there will be no attacks without positive 
identification of the target,” as well as a zone 50 miles from Switzerland “within which 
no attacks will be made” except on Spaatz’s personal authority.  If he did approve attacks 
within the restricted zone, “only experienced crews [will be] permitted to participate.”  
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Spaatz also stressed the need to keep the restricted zones confidential in order to preclude 
the Germans from intentionally relocating “military or industrial operations” near 
Switzerland to avoid aerial attacks.
43
     
 Spaatz claimed that General Guisan was “more than satisfied” with his control 
measures to mitigate the risk of future attacks.  He noted that Guisan and most of the 
other Swiss authorities at the conference seemed “very understanding and cordial,” with 
the notable exception of the Military Minister, Karl Kobelt, the same official who 
negotiated the legal rights and treatment of American internees with the U.S. Legation.  
Spaatz understood that his mission was primarily a gesture for the sake of public 
relations, but he knew that it also had the potential to affect the treatment of interned 
Americans.  Before his departure, he made certain to thank the Swiss Political Minister 
“particularly for the treatment which the Swiss Government had accorded our interned 
and escaped air crews.”44   
To prevent a recurrence of the Basel and Zurich bombings, Spaatz directed his 
subordinate commanders that “the program of indoctrination of all air crew personnel to 
avoid attacks which may result in damage to Swiss property or casualties to the Swiss 
people will be intensified.”  He also warned his command that “personnel who commit 
acts which result in Swiss incidents will be subjected to severe disciplinary actions.”45  
Spaatz lived up to his word: the USAAF pilot and navigator who led the squadron that 
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bombed Zurich were tried by general courts-martial in June 1945.  Although Spaatz was 
not directly involved in the proceedings, he used his influence to suggest that the charges 
go to trial.  Otherwise the charges would likely have been dropped, since the 
investigating officer believed that the accidental bombing was due to “circumstances 
beyond [the pilot’s] control,” and claimed that “the decision to bomb appears to have 
been based upon the best available information.”  Therefore, the investigator concluded 
that “[the] charges are not sustained by the evidence,” and advised that the evidence was 
insufficient “for a finding of guilty before a courts-martial.”46  The acting Judge 
Advocate of the Eighth Air Force agreed, and also believed that the charges should not be 
referred to trial based on “the improbability of conviction.”  However, he reversed his 
recommendation because General Spaatz “expressed a desire that charges be disposed of 
through trial, presumably in furtherance of relations with nations friendly to the United 
States and injured by the alleged misconduct of [the] accused.”47 
The court martial was noteworthy because it attempted the unprecedented step of 
holding American airmen criminally responsible for wartime damage in a neutral state, as 
well as the fact that the presiding officer was none other than actor Col. James “Jimmy” 
Stewart.
48
  First Lt. William Sincock, the pilot flying as squadron leader during the 
Zurich bombing, was charged with negligently “caus[ing] the planes of the formation he 
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was then leading to drop bombs upon and near the city of Zurich, Switzerland, which 
territory belongs to Switzerland, a nation friendly to the United States of America and the 
United Nations.”  Similarly, 1st Lt. Theodore Balides, the lead navigator for Lt. Sincock, 
was charged with “fail[ing] to maintain a complete and accurate log and chart” and 
“negligently and incorrectly determin[ing] the then existing geographical position of his 
aircraft to be in the area of Frieburg [sic], Germany.”49  Both lieutenants were charged 
with violating the 96
th
 Article of War, a general article that included “all disorders and 
neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the military service, and all crimes or offenses not capital [in 
nature].”50  The maximum punishment for a conviction on this charge was “dismissal, 
total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for life.”51  According to the officers’ 
senior defense counsel, a bombardment group lead navigator named Captain Jackson 
Granholm, both defendants were “scared silly,” as they stood a “good chance” of serving 
time in a military prison.
52
 
The trial revealed that Lt. Sincock’s squadron lost visual contact with its parent 
bombardment group, and therefore the pilot opted to attack an unplanned target of 
opportunity.  Lt. Balides had no reliable visual or radar navigation readings due to the 
                                                 
49
 “Record of Trial by General Court Martial,” United States v. Balides/Sincock, U.S.C.M. 291679, 
National Records Center, Suitland, MD, p.4. 
50
 Granholm, The Day We Bombed Switzerland, 151-53.  See also U.S. War Department, The Articles of 
War: Approved June 4, 1920 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920), 25.  The 96
th
 
Article of War is the equivalent of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
51
 Memo from Acting Eighth Air Force Judge Advocate to Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, 
“Advice of Air Force Judge Advocate,” dated May 21, 1945, United States v. Balides/Sincock, U.S.C.M. 
291679, National Records Center, Suitland, MD. 
52
 Granholm, The Day We Bombed Switzerland, 162-63. 
      236 
poor weather and German electronic jamming, and so he utilized only an unreliable 
position estimated from a weather penetrating radar in conjunction with the technique of 
dead reckoning.  This navigational technique consists of estimating an aircraft’s position 
based on previously known positions, course headings, indicated airspeed, estimated 
winds, and elapsed time.  Unfortunately, without the benefit of accurate weather data or 
other navigational references, the technique is also incredibly inaccurate.  Balides became 
completely disoriented when the squadron made several large turns, and he also made 
transcription mistakes that further exacerbated the error in his estimated position.  This 
eventually led to the mistaken conclusion that the squadron was over Freiburg, when it 
was in fact approximately fifty-four miles to the southeast, in Switzerland.
53
   
A parade of expert witnesses laid bare the standard operating procedures of the 
Eighth Air Force for bombing missions.  Control measures emplaced after the 
Schaffhausen incident included the requirement for navigators to “notify [their] crew[s] 
by means of interphone as all international boundaries are crossed on all operational 
flights.”54  This would, in theory, require all navigators to announce crossing into 
Switzerland and lessen the likelihood of a mistaken bombing over neutral territory.  
However, according to defense counsel, there was “no evidence that anyone had ever 
paid any attention to this order.”55  Lead ships were also given ample authority in 
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selecting alternate targets of opportunity when it was “impossible or inadvisable to attack 
the assigned target.”56  Lt. Sincock’s copilot validated the common wisdom among 
aircrews that “[any] bomb dropped on Germany is a good bomb,” as “there is no point in 
carrying bombs over and bringing them back.”  Retaining a heavy bomb load on the 
return flight could seriously impact fuel economy, and might result in no mission credit 
toward an aircrew’s tour requirement.57  In addition, the testimony of the 392nd 
Bombardment Group’s briefing officer revealed that no specific guidance was issued for 
selecting targets of opportunity other than granting permission to bomb “any military 
objective positively identified as being in Germany east of the current bomb line and west 
of 12°.”58  According to the defense counsel, “the rule, more or less, was ‘drop [your 
bombs] where you think they’ll blow up something that might be important.’”59 
Perhaps both Sincock and Balides were negligent to some degree, but in order to 
be convicted the prosecution had to demonstrate “culpable negligence” on the part of the 
accused.  According to the prosecuting attorney, this meant that the officers had to know 
“the probable consequences of [their acts], [and also be] reckless, intentionally or 
wantonly indifferent to the results.”60  The panel members apparently thought otherwise, 
as they sided with the defense.  On June 2
nd
, 1945, they deliberated for less than an hour 
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and returned the verdict of “Not Guilty” on all counts.61  The verdict validated that the 
panel members saw Sincock’s and Balides’s actions as within the reasonable—and highly 
imperfect—operating procedures of the day.  Although not a conviction, the verdict 
nevertheless allowed the USAAF leadership to claim that they investigated and 
prosecuted violations of Swiss neutrality, and therefore took the incidents seriously.  
According to one judge advocate involved in the trial, “apparently [the] case was tried in 
order that [the] record might be available to [the] State Dept. in any future negotiations 
over the incident [of bombing Zurich].”62  The verdict might also have warned other 
USAAF aircrews of the dangers of ignoring Swiss neutrality.  However, the war in 
Europe ended the month prior to the trial’s inception. 
Despite the external shift toward accountability for bombings of Switzerland, the 
USAAF leadership continued to express internal ambivalence about the mitigation of risk 
to neutral property.  Even after the bombings of Basel and Zurich, General Spaatz 
expressed in private correspondence that “it has been inevitable that reliance on 
complicated equipment and techniques should result in some errors,” a reference to the 
new USAAF focus on bombing in poor weather without definitive visual identification of 
all targets.  Spaatz felt that the new policy screening any targets within 150 miles of 
Switzerland was more restrictive “than normal prudence would demand.”  In his view, 
attacking viable enemy targets near the Swiss border was a matter of military necessity 
outweighing collateral damage, and so he believed “it is understandable that some of our 
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bombs have fallen in the wrong place.”63  Spaatz was correct that many bombs did fall in 
the wrong locations, although whether this was “understandable” depends largely on 
perspective.  By the end of the war, one estimate placed the number of Allied bombs 
dropped on Switzerland at nearly 5,000, a total of approximately 165 to 185 tons.  Nearly 
100 Swiss villages were hit, destroying about 150 buildings and damaging thousands 
more.  In the course of the bombings, 84 Swiss citizens were killed and another 260 were 
wounded.
64
    
Claims for property damage in Switzerland were submitted to the U.S. Claims 
Service, which investigated allegations of violations of Swiss neutrality and 
recommended monetary settlements to the U.S. government.  The single largest incidence 
of property damage from a crashed bomber was the destruction of Castle Wyden in 
Ossingen, Switzerland, which ironically was the home of ICRC President Max Huber.  
The castle was destroyed in July 1944 after a damaged B-24, Jack Pine Joe, was 
abandoned by 1
st
 Lt. Archie Davis over Siegerhausen after the crew bailed out.
65
  The 
navigator, 2
nd
 Lt. Johnson, bailed out over Munich, and the remainder of the crew 
parachuted into Switzerland.  The copilot, 2
nd
 Lt. Michael Ballbach, was killed when his 
parachute failed to open, and three other crewmembers who parachuted into Switzerland 
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were treated for gunshot wounds.
66
  Swiss witnesses reported that “the white chutes could 
be seen very clearly and with binoculars it was also possible to see the slowly descending 
men.”67  The pilotless Jack Pine Joe flew another thirty kilometers and eventually 
collided with the turret of Castle Wyden, causing significant damage and engulfing the 
entire structure in flames.
68
  Huber’s daughter, her children, and servants were still in the 
castle, and newspapers reported that “a servant girl suffered a slight injury from the 
bomber’s crash.”69   
The Swiss Legation in Washington, D.C. reported the destruction of Castle 
Wyden to the U.S. government with more than the usual aide-mémoire.  The Swiss 
Chargé d’Affaires, Dr. Feer, personally delivered a report and “deplored” the incident to 
a desk officer at the State Department.  Feer noted the irony that such a disaster befell the 
ICRC president, “particularly since the International Red Cross did so much to alleviate 
the suffering of American prisoners of war and internees held by the enemy.”  Feer 
correctly understood that Switzerland’s humanitarian services for American prisoners of 
war were a major point of diplomatic leverage, particularly since no other neutral 
countries were up to the task.  However, the significance of the event was lost on the 
State Department desk officer, who diplomatically but unapologetically informed Feer 
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that “as increasing numbers of bombers are used in missions against those parts of enemy 
territory which are near Switzerland, it is manifestly impossible to hope that occasional 
violations will not occur.”70   
In 1946 the Claims Service sent a U.S. Army Judge Advocate General officer, 
Captain. H.B. White, to investigate the damage to Castle Wyden.  Captain White 
recommended that “the Government of the United States accept responsibility for the 
claimant’s loss,” a figure that came to over $179,000, or over $2 million in 2011 
dollars.
71
  The U.S. government was wise to accept responsibility for these incidents, as 
aircrews received explicit instructions that “In Switzerland and Axis controlled neutrals, 
all aircraft, equipment and cargo will be totally destroyed.”  In the event of bailing out or 
ditching over enemy or neutral territory, USAAF pilots were instructed to “use every 
means available to him to have the aircraft destroy itself by fire on striking the ground,” 
including “leaving the battery and/or engine switches on, and/or putting the aircraft in an 
attitude that will cause it to strike the ground with the greatest amount of force.”  
Procedures even dictated that crews ignite thermite incendiary bombs over sensitive 
equipment and fire “several shots from a [pistol] into the cockpit and/or into any oil or 
gasoline” to “insure the aircraft catching fire.”72  These procedures were designed to 
ensure destruction of classified materials and denial of the aircraft to unfriendly forces, 
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but they also had the ancillary effect of exacerbating property damage when the aircraft 
impacted in populated areas.  In the case of Switzerland, this occasionally turned the 
normally sympathetic public against American forces.    
One Swiss newspaper, Die Tat, also decried the destruction of Castle Wyden, 
suggesting that American pilots should be held criminally responsible for the damage 
caused by their pilotless aircraft.  According to the author, American pilots seeking 
refuge should endeavor “not to cause any damage within the neutral country whose 
protection and hospitality they are about to claim.”  He argued that “the penal code 
should be invoked” when “injuries are caused to persons or damage to property.”  The 
author argued that the Swiss government should make an example of an American 
bomber crew, as “once sentences have been passed upon some pilots who are not aware 
of their responsibility, and who, therefore will have to sit in prison for years or months 
instead of being able to enjoy a vacation in a mountain-hotel, we can be sure that 
members of foreign airforces [sic] will take good care not to leave their planes pilot-
less.”73  The article reflects the attitudes of some Swiss who were not content to simply 
resort to claims procedures to settle incidents of U.S. wartime violations of neutrality.  In 
some cases they agitated for reciprocity against American airmen, the perceived 
architects of the violations.   
Swiss authorities considered charging two American pilots with manslaughter or 
negligent homicide after their landing at Dübendorf resulted in the deaths of two fourteen 
and fifteen year old boys as well as injuries to two other teenagers.  On March 18, 1944, 
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1
st
 Lt. Jean Sefton and 2
nd
 Lt. Robert Steurer were on a mission to bomb Friedrichshafen, 
Germany, in their B-24, P stol Pa k  ’ a a, when they lost one engine to a 
malfunction and another to enemy anti-aircraft fire.
74
  In addition, their electrical system 
was completely knocked out.  According to Staff Sergeant John Miner, the right waist 
gunner, “We were unable to hold altitude on two engines” and so “we had only one 
viable option—to head for Switzerland.”75  The airplane made it to Dübendorf airfield in 
Zurich, but since the pilots could not hold their altitude they made an extremely low 
approach of only 12-15 meters off the ground.  Staff Sergeant James Parker, the left waist 
gunner, recalled that “we were just skimming along the housetops to the final approach,” 
and “the pilot sent the Bombardier back to tell us to prepare for a crash landing.”76  As a 
result of the low altitude, the bomber struck a high voltage cable, and the severed wire 
sliced through “a large number of curious people” who had gathered on the edge of the 
airstrip to watch the spectacle of the landing aircraft.
77
  According to Sergeant Parker, the 
wire “fell to the ground with sparks flying about a foot or more into the air,” and 
simultaneously “two boys [fell] off of the bikes that they were sitting on.”78  One Swiss 
teenager was decapitated, while another suffered severe head trauma that later proved 
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fatal.  Several other teenagers received less severe injuries, including a fractured leg, 
contusions, and minor abrasions.
79
   
Swiss authorities took the incident seriously and investigated whether the pilots 
were negligent for their actions.  Swiss Army Colonel Karl Högger independently 
verified the condition of the bomber, noting that the electrical system was damaged and 
thus starting the engines “was not possible.”  The Swiss officials installed new batteries 
on the aircraft, but still could not start one of the engines.  Colonel Högger, who 
personally test flew the American bomber, testified that considering all the mechanical 
defects the pilots were “unable to land their aircraft correctly on D bendorf Airfield.”  
Rather than finding negligence, the colonel noted that the crew “have done their best as 
responsible leaders under the circumstances,” particularly since the bomber easily could 
have crashed “somewhere in the village of Dubendorf or its immediate vicinity.”  
According to Högger, if the bomber had missed the airfield, the significant fuel 
remaining in its tanks would have produced “a far greater disaster.”80 
The investigating Swiss Army officer recommended no “further disciplinary 
consequences” for the American pilots, at least partly as a result of Colonel Högger’s 
favorable tests on the bomber.
81
  The U.S. government also accepted responsibility and 
paid considerable indemnities to the surviving families.  An investigating Claims Service 
officer recommended compensating the family of one of the Swiss boys with over 20,000 
Swiss Francs for funeral expenses, the loss of a provider, and so-called “moral 
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damage.”82  Medical fees for the surviving teenagers were apparently paid up front by the 
U.S. General Consul at Zurich, Sam Woods.
83
  In this case legal reciprocity was avoided, 
although the outcome might have been different had the American bomber not received 
such significant combat damage or if the U.S. government had not been as willing to 
admit fault and issue appropriate indemnities.  Despite the avoidance of a trial, it is 
conceivable that this incident still engendered animosity toward Americans simply 
because of the tragic consequences and the fact that the Americans were the ones seeking 
refuge from their Swiss hosts.  The aircraft commander, Lt. Sefton, was later charged 
again with crimes against the Swiss state, but his second offense was an unsuccessful 
attempt to escape.
84
  
U.S. legal indemnity stopped at the border of Switzerland, but this did not prevent 
the Swiss government from protesting attacks against its neutral property and persons in 
active combat zones.  In August 1944 American pursuit planes attacked the car of W.E. 
Senger, the Swiss consul in Paris.  Senger and his wife were driving from Paris to 
Montigny-sur-Loing, France when the attack occurred.  Although the consul and his wife 
saw the approaching airplanes and escaped injury by running into the woods, their 
vehicle was completely destroyed after it was hit with “more than fifty bullets” and then 
set on fire.   The Swiss government forwarded a note to the U.S. State Department listing 
the amount of damage, 765 Swiss Francs, and noting that the car “was marked with a 
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Swiss flag on its top.”85  Apparently they were hoping that the U.S. government would 
reimburse the sum.  However, U.S. military officials were entirely unsympathetic.  
General Arnold was indignant, calling the Swiss note “a silly request” and asking “what 
does one expect in the war zone?”86  War Department officials noted that the attack took 
place “in the path of the advance of the United States armies,” and therefore suggested 
informing the Swiss that “any neutral who may choose to subject himself to the dangers 
of being present in the battle zone does so at his own risk.”87  The tone of this reply 
reflects the clear frustration of American commanders who were less attuned to the 
diplomatic consequences of such incidents and saw damage to Swiss property as 
unavoidable collateral damage.  Although there was no apparent violation of international 
law in this case, it is likely that many U.S. commanders harbored similar views about 
damages incurred within Switzerland.  The only distinction was that the illegality and 
indemnity of bombing Swiss soil prevented a similarly unvarnished response.   
Total Swiss claims against the U.S. government for bombings and damage from 
abandoned and landed airplanes during the war eventually came to over 70 million Swiss 
Francs.
88
  After deducting preliminary payments, the U.S. government paid Switzerland 
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over 62 million Swiss Francs through an act of Congress in 1949.  The amount was 
equivalent to $14 million in 1949 dollars, or $132 million in 2011 dollars.
89
  The fact that 
this debt remained unsettled years after the war’s conclusion rankled Swiss claimants and 
diplomats, who expected not only prompt settlement but also steps that would effectively 
mitigate future violations of Swiss neutrality.  In 1947, the mayor of Schaffhausen 
appealed to the U.S. State Department, complaining that rampant price inflation since the 
original bombings rendered the original claims estimates from 1944 woefully 
insufficient.  According to the mayor, “a further delay in the repayment of damages 
would seriously injure both private and industrial undertakings, as well as the City of 
Schaffhausen,” which had advanced funds to several injured parties.90 
General Legge made it clear that the USAAF violations of Swiss neutrality hurt 
the ongoing U.S. diplomacy over internment issues and noted that the incidents placed 
him in a “difficult position,” particularly since he was trying to negotiate the repatriation 
of the interned airmen before the end of the war.  Legge complained to General Arnold in 
late November 1944 that yet another series of attacks needed to be explained and 
apologized for, and asked “shall responsibility be accepted with regret but without 
excuse?”  He also reminded Arnold that “attacks render our position and that of interned 
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airmen more difficult.”91  Any American complaint over the Swiss application of 
international law governing internment could be rebutted by the fact that America was 
persistently violating the international law that guaranteed Swiss neutrality, perhaps a 
more serious charge when considering the deadly implications.      
American bombings of Switzerland occasionally resulted in apparent reciprocity 
directed at damaged American bombers seeking to land in Switzerland.  Less than a 
month after the bombing of Schaffhausen, Swiss fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft batteries 
shot down an American B-17 that was already badly damaged by enemy fighters while 
bombing Stuttgart, Germany, killing six American airmen.  First Lt. Everett Bailey was 
flying the aircraft, Little Chub, which was losing altitude and unable to maneuver due to 
inoperative landing gear and severely damaged rudder controls.  The crew was working 
to free the critically wounded ball turret gunner Sgt. Anthony Melazzi, who was unable to 
move, and three other crewmembers were also badly wounded.  Unable to comply with 
Swiss orders to land, the bomber circled twice around Zurich, and was then attacked by 
Swiss fighters and anti-aircraft batteries as it approached Lake Griefen.  The attacks set 
the bomber on fire and killed bombardier Lt. Jesse Greenebaum and left waist gunner 
Sgt. Richard Sendleback.  The condition of the aircraft prompted the surviving crew to 
bail out at only 600 feet altitude.   Lt. Bailey died after his parachute failed to open, and 
copilot Lt. James Burry went down with the airplane when it crashed into Lake Griefen.
92
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Several Swiss workers digging nearby irrigation canals witnessed the destruction 
of Little Chub, recounting that the flaming bomber “swept straight towards us like a sea 
of fire.”  According to the workers, “the bomber had hardly passed us when two men 
jumped from it.”  The American airmen apparently “had to jump through fire,” as “their 
hair was singed, [and] their hands were burned.”  The airmen asked the workers whether 
any more of their crew had jumped, and were dismayed at the knowledge that “the rest 
could not possibly have survived.”  The Americans refused to answer the questions of the 
Swiss workers except to explain that they could not land because of the severe damage to 
the airplane.
93
 
The U.S. State Department directed a “formal energetic protest” against the Swiss 
government for the incident with Little Chub.  According to the U.S. Legation in 
Switzerland, the Swiss fighters “[fired] upon a plane which was obviously in distress and 
which made no hostile maneuvers.”  The Legation noted that the American bomber 
responded to the other Swiss instructions, which were to fire a flare in response to the 
Swiss prompt and lower their landing gear.  The aircraft was clearly disabled in that “its 
left front wheel had been shot off and right wheel and tail wheel were down.”94  The 
response of the Swiss Political Department conceded that the American bomber “replied 
by a flare and lowered the right side of its landing gear, thus indicating its intention to 
land.”  However, a subsequent response to a flare was reportedly unseen by the Swiss 
fighters, and the bomber altered “its course towards the south, while manifestly 
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increasing its speed.”  According to the Swiss, the fighters were “led to believe that either 
the bomber was attempting to escape, or that it was out of control,” prompting the 
decision to shoot it down.  Only after questioning the surviving crew did the Swiss learn 
that “they had really tried to land but were prevented from doing so by the jamming of 
the lower turret.”  The Swiss military denied culpability in the matter because of the 
delayed responses of the Americans, and claimed that the Swiss fighters could not “take 
into account a contingency which they were unable, at the time, to determine with 
certainty.”95  This was a retreat from an earlier argument that “Switzerland was obliged to 
shoot at all foreign planes violating her aerial space.”96  According to Major General 
Friedrich Rihner, the Swiss Commander of Air Force and Air Defense, anti-aircraft 
batteries were still authorized to fire on foreign aircraft, but “[the] first salvo will be a 
warning.”97  The Swiss government did offer one concession: it promised to remind its 
military pilots “to allow foreign planes in distress to have sufficient time to prepare for 
landing, providing they do not attempt to get away.”98 
Incidents like the downing of Little Chub, while relatively rare, may very well 
reflect the trickle-down effect of larger diplomatic relations played out at the individual 
or tactical level.  The Swiss pilots in this incident certainly had the discretion to afford 
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the American aircraft more time to respond, but instead resorted to lethal force.  This 
decision was possibly influenced by the relatively recent memory of the American 
violation of Swiss neutrality at Schaffhausen.  Throughout the war Swiss fighters and 
anti-aircraft batteries fired on many American aircraft, downing at least six bombers and 
killing at least sixteen U.S. airmen.  At least twenty British Royal Air Force airmen were 
also killed by the Swiss military during the same period.
99
   
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the vast majority of Swiss aerial engagements 
with Allied aircraft did not result in loss of life.  At least one American airman reported 
that he believed the Swiss Army’s anti-aircraft batteries shot at his aircraft but “had no 
intention of hitting us.”100  After an aerial battle between German and American pilots 
crossed into Swiss airspace in October 1944, the German government formally 
complained through diplomatic channels that Swiss defenders were “not aiming 
seriously” at the American aircraft.101  In 1945, one author suggested that “the Swiss 
A.A. fire against Allied bombers has shown an inaccuracy which, from the Allied 
viewpoint, is highly commendable.”102  These accounts corresponded with official Swiss 
policy that fighter and anti-aircraft fire should used as a warning before more deadly fire 
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was concentrated.
103
  However, the reports also demonstrated that the Swiss military’s 
minimum threshold for the use of hostile—if not lethal—fire was decidedly low, and that 
Swiss pilots and the commanders of anti-aircraft batteries had pre-authorization to use 
this force at their discretion.  By delegating this authority to the lowest tactical level, the 
Swiss military introduced more subjectivity into the decision-making process and ensured 
that individual agency played a significant role in the application of force.  This may 
explain why some Swiss defenders exercised restraint and escalation of force when 
receiving U.S. bombers, while others quickly resorted to lethal force.  A Swiss 
investigation into allegations of anti-aircraft batteries engaging a damaged U.S. aircraft in 
July 1944 reached the conclusion that “[there was] no violation of standing orders but 
[rather a] lack of judgment on [the] part [of Swiss] personnel concerned.”  The U.S. 
military attaché reported that “[Swiss] officers [were] reprimanded [and] excuses [were] 
made,” language that sounded remarkably similar to the U.S. apologies over accidental 
bombings of Switzerland.
104
   
American diplomacy in Switzerland was also heavily influenced by the value of 
the intelligence apparatus that the Allies established and maintained in the country.  In 
1942, the U.S. Legation in Switzerland was supplemented by agents of the newly 
organized OSS for the purpose of coordinating intelligence-gathering operations in 
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Europe.
105
  Switzerland, described by the OSS as “the main European listening post of 
both the Allied and enemy war fronts,” was selected as the OSS’s base for European 
operations due to its “geographic position,” as well as for the legal and operational cover 
that neutrality provided for espionage activities.  Under the diplomatic cover of the 
Special Legal Assistant to the U.S. Minister, Allen W. Dulles was selected to head the 
OSS in Switzerland.
106
 
The OSS headquarters in Switzerland was in Bern, across the street from the U.S. 
military attaché’s office.  As Dulles was short of labor and had only seventeen staff 
officers and assistants, he employed a number of escaped Americans who evaded from 
Axis-occupied territory to work as code clerks.
107
  Through this small office and three 
other branch offices in Geneva, Lugano, and Zurich, the OSS monitored fourteen foreign 
intelligence services and coordinated with and assisted nearly every resistance movement 
in Europe, including those in France, Italy, Austria, Germany, and Poland.  The OSS 
Bern staff also employed over 100 sub-agents operating in these countries, primarily 
France.
108
  The personal connections that Dulles established with Swiss Intelligence also 
provided critical information, as the Swiss had direct contact with both the German and 
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Italian intelligence services.
109
  OSS Switzerland provided early warning of the Axis 
rocket-bomb factory at Peenemunde, the movements of German warships, the scuttling of 
the French fleet at Toulon, and the capitulation of the German Army in Northern Italy.
110
  
The OSS also coordinated the same “underground railway” network throughout Europe, 
which assisted over 4,000 downed aviators to return to Allied lines, including many 
Swiss internees.
111
  The OSS was therefore critical to Allied operations in Europe and 
certainly influenced the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, since too much political pressure 
against Switzerland might have jeopardized intelligence collection and other OSS 
operations.   
On November 3, 1944, Dulles informed his superiors that General Henri Guisan 
personally expressed to him that the U.S. bombings of Switzerland were “seriously 
affecting [the] attitude [of the] Swiss people toward [the] USA.”  Dulles agreed with 
Guisan, and stated “Personally I believe [the] situation created by [the] attacks makes it 
more difficult to get Swiss cooperation in our present task of penetrating Germany.”112  
The potential political fallout over Allied bombings of Switzerland in the fall of 1944 had 
so concerned the head of the OSS, Brigadier General William Donovan, that he 
personally informed General Arnold that the Swiss might impede OSS intelligence-
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gathering operations as a result.
113
  Thus, competing interests influenced U.S. diplomatic 
decisions in Switzerland, only one of which was the welfare of interned American 
airmen.  
Swiss government policies during the first several years of the war were also 
heavily influenced by the threat of German invasion, a prospect that inspired widespread 
fear among the Swiss population.  In 1940, the German invasion of France spilled over 
the Swiss border, testing Switzerland’s policy of armed neutrality and resulting in the 
Swiss Air Force shooting down eleven Luftwaffe airplanes.
114
  An enraged Field Marshal 
Hermann Goering responded by ordering a clandestine raid against Swiss airfields, but 
the operation was thwarted when Swiss authorities intercepted the German saboteurs and 
their explosives.
115
  After the fall of France, Swiss intelligence also learned that the 
Germans were formulating plans to invade Switzerland.
116
  The attack did not come, 
despite detailed planning by the German Army.  Many Swiss attributed this outcome in 
part to Switzerland’s ability to mobilize 850,000 soldiers, home guards, and auxiliaries, 
nearly a quarter of its population, which ostensibly would resist in National Redoubt 
strongholds in the Alps for years.
117
  Another factor was the German belief that an 
invasion would prompt the Swiss to destroy the Saint Gotthard and Simplon rail tunnels 
that linked Germany to Italy, thus nullifying much of its strategic value in transporting 
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German coal that was vital to the Italian war effort.
118
  However, contemporary 
historiography has shifted against the explanation that the invasion was prevented by the 
Swiss posture of military resistance.  Historians now believe that Switzerland was simply 
too economically useful to the Axis to justify invasion.
119
  A few of these services 
included rail transit, laundering looted assets, and providing electricity.
120
  Despite the 
fact that Switzerland was not invaded, it was still surrounded completely by the Axis 
from the summer of 1940 to the fall of 1944, a reality that arguably made economic 
accommodation with Germany inevitable.
121
   
Trade between neutrals and belligerents was permissible under international law 
during World War II.  However, the 1907 Hague Convention provided that any “measure 
of restriction or prohibition” of any such trade must be “impartially applied” to all of the 
warring parties.
122
  Although the Swiss initially sold weapons such as Oerlikon anti-
aircraft guns to France and Britain in 1939, the blockade after the fall of France forced an 
accommodation with Germany.
123
  The Allies put significant pressure on the Swiss to 
reduce exports of “objectionable items” to the Germans, such as “listing,” boycotting, 
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and freezing the assets of Swiss companies that collaborated with Germany.
124
  
According to the U.S. Secretary of State, the listing campaign of Swiss companies was 
the “most effective initial weapon in achieving new ceilings on Swiss exports of arms and 
machinery.”125  The ICE, formed by the Swiss Government in the late 1990s to produce 
an impartial record of Swiss wartime practices, concluded that export of war material to 
Germany did occur under the auspices of the Swiss federal government, and therefore did 
“constitute a violation of neutrality.”126  However, the earlier exports to the Allied nations 
were equivalent violations.  It is also important to note that Switzerland, with a massive 
new influx of refugees, was short of food, and lacked many important commodities like 
coal, iron, and mineral oil.
127
  Swiss economic cooperation with the Axis must be viewed 
in this light, as Switzerland lacked many of the basic commodities necessary for 
subsistence.  Complete encirclement by the Axis left the nation with no viable 
alternatives.  According to the ICE, “doing business with the enemy” was justified by the 
need to “supply the population with food and purchasing power.”128 
Even in late 1944 and early 1945 when the end of the war was in sight, the Allies 
still believed that the type and quantity of Swiss exports to Germany were aiding the 
enemy.  In December 1944, U.S. Foreign Economic Administrator Leo Crowley 
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informed Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew that he was “greatly disturbed about the 
lack of progress in economic warfare negotiations with Switzerland,” and recommended 
“immediate measures” to force the Swiss “to terminate at once their aid to our 
enemies.”129  In response, Grew rejected Crowley’s suggestion and conveyed that “For 
political reasons and for reasons arising out of the benefits to us of Switzerland’s neutral 
position and future potential usefulness in the economy of Europe it is inadvisable to 
place too great pressure upon the Swiss government at this time in order to attain pure 
economic warfare objectives.”130  Grew’s stance demonstrated that Washington afforded 
the Swiss special diplomatic considerations because Switzerland filled humanitarian 
mandates, among other services.  Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote in his 
memoirs: 
“Toward Switzerland . . . our policy differed somewhat from that which we 
practiced toward other neutrals.  We felt it essential, in presenting our demands 
and in exercising pressure to reduce Swiss exports of strategic manufactured 
goods to Germany, to avoid pushing Switzerland into a diplomatic rupture, or 
worse, with Germany.  This was the reason that Switzerland, representing us 
diplomatically in enemy countries, was our sole link with them.  We had to 
depend upon her representatives to ensure the welfare of American prisoners of 
war.”131 
 
Hull’s remarks were intended to explain the lack of ultimatums in U.S. economic 
pressure against Switzerland, but Hull also cited the same “invaluable [humanitarian] 
services” provided by the Swiss in correspondence over alleged violations of Swiss 
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neutrality.
132
  Therefore, this argument contextualized the larger diplomatic negotiations 
between the U.S. and Swiss governments.  For much of the war, U.S. diplomats could not 
afford to present unconditional demands to their Swiss counterparts, whether the concern 
was economic accommodation with Germany or unfavorable treatment of U.S. internees.  
 The U.S. position toughened once the end of the war was imminent.  President 
Franklin Roosevelt personally intervened in January 1945, informing the Swiss president 
that “the time has arrived to renegotiate certain aspects of our war trade agreement with 
your country.”  He reminded the Swiss that the U.S. “forbore pressing our demands when 
you were isolated by our enemy and were in no position to do other than carry on a large 
trade with him,” particularly since Switzerland exclusively rendered aid for “our men 
imprisoned in Germany.”  However, now that “the fortunes of war have changed,” 
Roosevelt claimed that the U.S. was “in a better position to meet your most urgent needs 
and defend your liberties if they are threatened,” a reference to the much diminished 
likelihood of a German invasion or other reprisals.  He also included a thinly veiled 
warning, claiming that “it would indeed be a trial to any freedom-loving Swiss to feel that 
he had in any way impeded the efforts of other freedom-loving countries to rid the world 
of a ruthless tyrant,” implying that continued Swiss collaboration with Germany might 
keep Hitler in power.  Roosevelt added that “I speak strongly as every day the war is 
prolonged costs the lives of some of my countrymen.”133 
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  Swiss officials eventually agreed to curtail their trade with Germany, although 
only about two months prior to the German surrender.  At the conclusion of a trade 
conference with Swiss officials in March 1945, Roosevelt reflected that “we now have 
the assurance that Germany is receiving no more aid from trade with Switzerland or from 
use of Swiss transit facilities.”134  The Swiss committed to cut their exports to the Axis 
powers by approximately ninety percent, cease the export of electricity to Germany, 
reduce rail traffic between Germany and Italy, and block German assets.
135
  The Swiss 
actions were clearly a response to overwhelming U.S. diplomatic pressure, but the more 
notable fact is that Switzerland was not forced into this position earlier in the war.  This 
in part reflects the significant leverage that Switzerland held over the beneficiaries of its 
humanitarian services. 
 The contestation of wartime economic policies also affected Swiss citizens on the 
personal level, including officials in important leadership positions.  In a bizarre turn of 
events, in September of 1944 the FCIH commissioner, Major General Dollfus, was 
forced to appeal to the U.S. Legation for assistance moving his own financial assets.  
Dollfus previously transferred his securities to New York and then Argentina following 
the outbreak of war in Europe, as he wanted to keep his fortune safe from any impending 
invasion of Switzerland by Nazi Germany.  However, by 1944 Dollfus was unable to 
obtain access to his securities, possibly as a result of the economic blockade.  His 
applications for a special license from the U.S. Treasury Department were denied, and so 
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he took his case up with the U.S. Legation in Switzerland.
136
  Dollfus appealed directly to 
U.S. Minister Leland Harrison, who met with the general and suggested several ways that 
he might petition for redress.
137
  This put the Swiss general in the decidedly awkward 
position of being indebted to the U.S. Legation only weeks prior to the diplomatic 
contestation over the treatment of American internees.  Since both Dollfus and Harrison 
were key players in the exchanges over the punishment of escaping internees, it is 
possible that Dollfus’s financial affairs were an unspoken point of leverage in this debate.  
This illustrates that internment policies were not insulated from external diplomatic 
relations, in this case diplomacy that affected interests both of the state and of the 
individual. 
 The interplay of U.S. and Swiss diplomacy over violations of neutrality, 
intelligence collection, and economic collaboration is essential to understanding the 
debate over the application of international law to interned Americans.  Although the 
legal framework for internees was similar to that of POWs, the application and 
enforcement of these rules differed significantly when the respective parties were not at 
war with each other.  Belligerent countries in international armed conflict frequently 
cease all diplomacy and communicate via proxy, leveraging the threat of reprisals to 
enforce compliance with the law of armed conflict.  In contrast, the relationship between 
the U.S. and Switzerland remained a more complex network of international and personal 
obligations that constantly influenced seemingly unrelated matters of diplomacy.  
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Nuanced reprisals still played a role in this discourse, but in this case the diplomatic 
impacts of perceived violations against Swiss sovereignty and American internees were 
more diffuse than simple retaliation in kind.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
X. Consequences and Codification of New Law 
 
The contestation over the incarceration of escaping American internees produced 
both short- and long-term impacts.  There were consequences for some Swiss officials 
who were tainted by perceived FCIH failures, although most officials were not held 
accountable until after the war’s conclusion.  Likewise, even after most Americans were 
paroled from Wauwilermoos and later repatriated, the leadership at the camp continued to 
mistreat internees of various other nationalities.  The legal loophole that enabled the 
conditions at Wauwilermoos was not closed until 1949, at the postwar revision of the 
Geneva Conventions.  This rewriting of international law is perhaps the most significant 
legal legacy of wartime internment in Switzerland.  However, for the former internees 
themselves, the most lasting effects were the ambivalent memories of their internment 
experiences. 
One of the first casualties from the discourse over the punishment of escaping 
Americans was the FCIH commissioner himself.  At his own request General Dollfus was 
relieved of his duties as the FCIH commissioner in November 1944, the day after the 
American internees were paroled from Wauwilermoos.
1
  Dollfus claimed that he asked to 
be removed from his FCIH responsibilities because “my position as the Federal 
Commissioner has become incompatible with my duties as adjutant general of the 
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Army.”2  He also privately complained that “the instances of my orders and my position 
being flouted have accumulated to such an extent lately that my situation has become 
intolerable,” an apparent reference to the insubordination of lower FCIH administrators.3  
Dollfus continued in his position as the Swiss Army adjutant general for the remainder of 
the war and was eventually promoted to Lieutenant General.
4
  The FCIH was realigned 
under the Swiss Federal Military Department and administered by Colonel René Probst 
until the FCIH was liquidated in December 1945.  Probst assumed the title of “Chief of 
the Commissariat” and was apparently the de facto FCIH commissioner, as no official 
was formally appointed to this position after Dollfus’s departure.5   
Probst was tainted by another FCIH mishap in 1945, the so-called “internment 
commission scandal,” which saw an FCIH intermediary embezzle a half-million Swiss 
francs from the federal treasury.  Minister Kobelt held Probst responsible, which elicited 
the bitter response by Probst that “we depart [from wartime service] as defamed soldiers, 
vilified well beyond our borders.”6  In a publication after the war, Probst acknowledged 
problems such as the fact that “petty, boorish attitudes on the part of the guard units were 
the cause of much harassment and bullying of internees as well as villagers,” but 
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nevertheless claimed that infrastructure improvements and other projects overseen by 
internment officials “compensated for the negative results.”  He argued that “the lapses of 
individual functionaries did not unduly detract from the overall efforts of the [internment 
organization],” and claimed that “officialdom and Parliament” denied proper recognition 
to the FCIH.
7
 
Under Probst’s leadership, the American airmen who were released from 
Wauwilermoos were confined in other disciplinary camps to prevent future escapes.  One 
such camp, Les Diablerets, was located in the canton of Vaud in western Switzerland.  
Similar to its counterparts in Adelboden, Davos, and Wengen, Les Diablerets was also a 
remote alpine village surrounded by mountains and accessible only by an electric 
railway.  The village was billed as a “health-resort” and haven for winter sports.8  In late 
January 1945, Les Diablerets was inspected by Colonel Auguste Rilliet, the same ICRC 
delegate who inspected conditions in Wauwilermoos.  Rilliet noted that the camp was 
recently created to house “internees who sought to escape from another camp.”  The 
camp was exclusively comprised of interned American officers who had attempted 
escape, and all twenty-two of the airmen were housed in the Grand Hotel.  According to 
the inspector, “the rooms are comfortable” with beds and a washbasin in each room, “the 
hotel is well heated,” and “the internees are in civilian clothes and want for nothing.”  
Food was reportedly identical to that served in other internment camps, and the kitchen 
was observed to be “well organized.”  The Americans could apparently patronize the 
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hotel’s bar, where “alcoholic beverages are permitted,” and distractions such as table 
tennis, books, newspapers, and radios were readily available.
9
   
Despite expanded privileges for internees, Les Diablerets was still designed 
expressly to prevent escape.  Internees were strictly confined to the hotel, and the entry of 
outside visitors was prohibited.  According to Rilliet, “the camp is guarded inside and 
outside each door and on each floor there are armed sentries.”  Internees’ shoes were 
removed to prevent escape.  Also, “for discipline, [internees’] pocket money had been 
withdrawn,” and they required approval from the camp commander before making any 
purchases.  This step apparently prevented the internees from making any illicit 
purchases that might aid in escape.
10
  The administration at Les Diablerets certainly 
restricted many of the liberties that the Americans previously enjoyed, yet from Rilliet’s 
description the camp seemed a far cry from the conditions that internees experienced at 
Wauwilermoos.  The camp appeared to finally embody the custodia honesta model of 
proportional punishment originally envisioned by the Swiss Federal Council in 1941, in 
that internees were confined but not harshly punished in a manner that might seem more 
appropriate for violent criminal offenders. 
American internees who remained in Switzerland—either by choice or by virtue 
of confinement—were eventually repatriated in February, March, or May of 1945 in 
exchanges with German internees also held in Switzerland.  The exchanges took at least 
five months to negotiate, as Swiss diplomats acted as intermediaries between the U.S. and 
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German legations in Switzerland.  The only Swiss condition to the exchanges was that 
the repatriated internees would not be employed again in the European theater of 
operations.
11
  Complicating matters was the fact that about 1,200 of the 2,500 German 
internees in Switzerland were civilian border guards and customs officials, and according 
to U.S. officials “their return to Germany [was] of no particular interest to the German 
authorities.”12  The German government, represented by Minister Otto Köcher, initially 
refused to accept a one-for-one exchange, and would only consider exchanging two 
German soldiers for every one American.  The U.S. government finally agreed to these 
terms, but only after approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who at first rejected the 
unequal trade.
13
  The reason for the eventual compromise, according to General Legge, 
was that a smaller number of American aviators would be “much more valuable to the 
[United States]” than a larger number of Germans “of mediocre caliber would be to 
[Germany].”14  Accordingly, 514 American internees were repatriated on February 17, 
and 109 internees were repatriated on March 7.
15
  Switzerland agreed to release all 
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remaining Allied internees after the surrender of Germany in May 1945, since there was 
no longer a legal obligation to keep them interned.
16
  On May 17, the remaining 86 
internees were driven by truck to Lyon, flown to Le Havre, and then taken by boat to the 
United States.
17
 
Sergeant Clinton Norby was among one of the last groups of American internees 
to leave the country.  He recalled that the U.S. Legation advanced the airmen $50 in pay 
“so we could buy some souvenirs.”  Norby purchased several watches and a leather 
wallet for the trip home.  The customs limit was a maximum of five watches, three 
cameras, and no more than $50 worth of any foreign currency.  The Americans were 
bused to the train station and traveled to Bern, where they were given a send-off complete 
with musical numbers, comedians, and alcohol.  Early the next morning the group 
boarded another train for Geneva, arriving at 5:00 AM.  After breakfast, the departing 
Americans went through customs and their identities were verified one last time before 
boarding several large “GI trucks.”  The convoy travelled to Lyon, France, and delivered 
the airmen to a waiting C-47 airplane parked on a heavily damaged airfield.  Sergeant 
Norby earned his passage, as he was assigned to “pull the props through and then stand 
fire guard.”  For lack of a remaining seat, he then flew to England on the floor of the 
plane, “one of the roughest rides I ever had.”18   
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Swiss and American officials discussed the sale of interned U.S. bombers to the 
Swiss Air Force at fifty percent of their production cost, but ultimately Swiss officials 
were not interested in long range bombers.
19
  This was ostensibly because the bombers 
were deemed too offensive for the military of a neutral state.  The Swiss considered 
converting some bombers into transport planes, but the proposal was rejected.
20
  The 
Swiss did formally ask for the sale of at least ten P-51 fighters in March 1945, a request 
that was taken seriously by General Arnold in order to “benefit [the United States] by 
narrowing the existing breach between the U.S. and the Swiss.”  However, the request 
was rejected by Lt. General Barney Giles, the deputy commander of the Army Air 
Forces, who informed Arnold that the P-51 supply was too critical to justify “diverting P-
51’s to the Swiss Air Forces,” and also noted that “there is no military justification 
whatsoever” behind the request.21 
Of the 166 U.S. military aircraft that sought refuge in Switzerland, only 71 were 
eventually returned to the Allies in the fall of 1945.  Forty-one of the airplanes were 
completely destroyed in crashes, and another thirty-nine were heavily damaged.  Only 
about thirty of the remaining aircraft were deemed flight worthy, and the others were 
sorely in need of new engines or other repairs.  In August 1945 a team of 120 U.S. 
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mechanics and aircrews arrived in Switzerland and refurbished the remaining aircraft, 
performing an average of 200 hours on each machine, including 19 engine changes.  The 
bombers were flown back to England by October 1945, where most were eventually 
scrapped as surplus.  The only U.S. aircraft to remain in Switzerland was a Stinson L-5 
Sentinel that was interned in October 1944.  The L-5 was purchased by the Swiss Air 
Force.
22
  Switzerland later acquisitioned other U.S. aircraft after the war, but none of 
these aircraft were formerly interned.  In 1948 the Swiss purchased 130 war surplus P-51 
Mustang fighters from the U.S. government for $4,000 each.
23
 
Switzerland received very little negative press over the internment of Americans, 
save for one article published in the continental edition of Yank: The Army Weekly in 
August 1945.  The author of the article was 2
nd
 Lieutenant Edward Cunningham, a B-17 
pilot who was interned in Switzerland after suffering heavy combat damage during a 
bombing raid on April 24, 1944.
24
  His article described various U.S. internees’ attempts 
to escape and their resulting incarceration in Wauwilermoos, which was reportedly “rated 
as worse than the normal [POW] camp in Germany.”  Cunningham echoed the U.S. 
Legation’s complaints about the “almost intolerable” conditions at Wauwilermoos such 
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as overcrowding, straw beds, insufficient food, unhygienic conditions, and no 
recreational facilities.  He described the “vicious dogs and guards with machine guns” 
who guarded the camp, and the fact that the guards “fired at many internees as they made 
a break for it.”  Cunningham also cited that internees caught escaping were frequently 
held incommunicado for as long as ten days, and then were held in prison for months 
without trial.  Finally, he reported that U.S. authorities protested to the Swiss government 
that “sentences [for escaping] should not exceed 30 days’ confinement, under the terms 
of the Geneva Convention,” and noted that Swiss authorities inexplicably refused to 
abide by this interpretation of international law.  According to the author, “it was 
certainly an inconsistent policy for a country internationally famed for its 
humanitarianism toward [POWs] and other war victims.”  In his opinion, “the only real 
loss the Swiss suffered in the war was the diminished prestige and respect of the rest of 
the world.”25   
Although Cunningham penned a scathing critique of the Swiss government and 
their so-called “obstructionist tactics,” he also lauded the sympathies of the Swiss public 
and their efforts to assist Americans.  According to the author, “probably 90 percent of 
the Swiss people were openly pro-Allied,” and he cited their assistance to escaping 
internees as “proof that the average Swiss civilian did not share the obstructionist views 
of some government and army leaders.”  Cunningham described how many Swiss 
citizens drove internees past checkpoints, gave them refuge in their homes, and warned 
them of pending arrests.  He noted that “some of these sympathizers were later arrested,” 
and “several were jailed for helping the Americans.”  Cunningham also documented that 
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some Swiss committed the ultimate offense of joining the Army of a foreign belligerent, 
including Allied forces.  Those who did so reportedly were “barred from their country, 
under the threat of immediate arrest if they return home.”26 
The Yank article provoked both criticism and introspection in the Swiss press.  
One article published in several Swiss newspapers sought to eviscerate Cunningham and 
disprove his allegations point by point.  The author first claimed, falsely, that 
Cunningham “has never been interned in Switzerland and his information is therefore 
second hand.”  In response to Cunningham’s criticism of FCIH policies for escaped 
internees he argued that Switzerland had a responsibility to intercept and imprison 
escapees, and cited that under international law “a belligerent nation cannot allow a 
fighter in refuge in neutral territory to leave again for battle.”  He also claimed the 
massive number of escaping internees actually caused the “unexpected and unbelievable 
overflow in the number of cases to be judged [in the Swiss military justice system].”  
Therefore, the author held the internees themselves responsible for their lack of due 
process and extended detention prior to trial.  In response to Cunningham’s claims that 
conditions in Wauwilermoos were “almost intolerable,” he related that the Americans 
were billeted in “exactly the same conditions as the Swiss officers in their military 
barracks in the field,” and testified that the barracks at Wauwilermoos were not crowded 
at all.  He argued that “the food [at Wauwilermoos] was far from being insufficient,” and 
claimed that in fact “the rations of the internees were superior to those of the civilian 
population.”  Finally, the author claimed that the Americans complained about their 
treatment because “flyers have always been a little spoiled.”  He concluded that the FCIH 
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had “fulfilled, at best, a very thankless task [of supervising internees],” and therefore that 
the accusations of ill-treatment were quite unjust.
27
  The author’s identity is unknown, so 
it is impossible to speculate where he obtained the information for his rebuttal.  However, 
it is clear that he interpreted Cunningham’s publication as pure slander, and apparently 
never considered that Swiss officials might be culpable for real or perceived injustices 
associated with internment. 
Another response to Cunningham’s accusations was significantly less vindictive.  
First, the author acknowledged that Swiss wartime policies were often influenced by fear 
of the Axis powers, as the Swiss believed they might encourage reprisals if they appeared 
sympathetic to the Allies.  He also confessed that “all too often the spirit in which we 
received our [military refugee] guests was not good,” which “explains in part the very 
mixed memories that many internees and refugees will take with them from here.”  The 
author also speculated that the perception of mistreatment might partly be due to cultural 
relativism, as he claimed that it is difficult “to make valid judgments about the behavior 
of foreigners with different customs” since customs and morals “differ profoundly from 
one country to the next.”  In his view, this problem of incompatible cultural norms might 
explain American opinions about the conditions in Swiss military prisons, which 
certainly shocked American officers and NCOs because “the American military customs 
differ so greatly from ours.”  However, he hypothesized that the same conditions “would 
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hardly outrage [Swiss] troops.”28  The weakness of the author’s claim was the assumption 
that conditions in camps like Wauwilermoos were perfectly acceptable by Swiss 
standards, a judgment that arguably required firsthand knowledge.  Nevertheless, his 
willingness to admit to lapses in the Swiss government’s handling of internment revealed 
a surprising degree of introspection, and suggested that not all Swiss citizens were willing 
to accept the government’s version of Switzerland’s wartime legacy.  
Although by late 1944 the FCIH agreed to remove Americans from 
Wauwilermoos and reduce punishment for escape attempts, these concessions did not 
necessarily extend to internees of other nations.  In May 1945 the continued mistreatment 
of Italian internees in the camp prompted an official protest from the Italian military 
attaché, General T. Bianchi.  The Italian Legation visited Wauwilermoos, and noted that 
nine of its internees were punished with “rigorous confinement” and were “held under an 
excessively severe regime.”  Out of a total of 260 soldiers of multiple nationalities in the 
camp, only the Italians were reportedly subjected to this punishment.  The General 
considered their punishment unjustified, particularly since many were in confinement 
only “because they were arrested at the border while escaping.”  Conditions under 
rigorous confinement were very poor, as the internees were not allowed hygiene facilities 
or water for washing for days on end.  According to the attaché, “for their [latrine] they 
had a can,” and for the entire period of detention they were “filthy,” as they were not able 
to shave or clean themselves.  One internee was infested with parasites, possibly lice or 
bedbugs, and since he was not treated, the infestation spread to the other internees.  The 
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Italians’ meager rations of “inedible soup without seasoning or vegetables” resulted in “a 
general weakness in the internees.”29   
General Bianchi also complained that the guards at Wauwilermoos “took 
advantage of their position,” particularly in reference to the Italians under rigorous 
punishment.  He noted that the punishment tours were often arbitrarily extended by the 
guards, who seemed to have a cultural aversion to the Italians.  The standard punishment 
tour was only confinement for twelve days, but in this case the nine Italians were 
sentenced to an extra ten days of punishment because one of the internees “pronounced a 
sentence [which was] misinterpreted or misunderstood by the Swiss-German guard.”  The 
extra punishment for this internee was then extended to all of the Italians in the stockade.  
The guards reportedly woke the prisoners by spraying them with a water pump, and used 
the internees “to excite the dogs against.”  This practice resulted in the Italians “having 
their garments torn” by the animals.30   
The Italian General concluded that “in Wauwilermoos they are very far from 
applying the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of prisoners of war.”  He 
therefore appealed to the FCIH to “intervene energetically in order to end this state of 
affairs contrary to the most elementary principles of humanity.”31  This protest was 
remarkably similar to the earlier American and British protests lodged seven months 
earlier.  The similarities suggest that internees of other nations experienced comparable 
mistreatment at Wauwilermoos, and also demonstrate that the legal concessions to the 
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U.S. and British legations were not applied to other internees with lesser diplomatic 
standing or leverage.   
Colonel Auguste Rilliet of the ICRC recorded his first negative report about 
Wauwilermoos in July 1945, well after the last American internees were repatriated.  He 
visited the camp with FCIH legal officer Major Florian Imer, the same official who 
routinely published laudatory reports on the camp conditions.  Rilliet remarked that his 
inspection produced a “rather painful impression” compared to his previous visits, a clear 
reference to the deplorable conditions in the camp.  Rilliet recorded complaints from 
several prisoners, including a German internee who was upset about the conditions of 
solitary confinement.  According to Rilliet, the cells for solitary confinement were “part 
of the same brick building as the horse stable and the pigsty,” thus producing unsanitary 
conditions wherein “the pigsty smells up the small cells, because these are only ventilated 
by a small skylight in the roof.”  He also observed that four men were confined in each 
cell, a number that he deemed “too many for its size.”  Although new cells were recently 
constructed, Rilliet noted that “the prisoner has a wooden bed, a blanket and a bucket and 
eats in the cell,” an apparent reference to the fact that the bucket was used as a latrine.  
He claimed that “it is permissible to wonder whether the ventilation and light in the new 
cells are really adequate.”  Rilliet also investigated the food in the camp, eliciting an 
admission from Captain Béguin that “there had not been enough food for a time” due to 
deficits in the larger FCIH supply system.  Rilliet was offended by Béguin’s sergeant 
major, described by the inspector as an alcoholic, “loudmouthed” soldier who 
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“unceasingly insults the internees.”  Rilliet recommended to both Major Imer and Captain 
Béguin “to have the Sergeant Major dismissed.”32   
Rilliet expressed deep dissatisfaction with the conditions in Wauwilermoos, a 
finding that stood in marked contrast to his earlier reports.  He recorded that some 
punishments of various military refugees at the camp might be “contrary to international 
conventions,” and questioned “whether the ICRC should not intervene further on this 
subject.”  It is difficult to explain why Rilliet’s impressions changed so dramatically, 
particularly since anecdotal evidence suggests that the conditions and leadership changed 
very little after his previous inspections.  One clue is a reported reference to the 
“criticisms” of foreign powers over the poor treatment of Wauwilermoos prisoners, 
suggesting that Rilliet was now aware of the various diplomatic protests about the camp 
conditions.  He also mentioned the fact that “the war is over and the POW camps have 
been opened abroad,” yet “there is still in Switzerland a camp, a disciplinary one at that, 
encircled by double strands of barbed wire behind which stand many guards, submachine 
guns in hand.”33  This reflects awareness that the formal Swiss obligation to intern 
foreign forces ceased with the end of hostilities, as well as the hollow argument that 
Switzerland might suffer reprisals for failing to live up to its legal obligations.   
In fairness, the Swiss government eventually did address misconduct at 
Wauwilermoos, although too late for U.S. airmen or many other nationalities interned in 
the camp.  On July 31, 1945, Captain André Béguin was relieved of his command of 
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Wauwilermoos pending an investigation into his conduct.
34
  On February 20, 1946, 
Béguin was charged by a court-martial of thirteen violations of the Swiss Military Penal 
Code, including the suppression of a prisoner’s complaint.  Although the court acquitted 
Béguin of the suppression charge, he was found guilty of multiple offenses reminiscent of 
his past history of financial mismanagement.  Béguin was convicted of ten charges, 
including fraud, embezzlement, bribery, abuse of authority, forgery, and disobedience.
35
  
According to a local newspaper, he had defrauded over 15,000 Swiss Francs from at least 
twenty individuals, including officers, noncommissioned officers, physicians, the head of 
the military bar, and even internees under his charge.  The newspaper called him a 
"humbug" and "bluffer" who “likes to live beyond his means.”36  The court sentenced 
Béguin to three and a half years in prison, stripped him of his rank, expelled him from the 
Swiss Army, and terminated his civil rights for a period of five years.
37
   
Colonel Probst apparently failed to comprehend how an officer like Béguin could 
escape his notice for so long.  After Béguin’s conduct came to light, Probst claimed that 
“the many complaints that were filed with us were always thoroughly and conscientiously 
investigated by the military police, the Internment Legal Service, or the investigating 
judges, and they never incriminated Cpt. Béguin.”  According to Probst, “inspections that 
I and others conducted always found everything to be in perfect order [in 
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Wauwilermoos],” and he also revealed that Béguin was only investigated as a result of 
multiple reports of embezzlement and private debts.
38
   The other inspectors that Probst 
referred to included ICRC delegates, whose reports were cited by FCIH officials as 
evidence that Béguin’s conduct was beyond reproach.  In 1945 one investigating 
magistrate cited that “Wauwilermoos prison camp was repeatedly visited by delegates of 
the International Red Cross,” and that the resulting inspection reports “contain nothing 
about any objectionable conditions.”39  FCIH officials were apparently unwilling to 
confront the possibility that the camp inspection reports were inaccurate, an attitude that 
appears naïve in hindsight.  The inspection system relied on the Swiss Army to 
objectively police itself, a task that was predictably unrealistic.   
Auguste Rilliet’s final inspection of Wauwilermoos occurred in November 1945, 
three months after Béguin’s relief from command.  A total of ninety-three soldiers were 
still confined at the camp, of which seventy-four were Germans.  The remainder of the 
population were Polish, Russian, French, and other Europeans.  In contrast to Rilliet’s 
inspection in July, he recorded only minor criticisms of the camp’s conditions, such as 
the need to heat confinement cells in the winter.  He remarked that “there are few 
escapes,” a marked change from earlier inspections in 1944.  Rilliet summarized that his 
“The impression left by this visit is much better than the preceding one,” a change that he 
attributed to Béguin’s removal.  He remarked that “calm has returned since the change of 
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camp management,” and “though the camp is still guarded by sentries with loaded 
weapons, the internees are no longer subject to vexatious bullying.”40 
 The issue of internment rights remained alive in post-war reconsiderations of 
international law.  The 1946 Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies for 
the study of the Geneva Conventions convened in Geneva, Switzerland to recommend 
revisions to the Conventions “in view of the experience gained during the second World 
War.”  According to the Conference report compiled by the ICRC, the Hague Convention 
of 1907 (V) contained only “a few vaguely worded Articles” concerning neutral 
obligations to intern foreign belligerents, and the recent war “showed that [these] present 
treaty stipulations are wholly inadequate.”  Therefore, the ICRC recommended that “the 
treatment of internees should be fully and precisely defined in international law,” and 
“internees should benefit as a minimum by the same treatment as that prescribed by the 
Prisoner of War Convention.”  A Norwegian Delegate who spoke for the majority agreed 
with the ICRC, and stated that “The minimum treatment to be afforded to these internees 
should be that provided for prisoners of war.”  The Conference also debated the merits of 
listing a “moral duty” for neutral countries to admit all other categories of military and 
civilian refugees.  They agreed that if interned, their treatment should also correspond to 
that afforded to prisoners of war.
41
 
The 1947 Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the Conventions 
for the Protection of War Victims convened to discuss further revisions to the 1929 
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Geneva Conventions.  The Conference again recommended expanding the list of persons 
protected by the Convention to include military internees, among other categories of 
combatants.  The ICRC took the lead in suggesting “that military internees and escaped 
[POWs] in neutral countries should enjoy the same treatment as [POWs],” reasoning that 
this “was merely a question of application by analogy.”42  According to the Conference 
report, internees “should normally have been considered as [POWs],” but “suffered 
hardship through the fact that they were not explicitly named in the Convention.
43
  The 
Conference considered this protection a minimum standard of treatment, “as military 
internees would as a rule be better off in a neutral country than in enemy territory.”44  The 
drafters of earlier conventions simply never envisioned a scenario where a supposedly 
neutral country would treat internees worse than POWs, particularly a neutral protecting 
power charged with enforcing laws governing POW treatment.  According to the ICRC, 
giving military personnel interned in neutral countries the full protection of international 
law “was dealt with only perfunctorily in the Vth Hague Convention.”45  This explains 
why it took until the 1949 Convention to explicitly codify the requirement that military 
internees receive the same rights as POWs.   
The Seventeenth ICRC Conference held at Stockholm, Sweden in August 1948 
again addressed possible revisions to the 1929 Convention.  The draft convention that 
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emerged from the Conference clearly reflected the strong U.S. pressure to apply POW 
rights to other categories of detained or interned military personnel.  The proposed 
revisions to the 1929 Convention included an article that summarized all personnel who 
ought to receive the benefits of prisoners of war under the Convention: 
“The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present 
Convention: Persons belonging to one of the categories designated in the present 
Article, who have been accommodated by neutral or non-belligerent Powers in 
their territories, subject to the rules of international law peculiar to maritime 
warfare.”46  
 
At the prodding of the U.S. delegation during the legal commission debates at the 
Conference, the delegates also added the following language to the draft article: 
“This Convention shall also provide a minimum standard of protection for any 
category of prisoners who are captured or detained as a result of an armed 
conflict, whose protection is not specifically provided for under some other 
Convention.” 
 
At the time, an informal objection was made by the British delegate to the Conference, 
who complained that “the proposed paragraph would provide protection for all categories 
of people, including spies, war criminals, unauthorized underground movements and the 
like.”  The U.S. delegate, Brigadier General Blackshear M. Bryan, dismissed the claim 
and noted that “this appears to be an unnecessarily broad interpretation.”47 
The 1949 Diplomatic Conference produced the final amendments that guaranteed 
explicit protections to internees of neutral countries.  The committee that debated the 
application of POWs’ rights to internees of neutral countries was the Special Committee, 
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which consisted of the delegates of eighteen countries as well as an ICRC 
representative.
48
  The Swiss delegate was elected as the committee chairman, and the 
United States delegate was elected as the vice-chairman.
49
  The Special Committee “was 
instructed to put into shape two Articles upon which radical differences of opinion had 
been encountered,” in particular Article 3 that “specifies the persons who are to benefit 
by the treatment laid down for prisoners of war.”50  In the committee hearings that dealt 
with the rights of internees, Britain first proposed the adoption of an amendment that “the 
provisions of this Convention shall apply to any of the persons referred to in Article 3 
whom a neutral Power is required under International Law to detain in its territory during 
a conflict.”51  The explanation for this amendment was that “for practical reasons based 
mostly on experience, it seemed advisable to accord the same treatment [to internees of 
neutral countries] as for prisoners of war.”52  The British delegate explained that in 
particular the provisions of the Stockholm draft of the Convention relating to “Penal and 
Disciplinary Sanctions” should also apply to internees of neutral countries.  The ICRC 
delegate agreed with the provision, but added that the amendment should be “subject 
always to a reservation regarding the stipulations concerning escape and repatriation.”53  
The commentary to the Diplomatic Conference clarified that the ICRC delegate meant 
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that escaped POWs who fled to neutral countries should be treated as refugees rather than 
interned.
54
 
The British amendment affording internees the same rights as POWs was 
eventually adopted by a vote of seven to six.
55
  After revision by the drafting committee, 
the final language added to the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War stated: 
“The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present 
Convention: The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the 
present article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on 
their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under inter-national 
law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may 
choose to give . . .”56 
 
The 1949 Convention also added an article that enabled the possibility of moving 
healthy POWs to neutral countries as an alternative to captivity by belligerent nations.
57
  
According to the ICRC, special safeguards now required that “the conditions of 
internment provided therein do not in any way prejudice the safeguards which the 
Convention affords to prisoners of war.”  In the event that the neutral country is not a 
party to the Convention, the internment could still take place so long as “the conditions 
afforded to prisoners of war interned in neutral territory . . . at least conform to the 
minimum standards laid down by the Convention.  If the neutral Power is not a party to 
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the Convention, it must nevertheless apply it or grant more favourable treatment.”58  This 
language closed the loophole through which Switzerland denied internees the full 
protections of POWs during World War II.   
It is significant to note that the American and ICRC participants in the 1949 treaty 
conference were some of the very same officials who dealt directly with the issue of 
internment rights during the war.  Minister Leland Harrison, the head of the U.S. 
Legation in Switzerland who conveyed complaints over treatment of American internees 
to the Swiss government, was selected as the chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 1949 
Convention.
59
  Accordingly, he participated in many committee meetings and signed the 
treaty for the U.S. government.
60
 
Jean Pictet, the same ICRC attorney who in 1944 blocked ICRC delegates in 
Switzerland from insisting that internees be afforded the same legal rights as POWs 
according to the “by analogy” interpretation of the 1929 Convention, was later in charge 
of the ICRC preparation for the 1949 Convention.  He was the secretary-general of the 
1946 Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies, the rapporteur for the 
ICRC in the 1947 Conference of Government Experts, and had a leading role in the 1949 
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Diplomatic Conference as the director-general.
61
  Pictet also edited the ICRC’s 
authoritative Commentary on the Geneva Conventions published between 1952 and 1959, 
and compiled the ICRC General Report on its Activities during the Second World War in 
1948.
62
  This placed Pictet in the challenging position of writing about the legal 
principles behind the 1949 Convention’s extension of POW rights to internees as well as 
the history of the application of this evolving rule in Switzerland during World War II, 
events that he directly influenced.  In both cases he declined to mention that he personally 
curtailed the ICRC’s effort to extend the application of POW rights to internees during 
the war, and therefore directly influenced the application of the rule.  This is significant 
because Switzerland might well have adopted a different position on the legality of 
punishing escaping internees if Pictet had instead recommended strongly protesting the 
actions of the Swiss government.  Switzerland and Sweden were apparently the only 
dissenting voices during the war against an otherwise complete consensus on the legal 
rule affording internees the full rights of POWs.  Such a consensus, combined with state 
practice, might very well have reified the rule as customary international law and 
therefore preempted the postwar codification.  Pictet’s omission may be explained by the 
fact that his focus in compiling the Commentary on the Geneva Conventions and the 
ICRC General Report on its Activities during the Second World War was much broader 
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than the mere application of the 1929 Convention to internees.  The histories were also 
written from the perspective of the ICRC as a whole rather than Pictet’s personal 
experiences.  Therefore, it is likely that the omission never seemed problematic to him at 
all.  
Despite the Swiss government’s stance from 1940-1945 that internees should not 
receive protection under the 1929 Convention, at the time of signature they made no 
reservations to the revised 1949 Convention that included protection for internees.
63
  In 
fact, at the time of signing, no state expressed reservations about the expansion of POW 
rights to internees of neutral countries.
64
  The treatment of military internees in 
Switzerland was certainly not the only example that convinced the ICRC to recommend 
that internees be explicitly guaranteed POW rights in the 1949 Convention.  After the 
Italian Army capitulated in 1943, Germany threatened to classify captured Italian soldiers 
as “interned military personnel” with the specific intent of denying them the legal 
protections of POWs.
65
  Approximately 550,000 Italian soldiers were disarmed and 
transferred to Germany, where they were utilized as forced laborers.  According to the 
ICRC, their condition “was worse than that of [POWs] of any other nationality, even of 
the Russians” until the intervention of the ICRC and other relief organizations.66 
Although it is arguable that the 1929 Geneva Convention intended full POW 
protections for internees, the ICRC ceased contesting the position of the Swiss 
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government until the revision of the Geneva Conventions at the end of the war.  An ICRC 
report prepared for the 1947 Conference of Government Experts determined that 
although “military internees and escaped [POWs] in neutral countries should enjoy the 
same treatment as [POWs],” the lack of this protection “did not, on the whole, give rise to 
difficulties during the war.”67  In the case of U.S. internees in Switzerland, the ICRC later 
judged that “only the disciplinary punishments for attempted escape were more severe” 
and that their overall treatment “was by no means less favourable than that laid down by 
the 1929 Conventions.”68  Based on the ICRC inspection reports, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the ICRC received few alarming indicators over conditions in 
Wauwilermoos before the end of the war, although it certainly intervened on behalf of 
many internees over perceived shortcomings in the humanitarian conditions in various 
camps.  It is also likely that the ICRC was more concerned with its mandate to protect 
internees who lacked diplomatic representation in Switzerland, since ostensibly they 
would have been the most apt to suffer abuse. 
Internees like 2
nd
 Lt. James Misuraca who experienced the Swiss legal system 
firsthand eventually returned to the United States and reflected on their treatment while 
interned.  Misuraca was heavily affected by the dichotomy between the conditions of 
regular internment and those in Swiss prisons.  He was first impressed by the generosity 
of the Swiss people in Adelboden and Davos, recalling that “they liked the [American 
internees] and we liked them.”  However, after Misuraca was caught during an escape 
attempt in October 1944, he spent a month incarcerated in Wauwilermoos before he 
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eventually escaped to France.  The experience of mistreatment at Wauwilermoos left him 
highly ambivalent about his six-month stay in Switzerland.  Misuraca harbored deep 
resentment for the Swiss government, which he accused of “riding on [the Allies’] 
shoulders” through their policy of neutrality.  He found it ironic that “instead of fighting 
[the Germans],” the Swiss Army was rigorously guarding interned Allied soldiers who 
might otherwise be helping to liberate Europe.  Misuraca claimed that the Swiss Army 
was comprised of “toy soldiers,” a derogatory term that implied that they had “no 
substance” and were ideologically bankrupt.69     
Technical Sergeant Daniel Culler recounted his experience in Switzerland for 
U.S. officials in England after his repatriation.  He was told by an intelligence officer that 
“everything you say will be placed before the International War Crimes Commission.”  
When Culler disclosed the extent of his mistreatment in Wauwilermoos, the interrogator 
called in a chaplain and accused the former internee of fabricating his story.  Culler was 
then given an audience with an Army colonel, who also accused him of lying.  According 
to the colonel, “there is no such place as Wauwilermoos in Switzerland, and if there was, 
the Swiss would not put any American soldier in there for nothing more than an 
attempted escape.”  The colonel also explained that any press on the accusations could 
disrupt the delicate negotiations over the reparations for the accidental U.S. bombings of 
Switzerland.  Therefore, he ordered Culler to maintain silence about his treatment, and 
destroyed the record of the interrogation.
70
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In fact, Culler’s mistreatment was filed with the War Crimes Commission, but not 
as a result of his own interrogation.  His former pilot, fellow internee 1
st
 Lt. George 
Telford, and another interned sergeant both reported Culler’s mistreatment to U.S. 
authorities in December 1944.  According to Telford, the living conditions at 
Wauwilermoos were unacceptable, as “the beds are just straw with one blanket, in 
addition to which the sanitary conditions are about the most deplorable that I have ever 
seen.”  He recalled that Culler was sentenced to an “indefinite” period in Wauwilermoos, 
and the Swiss Army “wouldn’t give the number of days he was supposed to be there.”  
Telford also relayed adverse treatment by the commandant of Wauwilermoos, who 
reportedly “belittled the American soldiers as a whole, and told them they were not fit to 
wear the uniform.”71 
 The War Crimes Commission opened a file on the complaint, which listed 
“unknown Swiss authorities” who “punished T/Sgt Daniel Culler for his attempt at 
escape by confining him on two separate occasions[,] the last for an indefinite time.”  
However, the officials staffing the War Crimes Commission were uncertain how to 
prosecute allegations against citizens of a neutral country.  According to one officer 
processing the file, the case merited investigation “in view of our friendly relations with 
Switzerland.”  In the officer’s view, the situation “should be corrected at once, because 
we have other men there.”  The official recommended “[taking] up [the] entire matter 
with [the] State Dept.”  However, another reviewing officer disagreed and claimed that 
“Switzerland, not being at war, precludes her involvement in war crimes.  Furthermore, 
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nothing serious is indicated and the Swiss reputation for fair dealing makes the 
anonymous information appear to be distorted.”72  The officer apparently terminated the 
case based on this assessment, in spite of the fact that the accusations were not 
anonymous but rather based on two sworn affidavits.   
The War Crimes Commission also collected multiple accusations of war crimes 
against Captain André Béguin, most as a result of interrogations of returning internees.  
The accusations were filed with the War Crimes Office of Judge Advocate General’s 
Department of the War Department.  The most common allegations against Béguin were 
“imprisonment under improper conditions,” “failure to provide Prisoners of War with 
proper medical care, food or quarters,” “men being confined to jail,” and “solitary 
confinement and [mistreatment] because they attempted to escape.”73  There is no 
evidence that the Commission attempted to exert jurisdiction over these alleged war 
crimes.  As with Culler’s case, it is likely that officials were simply unwilling to attempt 
an indictment against an agent of a friendly nation.  Alternately, it is also possible—
although much less likely—that they knew about the pending charges against Béguin, 
and therefore were willing to let him face prosecution by his own government. 
Daniel Culler returned to America wondering “why Switzerland, the headquarters 
of the International Red Cross, would not allow foreign military prisoners held in Swiss 
prisons to receive Red Cross food packages or to be visited by a Red Cross 
representative.”  He felt that his treatment was inconsistent with Switzerland’s 
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humanitarian ideals, and claimed that if “[Switzerland] was suppose[d] to protect POWs 
and other oppressed people from inhumane treatment,” then “under those same 
international laws, the Swiss should also be held accountable for the treatment of 
prisoners under their own command.”74  Culler was correct that for a time Red Cross 
parcels were withheld from imprisoned internees, a policy that was eventually reversed 
over U.S. protests.  Contrary to his assertion about Red Cross inspections, ICRC officials 
did in fact conduct inspections of conditions at Wauwilermoos.  However, Culler arrived 
in the camp in June 1944, a month after Colonel Rilliet’s first inspection, and departed in 
September 1944, less than a month prior to Rilliet’s re-inspection.75  Therefore, Culler 
never had the opportunity to present his case to the ICRC delegation. 
Although few American airmen in Switzerland likely suffered comparable 
physical and emotional trauma to what Culler experienced, many nevertheless developed 
the same doubts about the Swiss commitment to neutrality and humanitarian principles.  
Like Culler, Staff Sergeant Raymond Baus’s experience in Wauwilermoos also 
undermined his view of the ICRC’s mandate to protect prisoners of war.  Baus found it 
particularly ironic that American internees in Wauwilermoos were in dire need for food 
when the ICRC headquarters were located in the same country.  He claimed that “[we] 
were informed by the Red Cross through the American Legation that we were not 
considered sufficiently in need to warrant food parcels,” a response that he found 
unacceptable.
76
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In 1995, the publication of Daniel Culler’s memoirs prompted a statement from 
Kaspar Villiger, the Swiss Minister of the Federal Military Department and nominal  
President of Switzerland.  Villiger expressed regret that Culler was sentenced to prison 
for an offense that “was not defamatory,” and told him that “from today’s point of view 
the Swiss military court punished you very severely.”  The Swiss President also lauded 
Culler, and claimed that “you and your comrades deserve the gratitude of the Swiss 
people” for helping to defeat fascism in Europe.  This statement reflected a newfound 
willingness of some in Switzerland to reanalyze the history of their government’s actions 
during World War II, including the internment and mistreatment of foreign belligerents.  
However, in delivering his regrets, President Villiger also invoked the same argument 
used to justify the internment policy during the war, informing Culler that “[your] 
sentence reflects the important pressure exercised by other countries on Switzerland… 
The Swiss authorities were afraid that a less severe attitude toward attempts of interned 
military personnel to escape would be interpreted as preferential treatment by the other 
warring party.”77 
In November 1995, Culler was invited to revisit Switzerland by Olivier Grivat, 
editor of the Swiss newspaper 24 Heures and author of a historical survey on Swiss 
internment during World War II.
78
  Culler accepted the invitation, and was featured in a 
television documentary and several newspaper articles as a result of his visit.
79
  He was 
also given a thirty-minute audience with President Villiger, who reiterated his “regrets” 
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about Culler’s treatment during the war.  According to Culler, Villiger “was the most 
pleasant and sincere political person I had ever met.”80  Culler’s visit and his book 
produced ripple effects in both Switzerland and the U.S.  The media coverage in 
Switzerland undoubtedly challenged the Swiss public’s “idealized collective memory” 
about internment during the war.
81
  A Swiss Presidential Committee was also created to 
consider financially compensating Culler for his mistreatment while interned.
82
  Prior to 
the publication of his book, Culler was designated a POW for U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) purposes, a status affording priority medical treatment within the 
VA system.
83
  However, he was not yet considered a POW for military purposes.  In 
1996, Culler wrote to U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Fogleman and sent 
him a copy of his memoirs.  In response, Fogleman personally intervened to ensure that 
Culler received the Prisoner of War Medal, which had only recently been authorized for 
captives of non-enemies held outside of formal armed conflict.  In approving the award, 
the Air Force determined that Culler was held captive by “foreign armed forces hostile to 
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the United States” under circumstances “comparable to those under which persons have 
generally been held captive by enemy armed forces during periods of armed conflict.”84  
                                                 
84
 For Culler’s POW Medal approval, see letter from General Ronald Fogleman to Daniel Culler, dated 
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XI. Conclusion 
 
 The Swiss refusal to afford interned American airmen equivalent rights as POWs 
under the 1929 Geneva Convention was a questionable if not patently violative decision 
under emerging international law at the time.  Ironically, the Swiss followed this policy 
despite their extensive history of neutrality, association with the ICRC, and a position of 
moral authority that seemingly presented compelling incentives to adhere to the full spirit 
of international treaties governing prisoner treatment.  Yet a decision to fully rescind the 
contested internment policy may also have produced consequences that put the Swiss 
government in an untenable position.  The Swiss government faced a choice between 
violating the spirit of the law and tarnishing their neutrality, or following the spirit of the 
law and risking possible reprisals by the German government.   
Swiss and U.S. diplomats clearly operated in a complex web of competing 
interests, all of which were interrelated.  To claim that the Swiss legal policy over 
internment was pursued for its own sake and was divorced from exterior influences 
would be a mischaracterization, just as the U.S. response to this policy was also 
influenced by competing policy objectives.  In the early stages of the war the Swiss 
government faced the prospect of German invasion if it adopted a seemingly over-
benevolent stance toward the Allies, although one could argue that adjustment of Swiss 
internment policies was unlikely to disrupt this balance by 1944.  Political retribution for 
perceived negligence and resulting damages from the Allied Strategic Bombing 
Campaign were almost certainly stronger influences, as the Swiss sought leverage to curb 
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accidental aerial attacks against Swiss targets.  Conversely, U.S. diplomats limited the 
pressure they applied to solve the internment crisis, even near the end of the war when 
Allied victory was considered imminent.  The U.S. diplomats feared using political 
ultimatums to enforce Swiss compliance with international law, being unwilling to risk 
sacrificing Switzerland's value as a communications hub, intelligence center, and 
protecting power for U.S. POWs in Europe. 
Until late 1944, the Swiss chose to interpret the gray area of unenumerated POW 
rights in a manner that justified their recalcitrant internment policies.  In doing so they 
tacitly enabled and condoned the resulting prisoner mistreatment.  Many officials in the 
Swiss government were well aware of the shortcomings of the military justice system, 
which was painfully slow to function, seemingly violated baseline expectations of legal 
due process, and disproportionately sentenced internees who attempted escape to lengthy 
periods in Wauwilermoos.  Swiss politicians and prosecutors cited ambiguity in the 1907 
Hague Convention, domestic legal precedent, and the increasingly hollow threat of Axis 
reprisal to justify their response to escaping military internees.  However, even if Swiss 
officials legitimately believed that these penalties were both legal and necessary to 
strictly enforce the obligations of neutrality, this does not explain why they failed to 
correct repeated abuses at Wauwilermoos that were indefensible under domestic or 
international law.   
FCIH administrators may not have intended to sanction the mistreatment at 
Wauwilermoos, but they nevertheless played a part in enabling the conditions at the 
camp.  By advancing a loose interpretation of international law that minimized internees’ 
rights and granted the interning state a monopoly over their treatment, FCIH officials 
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created within interment policies the maneuver room that was exploited by unscrupulous 
individuals like André Béguin.  Even after Béguin’s background and methods of camp 
administration came to light, the FCIH was content to ignore the accusations over his 
conduct.  Their inaction seemed contrary to the Swiss commitment to humanitarian 
principles, but may also have reflected the same shortages of manpower and qualified 
leadership that allowed Béguin’s original recruitment to the organization. After all, 
Switzerland had a finite pool of professional military officers, and the FCIH did not 
attract many of these individuals to its ranks. 
The response to the treatment of internees was not monolithic; some Swiss 
military officers, ICRC officials, and ordinary citizens recognized that confinement in 
Wauwilermoos disregarded basic humanitarian principles.  They understood that this 
treatment flew in the face of the Swiss mandate to uphold international law and could 
potentially damage Switzerland’s standing as an impartial protecting power.  Others 
simply disagreed with the Swiss government’s posture on neutrality, and by extension the 
internment of Allied belligerents in general.  Therefore, they all contested the Swiss 
government’s inflexible legal interpretation of internee status in a variety of ways, 
ranging from complaints to belligerent actions that violated Swiss neutrality.  These were 
all examples of grassroots cultural contestation over the application of international law 
that countered the legalistic FCIH interpretation and possibly helped to overturn it.   
Swiss military officers like Major W. Huber sought to influence internment 
policies from inside the Swiss Army, apparently out of the belief that officials would 
concur with his assessment of the poor conditions at Wauwilermoos and respond in good 
faith to address his concerns.  Other Swiss officers like 1st Lt. Max Regazzi felt that strict 
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neutrality was akin to surrender in the face of German aggression.  His strong 
identification with an Italian-American airman over many of his dissimilar Swiss 
countrymen was also emblematic of the deep cultural fissures that challenged Swiss 
nationalism.  Unlike Huber, Regazzi had no trust in the Swiss military to address his 
concerns over neutrality; he chose to circumvent procedural redress and instead violated 
standing orders to help American internees escape into France.  His decision resulted in 
grave personal consequences, for although his illegal aid to the internees was an 
unsanctioned action, his status as a mobilized Swiss officer jeopardized both his personal 
neutrality as well as that of his government.  Therefore, Swiss officials predictably 
distanced themselves from Regazzi and punished him severely for his conduct.   
Some non-mobilized Swiss citizens also warned the Swiss Army about the 
consequences of excessive punishment at Wauwilermoos.  Editors like Albert Adler and 
Paul Altheer correctly understood that the effects of FCIH internment policies could 
easily spread beyond the camps and ultimately jeopardize postwar relations.  They sought 
to influence the strategic outcomes of the war rather than foster the Swiss Army’s narrow 
goal of interdicting future escapes.  However, the editors also dutifully shielded their 
complaints from the Swiss public despite their unprecedented access as journalists, and in 
doing so they muted the full impact of their findings.  Their decision to work within the 
FCIH was perhaps motivated by the naïve belief that internment officials would be 
responsive to their concerns.  Alternately, the editors were possibly unwilling to shoulder 
the personal risks posed by more direct methods of addressing the conditions at 
Wauwilermoos, such as publishing muckraking exposés in violation of Swiss censorship 
regulations.  
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After the war, at least one prominent Swiss editor concluded that the censorship 
and political subordination of the Swiss press allowed “certain abuses that actually should 
have been detected.”  In particular, he highlighted “the fraudulent activities of isolated 
officials in the internment system,” which were not immediately revealed by the press 
due to the heavy restrictions on such reporting.  The editor called these cases the “dark 
side” of the wartime press control system, which he believed were lamentable but 
ultimately justified by the political necessity of censorship in a time of war.
1
 
In sharp contrast to the Swiss editors, other pro-Allied Swiss like Alex Mussard 
openly violated Swiss laws to help American internees.  Like Regazzi, Mussard was less 
concerned about the exact implementation of internment policies.  Rather, he affiliated 
strongly with France, and believed that “the freedom of Europe was more important than 
Swiss neutrality.”2  In Mussard’s view, the conformance of Swiss internment policies to 
humanitarian principles made little difference if Swiss neutrality merely forestalled 
occupation by Nazi Germany.  Thus, his resistance was grounded in the larger vision of 
defeating Germany, and he went far beyond simply helping Americans escape from 
internment to accomplish this goal.  As a testament to his convictions, Mussard supplied 
weapons to the French resistance and personally fought against the Germans on at least 
one occasion.  He represented a segment of Swiss society that challenged the very 
foundations of the country’s political order, perhaps the strongest cultural confrontation 
of all.  Therefore, Mussard was anathema to the Swiss government, which sought to 
curtail his influence and eventually forced him into exile.  
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 Alex Mussard, letter to Robert Long, dated April 1, 1996, unpublished manuscript in possession of author. 
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ICRC assembly member Dr. Paul Martin also appealed to the Swiss government 
over the perceived inequity of severely punishing escaping internees as well as other 
shortcomings with the humanitarian conditions in the Swiss camps.  It was certainly the 
ICRC’s purview to contest apparent violations of humanitarian law, but violations within 
Switzerland held a special significance because they undermined the ICRC’s mandate 
that inherently depended on the neutrality of the Swiss government.  ICRC officials could 
not afford the perception of a double standard on prisoner treatment in their own country, 
and this perhaps gave them an additional incentive to ameliorate domestic conditions of 
internment.   
In spite of the ICRC’s intentions, its dependence on Swiss neutrality probably 
undermined its ability to inspect and improve conditions of internment within 
Switzerland.  The assumption that Switzerland would never tolerate adverse conditions of 
confinement apparently contributed to the ICRC’s decision not to inspect Swiss 
internment camps until 1944.  Concessions to the Swiss government also jeopardized the 
ICRC’s core values of neutrality and political independence, and possibly interfered with 
the ICRC’s inspection of internment camps as well as the debate over the legal rights of 
internees.  In fairness, ICRC President Max Huber probably realized that a refusal to 
compromise with FCIH officials on such issues as censorship of inspection reports might 
have resulted in the denial of any ICRC access to internees and escaped POWs.  
Therefore, consenting to some Swiss Army oversight and censorship was perhaps the 
only way that the ICRC addressed any of its concerns over internment.  The only truly 
impartial inspection system would have required inspections by a neutral protecting 
power operating from outside of Switzerland, perhaps Sweden, but the approval of such a 
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system seems improbable under the political realities of the period.  After all, if the Swiss 
Army only permitted ICRC camp inspections after the concession of censoring the ICRC 
reports, it is unlikely that they would have favorably considered the admission of foreign 
inspectors who would be immune to such oversight. 
Despite the failure of the ICRC to obtain a Swiss consensus over internee rights 
during the war, this stalemate was not the end of the debate.  The ICRC’s support for 
greater internee rights eventually resulted in codification of explicit treaty protections in 
the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.  Thus, the 
lack of customary protections during the war led the ICRC to modify the rules of 
internment in order to prevent a recurrence of the same contradictory practices in future 
conflicts.  The ICRC certainly deserves credit for this initiative, although some questions 
about ICRC conduct during the war still remain unanswered.  For example, why did the 
ICRC not reveal its problems with neutrality and impartiality vis-à-vis the Swiss 
government after the war’s conclusion?   These concerns are entirely absent from the 
ICRC’s own history of its wartime service, which left this defective framework intact for 
future generations.  Although it is doubtful that the same scenario of ICRC inspections 
within Switzerland will ever reoccur, the underlying question is still relevant to modern 
armed conflict: when a fundamental conflict of interest exists, who inspects the 
inspector?  
Despite the resistance of the ICRC, Swiss civilians, and some government 
officials, the policy on escaping internees was only moderated after the long-term 
political ramifications became evident as a result of protests by the U.S. and British 
legations.  Unlike their reaction to the internal complaints, Swiss officials could not 
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afford to ignore the possibility of reprisal from foreign governments who would almost 
certainly hold a dominant position in the postwar international order.   However, they 
compromised in a symptomatic manner that ameliorated internment conditions for the 
imprisoned Americans and British but ceded no ground in the larger debate over the 
negotiation of international law.  The FCIH’s decision may have been motivated by a 
desire to lessen the burden of implementing the policy shift, since limiting the 
compromise to American and British internees meant that it only applied to a small 
minority of the interned population.  
As a result of the compromise, most American internees were quickly paroled 
from Wauwilermoos, but the camp continued to operate under the same commander until 
he was prosecuted after the war ended.  Thus, internees of other nationalities who 
apparently committed identical offenses as the Americans continued to be punished 
excessively without redress well after the American internees were transferred and 
repatriated.  The difference can perhaps be explained in part by the relative strength of 
diplomacy among the various interned nationalities.  Although the U.S. Legation 
certainly had poor command and control of its internees in the country, it nevertheless 
exerted strong leverage over Switzerland when it came to the treatment of American 
personnel.  The ability to exert this influence was a product of the U.S. government’s 
powerful political and military stance near the end of the war, conditions that were 
noticeably absent for internees of Axis countries or those who lacked functioning 
governments at all. 
The compromise over the treatment of interned Americans seemingly averted any 
significant postwar fallout between the U.S. and Switzerland.  Edward Cunningham’s 
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August 1945 article in Yank: The Army Weekly was perhaps the only exception. 
Cunningham claimed that the domestic conditions of internment in Switzerland were at 
odds with the Swiss duty to oversee humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war.
3
  The 
author’s views may not have reflected those of all Americans interned in Switzerland; 
however, it is fair to say that Cunningham’s sentiments echoed those of many of his 
comrades in Swiss prison camps.  Thus, although the strict enforcement of Swiss 
internment policies apparently did not significantly affect Switzerland’s humanitarian 
reputation in the eyes of the international community, it did alter the perceptions of many 
individuals who experienced the policies firsthand.  Those Americans who experienced 
both the benevolence of the mountain resort towns and the cruelty of the prison camps 
harbored ambivalent memories of their experiences; they felt indebted to many Swiss, 
while at the same time aggrieved at their treatment by others. 
The Swiss reaction to Cunningham’s article reveals that some Swiss were also 
ambivalent about the administration of internment policies. While one Swiss author 
openly accused Cunningham of mischaracterizing and fabricating evidence, another 
acknowledged that the need to preserve neutrality did not justify inhumane treatment or 
shaping policies to appease the Axis powers.  The two responses roughly correspond to 
the contemporary divide between Swiss popular memory of the war and more recent 
historiography, in that Switzerland still grapples with the notion that the legacy of its 
wartime actions were not beyond reproach.  Swiss internment policies during World War 
II are not nearly as controversial as other issues such as racialized refugee policies and 
the retention of looted Nazi gold, but internment nevertheless was and still is part of 
                                                 
3
 Cunningham, “The Swiss Stake.” 
      305 
Switzerland’s nationalist narrative of the war.  As such, authors have cited Swiss 
internment both as an example of a laudable humanitarian tradition as well as a case 
where asylum went awry.
4
  Perhaps the reality is that both of these characterizations were 
true, in that many military refugees benefited from internment when the alternative was 
imprisonment in the hands of an enemy, while simultaneously other internees were 
treated in ways that contradicted Switzerland’s self-acclaimed role as a guardian of 
humanitarian law.         
 The problems, politics, and consequences of Switzerland's internment policy 
remain relevant to contemporary armed conflict, even though the protecting power 
system is virtually defunct and internees of neutral countries are now explicitly 
guaranteed rights as POWs in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
5
  Despite the changing face 
of warfare, in which combatants often lack clear labels such as “belligerent” or 
“internee,” or even clear mandates as combatants, the exploitation of gray areas in 
international law to deny prisoner rights still produces similar consequences today.  The 
increasing frequency of conflict involving non-state actors has promoted a reliance on 
customary international law over treaty law governing actions in war, since most treaty 
law only covers conventional conflict between recognized states.  Despite ICRC efforts 
to enumerate standards of state practice in an attempt to define customary international 
law over intra-state or non-international conflict, proving and enforcing customary law 
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remains extremely difficult.
6
  The lack of enumeration of humanitarian law for this type 
of emerging armed conflict makes it much more prone to subjective interpretation, 
particularly since state practice is inherently a fluid and evolving standard.  As a result, 
the same type of disagreement and negotiation over emerging international law that 
occurred in Switzerland during World War II is all the more likely to resurface during 
contemporary conflicts.  When this occurs, compliance with the spirit rather than the 
letter of humanitarian law may also be assisted by multiple factors beyond the diplomacy 
between nations.  As in Switzerland, individuals who administer and observe policies will 
undoubtedly play a role in the enforcement of emerging customary law at the grassroots 
level. 
After the attacks of  September 11, 2001, the U.S. government chose to deny 
Geneva Conventions protections for detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, 
claiming that terrorists did not fall under the treaties.  In doing so, as a minimum, it 
created "maneuver room" that allowed for the subsequent prisoner abuse perpetrated by 
the military and the Central Intelligence Agency, and failed to internally police itself in 
the absence of impartial observers.
7
  Although the modern U.S. military is quite 
discernible from the Swiss Army’s FCIH during World War II, they both faced 
manpower shortages that resulted in detention operations supervised by personnel with 
                                                 
6
 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, “Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict,” International Review of the Red Cross 
87, no. 857 (March 2005): 179. 
7
 This policy was eventually reversed in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al. (2006), 69.  The 
Supreme Court determined that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applied to 
nonsignatories to the Conventions, thus requiring the defendant- an al Qaeda affiliate- to be tried by a 
“regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.”  
      307 
questionable training or professionalism.  The similarity of both outcomes demonstrates 
that the infinite possibilities of combat continue to produce legal loopholes, and states 
continue to exploit them into the present. 
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APPENDIX: PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
 
 
An interned American aircrew immediately after they landed their damaged B-17 in Switzerland in April 
1944.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box E5792, Photo #18643, Dossier 0625. 
 
 
 
The recovery of B-17 # 42-102446 Little Chub from Lake Greifensee, Switzerland.  Little Chub was shot 
down by Swiss fighters on April 24, 1944, killing six crewmembers.  The U.S. State Department lodged 
official protests over the incident.  Source: Swiss Internees Association Archives. 
      309 
 
 
 
Swiss soldiers moving a damaged B-17 bomber.  The aircraft landed in Geneva in April 1944 and was 
interned.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box E5792, Photos #18641, 18645, Dossier 0625. 
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B-17 # 42-97515, which crashed at Dübendorf Airfield near Zurich in March 1944.  The landing was made 
without power as evidenced by the feathered propellers.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box E27, 
1000/721, Vol. 14609. 
 
 
 
The wreckage of B-24 # 42-100112, which crashed in Dietschwil, Switzerland in March 1944.  Source: 
Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box E27, 1000/721, Vol. 14608. 
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The recovery of B-17F # 42-30057 Raunchy, ditched by 1
st
 Lt. Sam R. Turner in Lake Constance, 
Switzerland, on 6 September 1943.  Three engines on the airplane were shot out and the ball turret gunner 
was killed while bombing Stuttgart.  Photo courtesy of 100th Bomb Group Foundation www.100thbg.com. 
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Leland Harrison, Minister of the U.S. Legation in Bern, Switzerland.  Harrison negotiated the exchange of 
interned Americans and also protested the mistreatment of Americans in Wauwilermoos.  Source: Library 
of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, call number LC-DIG-npcc-05751 [P&P]. 
 
 
 
Brigadier General Barnwell R. Legge, the military attaché at the U.S. Legation in Bern, Switzerland.   As 
the administrative commander of the American internees in the country, he oversaw escape efforts and 
protested mistreatment of Americans sent to Wauwilermoos.  Source: The Citadel Archives and Museum, 
Charleston, South Carolina. 
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Swiss General Henri Guisan and Military Dept. Minister Karl Kobelt in 1941.  Guisan pressured the ICRC 
into allowing censorship of inspection reports of Swiss internment camps, and Kobelt led the Swiss rebuttal 
to U.S. complaints about insufficient legal protections for internees.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at 
Bern, Box E5792, Photo #22077, Dossier 0832. 
 
 
 
Swiss Army Major General Ruggero Dollfus, the Adjutant General of the Swiss Army during World War II 
and the Commissioner of the Federal Commissariat for Internment and Hospitalization from 1943-1944.  
Dollfus fielded numerous complaints over conditions in Wauwilermoos, and in November 1944 he 
brokered a compromise to release U.S. internees from the camp and simultaneously resigned his post as 
commissioner.  Source: Graphische Sammlung, Schweizerische Nationalbibliothek Bern. 
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Allen Dulles (right) receives the Medal for Merit from Assistant Secretary of War Howard Petersen for 
heading the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland.  While in this role, Dulles reported that 
Allied bombings of Switzerland undermined U.S. intelligence collection.  Source: U.S. National Archives 
and Records Administration, Photo #111-SC-259837. 
 
 
 
Sam E. Woods, the U.S. Consul General in Zurich, Switzerland during World War II.  Woods took many 
risks assisting hundreds of U.S. internees to escape into France, and also passed critical intelligence from 
German sources to President Roosevelt.  Photo courtesy of Katie McClendon. 
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Swiss Army 1st Lt. Max Regazzi.  Regazzi was sentenced by a Swiss military tribunal to 150 days 
imprisonment and five years probation for assisting American internees to escape from their camp at 
Davos.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Tribunal Militaire #44-6669, Box E 5330-01, 1975/95. 
 
 
 
Swiss citizen Alex Mussard (left) with a member of the French Resistance.  Alex fought against the 
Germans in France and also helped several American internees escape from Switzerland.  He was arrested 
while helping American internee 1
st
 Lt. Ferris Martin cross the French border in September 1944.  Mussard 
was imprisoned and later exiled from Switzerland.  Source: Swiss Internees Association. 
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1
st
 Lt. Ferris Martin, an American internee.  Martin was caught crossing the French border with Alex 
Mussard in September 1944.  He was incarcerated at Wauwilermoos, where he contracted tuberculosis.  
Photo courtesy of Ferris Martin. 
 
 
 
2
nd
 Lt. Floyd “Mac” MacSpadden, an American internee.  The U.S. Legation designated MacSpadden as a 
liaison to several film distributors in Switzerland, a cover that allowed him to travel without restrictions and 
assist internees to escape into France.  Photo courtesy of Chris MacSpadden. 
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Forged rail passes for two escaping American internees, Lt. John McFarland (alias Hans Brunner), and Lt. 
William Howell (alias Josef Baumann).  The Americans were intercepted and incarcerated in 
Wauwilermoos, and five Swiss citizens were also imprisoned for helping them.  Source: Swiss Federal 
Archives at Bern, Tribunal Militaire #44-6085, Box E 5330-01, 1975/95. 
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USAAF Technical Sergeant Daniel Culler, during gunnery training in 1942 and receiving an Air Medal in 
1944.  Culler was interned in Switzerland in March 1944, and was incarcerated in Wauwilermoos after he 
attempted to escape.  He later received a statement of regret from the Swiss President, and was designated a 
prisoner of war by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and the U.S. Air Force. Photos courtesy of 
Daniel Culler. 
 
 
 
USAAF 1
st
 Lt. George D. Telford, an American internee.  Telford was shot by a Swiss border guard while 
escaping from Switzerland in September 1944.  He later submitted complaints of war crimes at 
Wauwilermoos to the War Crimes Office of the War Department.  The complaints were not investigated or 
prosecuted, apparently due to lack of jurisdiction.  Photo courtesy of Frank Coune. 
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USAAF 1
st
 Lt. Wallace O. Northfelt, a B-24 navigator who was shot down and interned in Switzerland in 
March 1944.  Northfelt tried to escape in September 1944, but was caught and imprisoned in 
Wauwilermoos.  After he returned to Allied control, Northfelt submitted complaints of war crimes at 
Wauwilermoos to the War Crimes Office of the War Department.  Photo from author’s collection. 
 
 
 
 
Swiss guard outside of Wauwilermoos.  Source: Swiss Internees Association Archives, Lakewood, NJ. 
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Swiss Army Captain Andre Béguin, commander of Wauwilermoos.  After the war, Béguin was tried and 
imprisoned in connection with his administration of the camp.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, 
Box E5791, 1000/949, Vol. 687. 
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Barracks at Wauwilermoos.  The photographs were taken during an investigation into the shooting of a 
prisoner.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box E5330, 1975/95, Vol. 1945/2918I. 
 
 
 
An American internee at Wauwilermoos.  Source: Swiss Internees Association Archives, Lakewood, NJ. 
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Barracks at Wauwilermoos.  The photographs were taken during an investigation into the shooting of a 
prisoner.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box E5330, Versement 1975/95, Vol. 1945/2918I. 
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Barracks at Wauwilermoos.  The photographs were taken during an investigation into the shooting of a 
prisoner.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box E5330, Versement 1975/95, Vol. 1945/2918I. 
 
 
 
      324 
 
 
Sketch of Wauwilermoos drawn by American internee.  Source: Swiss Internees Association Archives, 
Lakewood, NJ. 
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Swiss Army Major Florian Imer, the Chief of Internment Legal Services for the Federal Commissariat for 
Internment and Hospitalization from 1941-1945.  Imer inspected Wauwilermoos and reported that the 
conditions and leadership were both excellent, even after the ICRC reported serious concerns about the 
camp.  Photo courtesy of Memoriav and Museum of Art and History, La Neuveville, Switzerland. 
 
 
 
Swiss Army Colonel M. Auguste Rilliet, former commander of the Second Infantry Brigade in Geneva and 
chief ICRC delegate to Switzerland for internment issues.  Rilliet inspected conditions in Wauwilermoos at 
least four times, but only reported unsatisfactory camp conditions after official protests were lodged by the 
United States and several other foreign powers.  Source: Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 309 
(September 1944). 
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Dr. Paul E. Martin, ICRC Assembly member and Professor of History at the University of Geneva.  Martin 
asked the Swiss Army to apply the prisoner of war protections in the 1929 Geneva Conventions to interned 
soldiers, but the request was denied.  Source: Photothèque CICR, call number V-P-PER-E-00207A. 
 
 
 
Dr. Max Huber, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross.  Huber brokered an agreement 
with the Swiss Army to allow ICRC inspectors to access Swiss internment camps in exchange for prior 
review and censorship of inspection reports.  His house was also destroyed by a USAAF bomber.  Source: 
Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, call number LC-B2- 6265-9[P&P]. 
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The city of Schaffhausen burning after the accidental U.S. raid on April 1, 1944.  Source: Swiss Federal 
Archives at Bern, Box E27, Vol. 14354, Bd. 3-4. 
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Bombing damage in Schaffhausen after the accidental U.S. raid on April 1, 1944.  Source: Swiss Federal 
Archives at Bern, Box E5792, Photo #26642, Dossier 1047. 
 
 
 
Bombing damage in Schaffhausen after the accidental U.S. raid on April 1, 1944.  Source: Swiss Federal 
Archives at Bern, Box E5792, Photo #08420, Dossier 0237. 
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Swiss soldiers extract an Allied bomb from an urban area.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box 
E27, Vol. 14354, bd. 1. 
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Swiss soldiers extract an Allied bomb from an urban area.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box 
E27, Vol. 14354, bd. 1. 
 
 
 
ICRC President Max Huber’s house in Ossingen, Switzerland, before and after it was hit by an abandoned 
B-24 Liberator bomber in July 1944.  Professor Huber submitted a claim to the U.S. Government for 
769,040 Swiss Francs. Source: U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, RG 59, 
Department of State Central Decimal File 1945-1949, 811.2354, Box 4693. 
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A Swiss Messerschmitt fighter damaged in combat in 1940, presumably in a dogfight with German aircraft 
during the fall of France.  Source: Swiss Federal Archives at Bern, Box E5792, Photos #01263, 01284, 
Dossier 0035. 
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